Laws: Book IX
Book IX
Next to all the matters which have preceded in the natural order of
legislation will come suits of law. Of suits those which relate to
agriculture have been already described, but the more important have not
been described. Having mentioned them severally under their usual names,
we will proceed to say what punishments are to be inflicted for each
offence, and who are to be the judges of them.
CLEINIAS: Very good.
ATHENIAN: There is a sense of disgrace in legislating, as we are about to
do, for all the details of crime in a state which, as we say, is to be
well regulated and will be perfectly adapted to the practice of virtue. To
assume that in such a state there will arise some one who will be guilty
of crimes as heinous as any which are ever perpetrated in other states,
and that we must legislate for him by anticipation, and threaten and make
laws against him if he should arise, in order to deter him, and punish his
acts, under the idea that he will arise--this, as I was saying, is in a
manner disgraceful. Yet seeing that we are not like the ancient
legislators, who gave laws to heroes and sons of gods, being, according to
the popular belief, themselves the offspring of the gods, and legislating
for others, who were also the children of divine parents, but that we are
only men who are legislating for the sons of men, there is no
uncharitableness in apprehending that some one of our citizens may be like
a seed which has touched the ox's horn, having a heart so hard that it
cannot be softened any more than those seeds can be softened by fire.
Among our citizens there may be those who cannot be subdued by all the
strength of the laws; and for their sake, though an ungracious task, I
will proclaim my first law about the robbing of temples, in case any one
should dare to commit such a crime. I do not expect or imagine that any
well-brought-up citizen will ever take the infection, but their servants,
and strangers, and strangers' servants may be guilty of many impieties.
And with a view to them especially, and yet not without a provident eye to
the weakness of human nature generally, I will proclaim the law about
robbers of temples and similar incurable, or almost incurable, criminals.
Having already agreed that such enactments ought always to have a short
prelude, we may speak to the criminal, whom some tormenting desire by
night and by day tempts to go and rob a temple, the fewest possible words
of admonition and exhortation: O sir, we will say to him, the impulse
which moves you to rob temples is not an ordinary human malady, nor yet a
visitation of heaven, but a madness which is begotten in a man from
ancient and unexpiated crimes of his race, an ever-recurring curse--
against this you must guard with all your might, and how you are to guard
we will explain to you. When any such thought comes into your mind, go and
perform expiations, go as a suppliant to the temples of the Gods who avert
evils, go to the society of those who are called good men among you; hear
them tell and yourself try to repeat after them, that every man should
honour the noble and the just. Fly from the company of the wicked--fly and
turn not back; and if your disorder is lightened by these remedies, well
and good, but if not, then acknowledge death to be nobler than life, and
depart hence.
Such are the preludes which we sing to all who have thoughts of unholy and
treasonable actions, and to him who hearkens to them the law has nothing
to say. But to him who is disobedient when the prelude is over, cry with a
loud voice--He who is taken in the act of robbing temples, if he be a
slave or stranger, shall have his evil deed engraven on his face and
hands, and shall be beaten with as many stripes as may seem good to the
judges, and be cast naked beyond the borders of the land. And if he
suffers this punishment he will probably return to his right mind and be
improved; for no penalty which the law inflicts is designed for evil, but
always makes him who suffers either better or not so much worse as he
would have been. But if any citizen be found guilty of any great or
unmentionable wrong, either in relation to the Gods, or his parents, or
the state, let the judge deem him to be incurable, remembering that after
receiving such an excellent education and training from youth upward, he
has not abstained from the greatest of crimes. His punishment shall be
death, which to him will be the least of evils; and his example will
benefit others, if he perish ingloriously, and be cast beyond the borders
of the land. But let his children and family, if they avoid the ways of
their father, have glory, and let honourable mention be made of them, as
having nobly and manfully escaped out of evil into good. None of them
should have their goods confiscated to the state, for the lots of the
citizens ought always to continue the same and equal.
Touching the exaction of penalties, when a man appears to have done
anything which deserves a fine, he shall pay the fine, if he have anything
in excess of the lot which is assigned to him; but more than that he shall
not pay. And to secure exactness, let the guardians of the law refer to
the registers, and inform the judges of the precise truth, in order that
none of the lots may go uncultivated for want of money. But if any one
seems to deserve a greater penalty, let him undergo a long and public
imprisonment and be dishonoured, unless some of his friends are willing to
be surety for him, and liberate him by assisting him to pay the fine. No
criminal shall go unpunished, not even for a single offence, nor if he
have fled the country; but let the penalty be according to his deserts--
death, or bonds, or blows, or degrading places of sitting or standing, or
removal to some temple on the borders of the land; or let him pay fines,
as we said before. In cases of death, let the judges be the guardians of
the law, and a court selected by merit from the last year's magistrates.
But how the causes are to be brought into court, how the summonses are to
be served, and the like, these things may be left to the younger
generation of legislators to determine; the manner of voting we must
determine ourselves.
Let the vote be given openly; but before they come to the vote let the
judges sit in order of seniority over against plaintiff and defendant, and
let all the citizens who can spare time hear and take a serious interest
in listening to such causes. First of all the plaintiff shall make one
speech, and then the defendant shall make another; and after the speeches
have been made the eldest judge shall begin to examine the parties, and
proceed to make an adequate enquiry into what has been said; and after the
oldest has spoken, the rest shall proceed in order to examine either party
as to what he finds defective in the evidence, whether of statement or
omission; and he who has nothing to ask shall hand over the examination to
another. And on so much of what has been said as is to the purpose all the
judges shall set their seals, and place the writings on the altar of
Hestia. On the next day they shall meet again, and in like manner put
their questions and go through the cause, and again set their seals upon
the evidence; and when they have three times done this, and have had
witnesses and evidence enough, they shall each of them give a holy vote,
after promising by Hestia that they will decide justly and truly to the
utmost of their power; and so they shall put an end to the suit.
Next, after what relates to the Gods, follows what relates to the
dissolution of the state: Whoever by permitting a man to power enslaves
the laws, and subjects the city to factions, using violence and stirring
up sedition contrary to law, him we will deem the greatest enemy of the
whole state. But he who takes no part in such proceedings, and, being one
of the chief magistrates of the state, has no knowledge of treason, or,
having knowledge of it, by reason of cowardice does not interfere on
behalf of his country, such an one we must consider nearly as bad. Every
man who is worth anything will inform the magistrates, and bring the
conspirator to trial for making a violent and illegal attempt to change
the government. The judges of such cases shall be the same as of the
robbers of temples; and let the whole proceeding be carried on in the same
way, and the vote of the majority condemn to death. But let there be a
general rule, that the disgrace and punishment of the father is not to be
visited on the children, except in the case of some one whose father,
grandfather, and great-grandfather have successively undergone the penalty
of death. Such persons the city shall send away with all their possessions
to the city and country of their ancestors, retaining only and wholly
their appointed lot. And out of the citizens who have more than one son of
not less than ten years of age, they shall select ten whom their father or
grandfather by the mother's or father's side shall appoint, and let them
send to Delphi the names of those who are selected, and him whom the God
chooses they shall establish as heir of the house which has failed; and
may he have better fortune than his predecessors!
CLEINIAS: Very good.
ATHENIAN: Once more let there be a third general law respecting the judges
who are to give judgment, and the manner of conducting suits against those
who are tried on an accusation of treason; and as concerning the remaining
or departure of their descendants--there shall be one law for all three,
for the traitor, and the robber of temples, and the subverter by violence
of the laws of the state. For a thief, whether he steal much or little,
let there be one law, and one punishment for all alike: in the first
place, let him pay double the amount of the theft if he be convicted, and
if he have so much over and above the allotment--if he have not, he shall
be bound until he pay the penalty, or persuade him who has obtained the
sentence against him to forgive him. But if a person be convicted of a
theft against the state, then if he can persuade the city, or if he will
pay back twice the amount of the theft, he shall be set free from his
bonds.
CLEINIAS: What makes you say, Stranger, that a theft is all one, whether
the thief may have taken much or little, and either from sacred or secular
places--and these are not the only differences in thefts--seeing, then,
that they are of many kinds, ought not the legislator to adapt himself to
them, and impose upon them entirely different penalties?
ATHENIAN: Excellent. I was running on too fast, Cleinias, and you impinged
upon me, and brought me to my senses, reminding me of what, indeed, had
occurred to my mind already, that legislation was never yet rightly worked
out, as I may say in passing. Do you remember the image in which I likened
the men for whom laws are now made to slaves who are doctored by slaves?
For of this you may be very sure, that if one of those empirical
physicians, who practise medicine without science, were to come upon the
gentleman physician talking to his gentleman patient, and using the
language almost of philosophy, beginning at the beginning of the disease
and discoursing about the whole nature of the body, he would burst into a
hearty laugh--he would say what most of those who are called doctors
always have at their tongue's end: Foolish fellow, he would say, you are
not healing the sick man, but you are educating him; and he does not want
to be made a doctor, but to get well.
CLEINIAS: And would he not be right?
ATHENIAN: Perhaps he would; and he might remark upon us, that he who
discourses about laws, as we are now doing, is giving the citizens
education and not laws; that would be rather a telling observation.
CLEINIAS: Very true.
ATHENIAN: But we are fortunate.
CLEINIAS: In what way?
ATHENIAN: Inasmuch as we are not compelled to give laws, but we may take
into consideration every form of government, and ascertain what is best
and what is most needful, and how they may both be carried into execution;
and we may also, if we please, at this very moment choose what is best,
or, if we prefer, what is most necessary--which shall we do?
CLEINIAS: There is something ridiculous, Stranger, in our proposing such
an alternative, as if we were legislators, simply bound under some great
necessity which cannot be deferred to the morrow. But we, as I may by the
grace of Heaven affirm, like gatherers of stones or beginners of some
composite work, may gather a heap of materials, and out of this, at our
leisure, select what is suitable for our projected construction. Let us
then suppose ourselves to be at leisure, not of necessity building, but
rather like men who are partly providing materials, and partly putting
them together. And we may truly say that some of our laws, like stones,
are already fixed in their places, and others lie at hand.
ATHENIAN: Certainly, in that case, Cleinias, our view of law will be more
in accordance with nature. For there is another matter affecting
legislators, which I must earnestly entreat you to consider.
CLEINIAS: What is it?
ATHENIAN: There are many writings to be found in cities, and among them
there are discourses composed by legislators as well as by other persons.
CLEINIAS: To be sure.
ATHENIAN: Shall we give heed rather to the writings of those others--poets
and the like, who either in metre or out of metre have recorded their
advice about the conduct of life, and not to the writings of legislators?
or shall we give heed to them above all?
CLEINIAS: Yes; to them far above all others.
ATHENIAN: And ought the legislator alone among writers to withhold his
opinion about the beautiful, the good, and the just, and not to teach what
they are, and how they are to be pursued by those who intend to be happy?
CLEINIAS: Certainly not.
ATHENIAN: And is it disgraceful for Homer and Tyrtaeus and other poets to
lay down evil precepts in their writings respecting life and the pursuits
of men, but not so disgraceful for Lycurgus and Solon and others who were
legislators as well as writers? Is it not true that of all the writings to
be found in cities, those which relate to laws, when you unfold and read
them, ought to be by far the noblest and the best? and should not other
writings either agree with them, or if they disagree, be deemed
ridiculous? We should consider whether the laws of states ought not to
have the character of loving and wise parents, rather than of tyrants and
masters, who command and threaten, and, after writing their decrees on
walls, go their ways; and whether, in discoursing of laws, we should not
take the gentler view of them which may or may not be attainable--at any
rate, we will show our readiness to entertain such a view, and be prepared
to undergo whatever may be the result. And may the result be good, and if
God be gracious, it will be good!
CLEINIAS: Excellent; let us do as you say.
ATHENIAN: Then we will now consider accurately, as we proposed, what
relates to robbers of temples, and all kinds of thefts, and offences in
general; and we must not be annoyed if, in the course of legislation, we
have enacted some things, and have not made up our minds about some
others; for as yet we are not legislators, but we may soon be. Let us, if
you please, consider these matters.
CLEINIAS: By all means.
ATHENIAN: Concerning all things honourable and just, let us then endeavour
to ascertain how far we are consistent with ourselves, and how far we are
inconsistent, and how far the many, from whom at any rate we should
profess a desire to differ, agree and disagree among themselves.
CLEINIAS: What are the inconsistencies which you observe in us?
ATHENIAN: I will endeavour to explain. If I am not mistaken, we are all
agreed that justice, and just men and things and actions, are all fair,
and, if a person were to maintain that just men, even when they are
deformed in body, are still perfectly beautiful in respect of the
excellent justice of their minds, no one would say that there was any
inconsistency in this.
CLEINIAS: They would be quite right.
ATHENIAN: Perhaps; but let us consider further, that if all things which
are just are fair and honourable, in the term 'all' we must include just
sufferings which are the correlatives of just actions.
CLEINIAS: And what is the inference?
ATHENIAN: The inference is, that a just action in partaking of the just
partakes also in the same degree of the fair and honourable.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: And must not a suffering which partakes of the just principle be
admitted to be in the same degree fair and honourable, if the argument is
consistently carried out?
CLEINIAS: True.
ATHENIAN: But then if we admit suffering to be just and yet dishonourable,
and the term 'dishonourable' is applied to justice, will not the just and
the honourable disagree?
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
ATHENIAN: A thing not difficult to understand; the laws which have been
already enacted would seem to announce principles directly opposed to what
we are saying.
CLEINIAS: To what?
ATHENIAN: We had enacted, if I am not mistaken, that the robber of
temples, and he who was the enemy of law and order, might justly be put to
death, and we were proceeding to make divers other enactments of a similar
nature. But we stopped short, because we saw that these sufferings are
infinite in number and degree, and that they are, at once, the most just
and also the most dishonourable of all sufferings. And if this be true,
are not the just and the honourable at one time all the same, and at
another time in the most diametrical opposition?
CLEINIAS: Such appears to be the case.
ATHENIAN: In this discordant and inconsistent fashion does the language of
the many rend asunder the honourable and just.
CLEINIAS: Very true, Stranger.
ATHENIAN: Then now, Cleinias, let us see how far we ourselves are
consistent about these matters.
CLEINIAS: Consistent in what?
ATHENIAN: I think that I have clearly stated in the former part of the
discussion, but if I did not, let me now state--
CLEINIAS: What?
ATHENIAN: That all bad men are always involuntarily bad; and from this I
must proceed to draw a further inference.
CLEINIAS: What is it?
ATHENIAN: That the unjust man may be bad, but that he is bad against his
will. Now that an action which is voluntary should be done involuntarily
is a contradiction; wherefore he who maintains that injustice is
involuntary will deem that the unjust does injustice involuntarily. I too
admit that all men do injustice involuntarily, and if any contentious or
disputatious person says that men are unjust against their will, and yet
that many do injustice willingly, I do not agree with him. But, then, how
can I avoid being inconsistent with myself, if you, Cleinias, and you,
Megillus, say to me--Well, Stranger, if all this be as you say, how about
legislating for the city of the Magnetes--shall we legislate or not--what
do you advise? Certainly we will, I should reply. Then will you determine
for them what are voluntary and what are involuntary crimes, and shall we
make the punishments greater of voluntary errors and crimes and less for
the involuntary? or shall we make the punishment of all to be alike, under
the idea that there is no such thing as voluntary crime?
CLEINIAS: Very good, Stranger; and what shall we say in answer to these
objections?
ATHENIAN: That is a very fair question. In the first place, let us--
CLEINIAS: Do what?
ATHENIAN: Let us remember what has been well said by us already, that our
ideas of justice are in the highest degree confused and contradictory.
Bearing this in mind, let us proceed to ask ourselves once more whether we
have discovered a way out of the difficulty. Have we ever determined in
what respect these two classes of actions differ from one another? For in
all states and by all legislators whatsoever, two kinds of actions have
been distinguished--the one, voluntary, the other, involuntary; and they
have legislated about them accordingly. But shall this new word of ours,
like an oracle of God, be only spoken, and get away without giving any
explanation or verification of itself? How can a word not understood be
the basis of legislation? Impossible. Before proceeding to legislate,
then, we must prove that they are two, and what is the difference between
them, that when we impose the penalty upon either, every one may
understand our proposal, and be able in some way to judge whether the
penalty is fitly or unfitly inflicted.
CLEINIAS: I agree with you, Stranger; for one of two things is certain:
either we must not say that all unjust acts are involuntary, or we must
show the meaning and truth of this statement.
ATHENIAN: Of these two alternatives, the one is quite intolerable--not to
speak what I believe to be the truth would be to me unlawful and unholy.
But if acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary and involuntary,
I must endeavour to find some other distinction between them.
CLEINIAS: Very true, Stranger; there cannot be two opinions among us upon
that point.
ATHENIAN: Reflect, then; there are hurts of various kinds done by the
citizens to one another in the intercourse of life, affording plentiful
examples both of the voluntary and involuntary.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: I would not have any one suppose that all these hurts are
injuries, and that these injuries are of two kinds--one, voluntary, and
the other, involuntary; for the involuntary hurts of all men are quite as
many and as great as the voluntary. And please to consider whether I am
right or quite wrong in what I am going to say; for I deny, Cleinias and
Megillus, that he who harms another involuntarily does him an injury
involuntarily, nor should I legislate about such an act under the idea
that I am legislating for an involuntary injury. But I should rather say
that such a hurt, whether great or small, is not an injury at all; and, on
the other hand, if I am right, when a benefit is wrongly conferred, the
author of the benefit may often be said to injure. For I maintain, O my
friends, that the mere giving or taking away of anything is not to be
described either as just or unjust; but the legislator has to consider
whether mankind do good or harm to one another out of a just principle and
intention. On the distinction between injustice and hurt he must fix his
eye; and when there is hurt, he must, as far as he can, make the hurt good
by law, and save that which is ruined, and raise up that which is fallen,
and make that which is dead or wounded whole. And when compensation has
been given for injustice, the law must always seek to win over the doers
and sufferers of the several hurts from feelings of enmity to those of
friendship.
CLEINIAS: Very good.
ATHENIAN: Then as to unjust hurts (and gains also, supposing the injustice
to bring gain), of these we may heal as many as are capable of being
healed, regarding them as diseases of the soul; and the cure of injustice
will take the following direction.
CLEINIAS: What direction?
ATHENIAN: When any one commits any injustice, small or great, the law will
admonish and compel him either never at all to do the like again, or never
voluntarily, or at any rate in a far less degree; and he must in addition
pay for the hurt. Whether the end is to be attained by word or action,
with pleasure or pain, by giving or taking away privileges, by means of
fines or gifts, or in whatsoever way the law shall proceed to make a man
hate injustice, and love or not hate the nature of the just--this is quite
the noblest work of law. But if the legislator sees any one who is
incurable, for him he will appoint a law and a penalty. He knows quite
well that to such men themselves there is no profit in the continuance of
their lives, and that they would do a double good to the rest of mankind
if they would take their departure, inasmuch as they would be an example
to other men not to offend, and they would relieve the city of bad
citizens. In such cases, and in such cases only, the legislator ought to
inflict death as the punishment of offences.
CLEINIAS: What you have said appears to me to be very reasonable, but will
you favour me by stating a little more clearly the difference between hurt
and injustice, and the various complications of the voluntary and
involuntary which enter into them?
ATHENIAN: I will endeavour to do as you wish: Concerning the soul, thus
much would be generally said and allowed, that one element in her nature
is passion, which may be described either as a state or a part of her, and
is hard to be striven against and contended with, and by irrational force
overturns many things.
CLEINIAS: Very true.
ATHENIAN: And pleasure is not the same with passion, but has an opposite
power, working her will by persuasion and by the force of deceit in all
things.
CLEINIAS: Quite true.
ATHENIAN: A man may truly say that ignorance is a third cause of crimes.
Ignorance, however, may be conveniently divided by the legislator into two
sorts: there is simple ignorance, which is the source of lighter offences,
and double ignorance, which is accompanied by a conceit of wisdom; and he
who is under the influence of the latter fancies that he knows all about
matters of which he knows nothing. This second kind of ignorance, when
possessed of power and strength, will be held by the legislator to be the
source of great and monstrous crimes, but when attended with weakness,
will only result in the errors of children and old men; and these he will
treat as errors, and will make laws accordingly for those who commit them,
which will be the mildest and most merciful of all laws.
CLEINIAS: You are perfectly right.
ATHENIAN: We all of us remark of one man that he is superior to pleasure
and passion, and of another that he is inferior to them; and this is true.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: But no one was ever yet heard to say that one of us is superior
and another inferior to ignorance.
CLEINIAS: Very true.
ATHENIAN: We are speaking of motives which incite men to the fulfilment of
their will; although an individual may be often drawn by them in opposite
directions at the same time.
CLEINIAS: Yes, often.
ATHENIAN: And now I can define to you clearly, and without ambiguity, what
I mean by the just and unjust, according to my notion of them: When anger
and fear, and pleasure and pain, and jealousies and desires, tyrannize
over the soul, whether they do any harm or not--I call all this injustice.
But when the opinion of the best, in whatever part of human nature states
or individuals may suppose that to dwell, has dominion in the soul and
orders the life of every man, even if it be sometimes mistaken, yet what
is done in accordance therewith, and the principle in individuals which
obeys this rule, and is best for the whole life of man, is to be called
just; although the hurt done by mistake is thought by many to be
involuntary injustice. Leaving the question of names, about which we are
not going to quarrel, and having already delineated three sources of
error, we may begin by recalling them somewhat more vividly to our memory:
One of them was of the painful sort, which we denominate anger and fear.
CLEINIAS: Quite right.
ATHENIAN: There was a second consisting of pleasures and desires, and a
third of hopes, which aimed at true opinion about the best. The latter
being subdivided into three, we now get five sources of actions, and for
these five we will make laws of two kinds.
CLEINIAS: What are the two kinds?
ATHENIAN: There is one kind of actions done by violence and in the light
of day, and another kind of actions which are done in darkness and with
secret deceit, or sometimes both with violence and deceit; the laws
concerning these last ought to have a character of severity.
CLEINIAS: Naturally.
ATHENIAN: And now let us return from this digression and complete the work
of legislation. Laws have been already enacted by us concerning the
robbers of the Gods, and concerning traitors, and also concerning those
who corrupt the laws for the purpose of subverting the government. A man
may very likely commit some of these crimes, either in a state of madness
or when affected by disease, or under the influence of extreme old age, or
in a fit of childish wantonness, himself no better than a child. And if
this be made evident to the judges elected to try the cause, on the appeal
of the criminal or his advocate, and he be judged to have been in this
state when he committed the offence, he shall simply pay for the hurt
which he may have done to another; but he shall be exempt from other
penalties, unless he have slain some one, and have on his hands the stain
of blood. And in that case he shall go to another land and country, and
there dwell for a year; and if he return before the expiration of the time
which the law appoints, or even set his foot at all on his native land, he
shall be bound by the guardians of the law in the public prison for two
years, and then go free.
Having begun to speak of homicide, let us endeavour to lay down laws
concerning every different kind of homicide; and, first of all, concerning
violent and involuntary homicides. If any one in an athletic contest, and
at the public games, involuntarily kills a friend, and he dies either at
the time or afterwards of the blows which he has received; or if the like
misfortune happens to any one in war, or military exercises, or mimic
contests of which the magistrates enjoin the practice, whether with or
without arms, when he has been purified according to the law brought from
Delphi relating to these matters, he shall be innocent. And so in the case
of physicians: if their patient dies against their will, they shall be
held guiltless by the law. And if one slay another with his own hand, but
unintentionally, whether he be unarmed or have some instrument or dart in
his hand; or if he kill him by administering food or drink, or by the
application of fire or cold, or by suffocating him, whether he do the deed
by his own hand, or by the agency of others, he shall be deemed the agent,
and shall suffer one of the following penalties: If he kill the slave of
another in the belief that he is his own, he shall bear the master of the
dead man harmless from loss, or shall pay a penalty of twice the value of
the dead man, which the judges shall assess; but purifications must be
used greater and more numerous than for those who committed homicide at
the games--what they are to be, the interpreters whom the God appoints
shall be authorised to declare. And if a man kills his own slave, when he
has been purified according to law, he shall be quit of the homicide. And
if a man kills a freeman unintentionally, he shall undergo the same
purification as he did who killed the slave. But let him not forget also a
tale of olden time, which is to this effect: He who has suffered a violent
end, when newly dead, if he has had the soul of a freeman in life, is
angry with the author of his death; and being himself full of fear and
panic by reason of his violent end, when he sees his murderer walking
about in his own accustomed haunts, he is stricken with terror and becomes
disordered, and this disorder of his, aided by the guilty recollection of
the other, is communicated by him with overwhelming force to the murderer
and his deeds. Wherefore also the murderer must go out of the way of his
victim for the entire period of a year, and not himself be found in any
spot which was familiar to him throughout the country. And if the dead man
be a stranger, the homicide shall be kept from the country of the stranger
during a like period. If any one voluntarily obeys this law, the next of
kin to the deceased, seeing all that has happened, shall take pity on him,
and make peace with him, and show him all gentleness. But if any one is
disobedient, and either ventures to go to any of the temples and sacrifice
unpurified, or will not continue in exile during the appointed time, the
next of kin to the deceased shall proceed against him for murder; and if
he be convicted, every part of his punishment shall be doubled. And if the
next of kin do not proceed against the perpetrator of the crime, then the
pollution shall be deemed to fall upon his own head--the murdered man will
fix the guilt upon his kinsman, and he who has a mind to proceed against
him may compel him to be absent from his country during five years,
according to law. If a stranger unintentionally kill a stranger who is
dwelling in the city, he who likes shall prosecute the cause according to
the same rules. If he be a metic, let him be absent for a year, or if he
be an entire stranger, in addition to the purification, whether he have
slain a stranger, or a metic, or a citizen, he shall be banished for life
from the country which is in possession of our laws. And if he return
contrary to law, let the guardians of the law punish him with death; and
let them hand over his property, if he have any, to him who is next of kin
to the sufferer. And if he be wrecked, and driven on the coast against his
will, he shall take up his abode on the seashore, wetting his feet in the
sea, and watching for an opportunity of sailing; but if he be brought by
land, and is not his own master, let the magistrate whom he first comes
across in the city, release him and send him unharmed over the border.
If any one slays a freeman with his own hand, and the deed be done in
passion, in the case of such actions we must begin by making a
distinction. For a deed is done from passion either when men suddenly, and
without intention to kill, cause the death of another by blows and the
like on a momentary impulse, and are sorry for the deed immediately
afterwards; or again, when after having been insulted in deed or word, men
pursue revenge, and kill a person intentionally, and are not sorry for the
act. And, therefore, we must assume that these homicides are of two kinds,
both of them arising from passion, which may be justly said to be in a
mean between the voluntary and involuntary; at the same time, they are
neither of them anything more than a likeness or shadow of either. He who
treasures up his anger, and avenges himself, not immediately and at the
moment, but with insidious design, and after an interval, is like the
voluntary; but he who does not treasure up his anger, and takes vengeance
on the instant, and without malice prepense, approaches to the
involuntary; and yet even he is not altogether involuntary, but is only
the image or shadow of the involuntary; wherefore about homicides
committed in hot blood, there is a difficulty in determining whether in
legislating we shall reckon them as voluntary or as partly involuntary.
The best and truest view is to regard them respectively as likenesses only
of the voluntary and involuntary, and to distinguish them accordingly as
they are done with or without premeditation. And we should make the
penalties heavier for those who commit homicide with angry premeditation,
and lighter for those who do not premeditate, but smite upon the instant;
for that which is like a greater evil should be punished more severely,
and that which is like a less evil should be punished less severely: this
shall be the rule of our laws.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: Let us proceed: If any one slays a freeman with his own hand,
and the deed be done in a moment of anger, and without premeditation, let
the offender suffer in other respects as the involuntary homicide would
have suffered, and also undergo an exile of two years, that he may learn
to school his passions. But he who slays another from passion, yet with
premeditation, shall in other respects suffer as the former; and to this
shall be added an exile of three instead of two years--his punishment is
to be longer because his passion is greater. The manner of their return
shall be on this wise: (and here the law has difficulty in determining
exactly; for in some cases the murderer who is judged by the law to be the
worse may really be the less cruel, and he who is judged the less cruel
may be really the worse, and may have executed the murder in a more savage
manner, whereas the other may have been gentler. But in general the
degrees of guilt will be such as we have described them. Of all these
things the guardians of the law must take cognizance): When a homicide of
either kind has completed his term of exile, the guardians shall send
twelve judges to the borders of the land; these during the interval shall
have informed themselves of the actions of the criminals, and they shall
judge respecting their pardon and reception; and the homicides shall abide
by their judgment. But if after they have returned home, any one of them
in a moment of anger repeats the deed, let him be an exile, and return no
more; or if he returns, let him suffer as the stranger was to suffer in a
similar case. He who kills his own slave shall undergo a purification, but
if he kills the slave of another in anger, he shall pay twice the amount
of the loss to his owner. And if any homicide is disobedient to the law,
and without purification pollutes the agora, or the games, or the temples,
he who pleases may bring to trial the next of kin to the dead man for
permitting him, and the murderer with him, and may compel the one to exact
and the other to suffer a double amount of fines and purifications; and
the accuser shall himself receive the fine in accordance with the law. If
a slave in a fit of passion kills his master, the kindred of the deceased
man may do with the murderer (provided only they do not spare his life)
whatever they please, and they will be pure; or if he kills a freeman, who
is not his master, the owner shall give up the slave to the relatives of
the deceased, and they shall be under an obligation to put him to death,
but this may be done in any manner which they please. And if (which is a
rare occurrence, but does sometimes happen) a father or a mother in a
moment of passion slays a son or daughter by blows, or some other
violence, the slayer shall undergo the same purification as in other
cases, and be exiled during three years; but when the exile returns the
wife shall separate from the husband, and the husband from the wife, and
they shall never afterwards beget children together, or live under the
same roof, or partake of the same sacred rites with those whom they have
deprived of a child or of a brother. And he who is impious and disobedient
in such a case shall be brought to trial for impiety by any one who
pleases. If in a fit of anger a husband kills his wedded wife, or the wife
her husband, the slayer shall undergo the same purification, and the term
of exile shall be three years. And when he who has committed any such
crime returns, let him have no communication in sacred rites with his
children, neither let him sit at the same table with them, and the father
or son who disobeys shall be liable to be brought to trial for impiety by
any one who pleases. If a brother or a sister in a fit of passion kills a
brother or a sister, they shall undergo purification and exile, as was the
case with parents who killed their offspring: they shall not come under
the same roof, or share in the sacred rites of those whom they have
deprived of their brethren, or of their children. And he who is
disobedient shall be justly liable to the law concerning impiety, which
relates to these matters. If any one is so violent in his passion against
his parents, that in the madness of his anger he dares to kill one of
them, if the murdered person before dying freely forgives the murderer,
let him undergo the purification which is assigned to those who have been
guilty of involuntary homicide, and do as they do, and he shall be pure.
But if he be not acquitted, the perpetrator of such a deed shall be
amenable to many laws--he shall be amenable to the extreme punishments for
assault, and impiety, and robbing of temples, for he has robbed his parent
of life; and if a man could be slain more than once, most justly would he
who in a fit of passion has slain father or mother, undergo many deaths.
How can he, whom, alone of all men, even in defence of his life, and when
about to suffer death at the hands of his parents, no law will allow to
kill his father or his mother who are the authors of his being, and whom
the legislator will command to endure any extremity rather than do this--
how can he, I say, lawfully receive any other punishment? Let death then
be the appointed punishment of him who in a fit of passion slays his
father or his mother. But if brother kills brother in a civil broil, or
under other like circumstances, if the other has begun, and he only
defends himself, let him be free from guilt, as he would be if he had
slain an enemy; and the same rule will apply if a citizen kill a citizen,
or a stranger a stranger. Or if a stranger kill a citizen or a citizen a
stranger in self-defence, let him be free from guilt in like manner; and
so in the case of a slave who has killed a slave; but if a slave have
killed a freeman in self-defence, let him be subject to the same law as he
who has killed a father; and let the law about the remission of penalties
in the case of parricide apply equally to every other remission. Whenever
any sufferer of his own accord remits the guilt of homicide to another,
under the idea that his act was involuntary, let the perpetrator of the
deed undergo a purification and remain in exile for a year, according to
law.
Enough has been said of murders violent and involuntary and committed in
passion: we have now to speak of voluntary crimes done with injustice of
every kind and with premeditation, through the influence of pleasures, and
desires, and jealousies.
CLEINIAS: Very good.
ATHENIAN: Let us first speak, as far as we are able, of their various
kinds. The greatest cause of them is lust, which gets the mastery of the
soul maddened by desire; and this is most commonly found to exist where
the passion reigns which is strongest and most prevalent among the mass of
mankind: I mean where the power of wealth breeds endless desires of never-
to-be-satisfied acquisition, originating in natural disposition, and a
miserable want of education. Of this want of education, the false praise
of wealth which is bruited about both among Hellenes and barbarians is the
cause; they deem that to be the first of goods which in reality is only
the third. And in this way they wrong both posterity and themselves, for
nothing can be nobler and better than that the truth about wealth should
be spoken in all states--namely, that riches are for the sake of the body,
as the body is for the sake of the soul. They are good, and wealth is
intended by nature to be for the sake of them, and is therefore inferior
to them both, and third in order of excellence. This argument teaches us
that he who would be happy ought not to seek to be rich, or rather he
should seek to be rich justly and temperately, and then there would be no
murders in states requiring to be purged away by other murders. But now,
as I said at first, avarice is the chiefest cause and source of the worst
trials for voluntary homicide. A second cause is ambition: this creates
jealousies, which are troublesome companions, above all to the jealous man
himself, and in a less degree to the chiefs of the state. And a third
cause is cowardly and unjust fear, which has been the occasion of many
murders. When a man is doing or has done something which he desires that
no one should know him to be doing or to have done, he will take the life
of those who are likely to inform of such things, if he have no other
means of getting rid of them. Let this be said as a prelude concerning
crimes of violence in general; and I must not omit to mention a tradition
which is firmly believed by many, and has been received by them from those
who are learned in the mysteries: they say that such deeds will be
punished in the world below, and also that when the perpetrators return to
this world they will pay the natural penalty which is due to the sufferer,
and end their lives in like manner by the hand of another. If he who is
about to commit murder believes this, and is made by the mere prelude to
dread such a penalty, there is no need to proceed with the proclamation of
the law. But if he will not listen, let the following law be declared and
registered against him: Whoever shall wrongfully and of design slay with
his own hand any of his kinsmen, shall in the first place be deprived of
legal privileges; and he shall not pollute the temples, or the agora, or
the harbours, or any other place of meeting, whether he is forbidden of
men or not; for the law, which represents the whole state, forbids him,
and always is and will be in the attitude of forbidding him. And if a
cousin or nearer relative of the deceased, whether on the male or female
side, does not prosecute the homicide when he ought, and have him
proclaimed an outlaw, he shall in the first place be involved in the
pollution, and incur the hatred of the Gods, even as the curse of the law
stirs up the voices of men against him; and in the second place he shall
be liable to be prosecuted by any one who is willing to inflict
retribution on behalf of the dead. And he who would avenge a murder shall
observe all the precautionary ceremonies of lavation, and any others which
the God commands in cases of this kind. Let him have proclamation made,
and then go forth and compel the perpetrator to suffer the execution of
justice according to the law. Now the legislator may easily show that
these things must be accomplished by prayers and sacrifices to certain
Gods, who are concerned with the prevention of murders in states. But who
these Gods are, and what should be the true manner of instituting such
trials with due regard to religion, the guardians of the law, aided by the
interpreters, and the prophets, and the God, shall determine, and when
they have determined let them carry on the prosecution at law. The cause
shall have the same judges who are appointed to decide in the case of
those who plunder temples. Let him who is convicted be punished with
death, and let him not be buried in the country of the murdered man, for
this would be shameless as well as impious. But if he fly and will not
stand his trial, let him fly for ever; or, if he set foot anywhere on any
part of the murdered man's country, let any relation of the deceased, or
any other citizen who may first happen to meet with him, kill him with
impunity, or bind and deliver him to those among the judges of the case
who are magistrates, that they may put him to death. And let the
prosecutor demand surety of him whom he prosecutes; three sureties
sufficient in the opinion of the magistrates who try the cause shall be
provided by him, and they shall undertake to produce him at the trial. But
if he be unwilling or unable to provide sureties, then the magistrates
shall take him and keep him in bonds, and produce him at the day of trial.
If a man do not commit a murder with his own hand, but contrives the death
of another, and is the author of the deed in intention and design, and he
continues to dwell in the city, having his soul not pure of the guilt of
murder, let him be tried in the same way, except in what relates to the
sureties; and also, if he be found guilty, his body after execution may
have burial in his native land, but in all other respects his case shall
be as the former; and whether a stranger shall kill a citizen, or a
citizen a stranger, or a slave a slave, there shall be no difference as
touching murder by one's own hand or by contrivance, except in the matter
of sureties; and these, as has been said, shall be required of the actual
murderer only, and he who brings the accusation shall bind them over at
the time. If a slave be convicted of slaying a freeman voluntarily, either
by his own hand or by contrivance, let the public executioner take him in
the direction of the sepulchre, to a place whence he can see the tomb of
the dead man, and inflict upon him as many stripes as the person who
caught him orders, and if he survive, let him put him to death. And if any
one kills a slave who has done no wrong, because he is afraid that he may
inform of some base and evil deeds of his own, or for any similar reason,
in such a case let him pay the penalty of murder, as he would have done if
he had slain a citizen. There are things about which it is terrible and
unpleasant to legislate, but impossible not to legislate. If, for example,
there should be murders of kinsmen, either perpetrated by the hands of
kinsmen, or by their contrivance, voluntary and purely malicious, which
most often happen in ill-regulated and ill-educated states, and may
perhaps occur even in a country where a man would not expect to find them,
we must repeat once more the tale which we narrated a little while ago, in
the hope that he who hears us will be the more disposed to abstain
voluntarily on these grounds from murders which are utterly abominable.
For the myth, or saying, or whatever we ought to call it, has been plainly
set forth by priests of old; they have pronounced that the justice which
guards and avenges the blood of kindred, follows the law of retaliation,
and ordains that he who has done any murderous act should of necessity
suffer that which he has done. He who has slain a father shall himself be
slain at some time or other by his children--if a mother, he shall of
necessity take a woman's nature, and lose his life at the hands of his
offspring in after ages; for where the blood of a family has been polluted
there is no other purification, nor can the pollution be washed out until
the homicidal soul which did the deed has given life for life, and has
propitiated and laid to sleep the wrath of the whole family. These are the
retributions of Heaven, and by such punishments men should be deterred.
But if they are not deterred, and any one should be incited by some
fatality to deprive his father, or mother, or brethren, or children, of
life voluntarily and of purpose, for him the earthly lawgiver legislates
as follows: There shall be the same proclamations about outlawry, and
there shall be the same sureties which have been enacted in the former
cases. But in his case, if he be convicted, the servants of the judges and
the magistrates shall slay him at an appointed place without the city
where three ways meet, and there expose his body naked, and each of the
magistrates on behalf of the whole city shall take a stone and cast it
upon the head of the dead man, and so deliver the city from pollution;
after that, they shall bear him to the borders of the land, and cast him
forth unburied, according to law. And what shall he suffer who slays him
who of all men, as they say, is his own best friend? I mean the suicide,
who deprives himself by violence of his appointed share of life, not
because the law of the state requires him, nor yet under the compulsion of
some painful and inevitable misfortune which has come upon him, nor
because he has had to suffer from irremediable and intolerable shame, but
who from sloth or want of manliness imposes upon himself an unjust
penalty. For him, what ceremonies there are to be of purification and
burial God knows, and about these the next of kin should enquire of the
interpreters and of the laws thereto relating, and do according to their
injunctions. They who meet their death in this way shall be buried alone,
and none shall be laid by their side; they shall be buried ingloriously in
the borders of the twelve portions of the land, in such places as are
uncultivated and nameless, and no column or inscription shall mark the
place of their interment. And if a beast of burden or other animal cause
the death of any one, except in the case of anything of that kind
happening to a competitor in the public contests, the kinsmen of the
deceased shall prosecute the slayer for murder, and the wardens of the
country, such, and so many as the kinsmen appoint, shall try the cause,
and let the beast when condemned be slain by them, and let them cast it
beyond the borders. And if any lifeless thing deprive a man of life,
except in the case of a thunderbolt or other fatal dart sent from the
Gods--whether a man is killed by lifeless objects falling upon him, or by
his falling upon them, the nearest of kin shall appoint the nearest
neighbour to be a judge, and thereby acquit himself and the whole family
of guilt. And he shall cast forth the guilty thing beyond the border, as
has been said about the animals.
If a man is found dead, and his murderer be unknown, and after a diligent
search cannot be detected, there shall be the same proclamation as in the
previous cases, and the same interdict on the murderer; and having
proceeded against him, they shall proclaim in the agora by a herald, that
he who has slain such and such a person, and has been convicted of murder,
shall not set his foot in the temples, nor at all in the country of the
murdered man, and if he appears and is discovered, he shall die, and be
cast forth unburied beyond the border. Let this one law then be laid down
by us about murder; and let cases of this sort be so regarded.
And now let us say in what cases and under what circumstances the murderer
is rightly free from guilt: If a man catch a thief coming into his house
by night to steal, and he take and kill him, or if he slay a footpad in
self-defence, he shall be guiltless. And any one who does violence to a
free woman or a youth, shall be slain with impunity by the injured person,
or by his or her father or brothers or sons. If a man find his wife
suffering violence, he may kill the violator, and be guiltless in the eye
of the law; or if a person kill another in warding off death from his
father or mother or children or brethren or wife who are doing no wrong,
he shall assuredly be guiltless.
Thus much as to the nurture and education of the living soul of man,
having which, he can, and without which, if he unfortunately be without
them, he cannot live; and also concerning the punishments which are to be
inflicted for violent deaths, let thus much be enacted. Of the nurture and
education of the body we have spoken before, and next in order we have to
speak of deeds of violence, voluntary and involuntary, which men do to one
another; these we will now distinguish, as far as we are able, according
to their nature and number, and determine what will be the suitable
penalties of each, and so assign to them their proper place in the series
of our enactments. The poorest legislator will have no difficulty in
determining that wounds and mutilations arising out of wounds should
follow next in order after deaths. Let wounds be divided as homicides were
divided--into those which are involuntary, and which are given in passion
or from fear, and those inflicted voluntarily and with premeditation.
Concerning all this, we must make some such proclamation as the following:
Mankind must have laws, and conform to them, or their life would be as bad
as that of the most savage beast. And the reason of this is that no man's
nature is able to know what is best for human society; or knowing, always
able and willing to do what is best. In the first place, there is a
difficulty in apprehending that the true art of politics is concerned, not
with private but with public good (for public good binds together states,
but private only distracts them); and that both the public and private
good as well of individuals as of states is greater when the state and not
the individual is first considered. In the second place, although a person
knows in the abstract that this is true, yet if he be possessed of
absolute and irresponsible power, he will never remain firm in his
principles or persist in regarding the public good as primary in the
state, and the private good as secondary. Human nature will be always
drawing him into avarice and selfishness, avoiding pain and pursuing
pleasure without any reason, and will bring these to the front, obscuring
the juster and better; and so working darkness in his soul will at last
fill with evils both him and the whole city. For if a man were born so
divinely gifted that he could naturally apprehend the truth, he would have
no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no law or order which is
above knowledge, nor can mind, without impiety, be deemed the subject or
slave of any man, but rather the lord of all. I speak of mind, true and
free, and in harmony with nature. But then there is no such mind anywhere,
or at least not much; and therefore we must choose law and order, which
are second best. These look at things as they exist for the most part
only, and are unable to survey the whole of them. And therefore I have
spoken as I have.
And now we will determine what penalty he ought to pay or suffer who has
hurt or wounded another. Any one may easily imagine the questions which
have to be asked in all such cases: What did he wound, or whom, or how, or
when? for there are innumerable particulars of this sort which greatly
vary from one another. And to allow courts of law to determine all these
things, or not to determine any of them, is alike impossible. There is one
particular which they must determine in all cases--the question of fact.
And then, again, that the legislator should not permit them to determine
what punishment is to be inflicted in any of these cases, but should
himself decide about all of them, small or great, is next to impossible.
CLEINIAS: Then what is to be the inference?
ATHENIAN: The inference is, that some things should be left to courts of
law; others the legislator must decide for himself.
CLEINIAS: And what ought the legislator to decide, and what ought he to
leave to the courts of law?
ATHENIAN: I may reply, that in a state in which the courts are bad and
mute, because the judges conceal their opinions and decide causes
clandestinely; or what is worse, when they are disorderly and noisy, as in
a theatre, clapping or hooting in turn this or that orator--I say that
then there is a very serious evil, which affects the whole state.
Unfortunate is the necessity of having to legislate for such courts, but
where the necessity exists, the legislator should only allow them to
ordain the penalties for the smallest offences; if the state for which he
is legislating be of this character, he must take most matters into his
own hands and speak distinctly. But when a state has good courts, and the
judges are well trained and scrupulously tested, the determination of the
penalties or punishments which shall be inflicted on the guilty may fairly
and with advantage be left to them. And we are not to be blamed for not
legislating concerning all that large class of matters which judges far
worse educated than ours would be able to determine, assigning to each
offence what is due both to the perpetrator and to the sufferer. We
believe those for whom we are legislating to be best able to judge, and
therefore to them the greater part may be left. At the same time, as I
have often said, we should exhibit to the judges, as we have done, the
outline and form of the punishments to be inflicted, and then they will
not transgress the just rule. That was an excellent practice, which we
observed before, and which now that we are resuming the work of
legislation, may with advantage be repeated by us.
Let the enactment about wounding be in the following terms: If any one has
a purpose and intention to slay another who is not his enemy, and whom the
law does not permit him to slay, and he wounds him, but is unable to kill
him, he who had the intent and has wounded him is not to be pitied--he
deserves no consideration, but should be regarded as a murderer and be
tried for murder. Still having respect to the fortune which has in a
manner favoured him, and to the providence which in pity to him and to the
wounded man saved the one from a fatal blow, and the other from an
accursed fate and calamity--as a thank-offering to this deity, and in
order not to oppose his will--in such a case the law will remit the
punishment of death, and only compel the offender to emigrate to a
neighbouring city for the rest of his life, where he shall remain in the
enjoyment of all his possessions. But if he have injured the wounded man,
he shall make such compensation for the injury as the court deciding the
cause shall assess, and the same judges shall decide who would have
decided if the man had died of his wounds. And if a child intentionally
wound his parents, or a servant his master, death shall be the penalty.
And if a brother or a sister intentionally wound a brother or a sister,
and is found guilty, death shall be the penalty. And if a husband wound a
wife, or a wife a husband, with intent to kill, let him or her undergo
perpetual exile; if they have sons or daughters who are still young, the
guardians shall take care of their property, and have charge of the
children as orphans. If their sons are grown up, they shall be under no
obligation to support the exiled parent, but they shall possess the
property themselves. And if he who meets with such a misfortune has no
children, the kindred of the exiled man to the degree of sons of cousins,
both on the male and female side, shall meet together, and after taking
counsel with the guardians of the law and the priests, shall appoint a
5040th citizen to be the heir of the house, considering and reasoning that
no house of all the 5040 belongs to the inhabitant or to the whole family,
but is the public and private property of the state. Now the state should
seek to have its houses as holy and happy as possible. And if any one of
the houses be unfortunate, and stained with impiety, and the owner leave
no posterity, but dies unmarried, or married and childless, having
suffered death as the penalty of murder or some other crime committed
against the Gods or against his fellow-citizens, of which death is the
penalty distinctly laid down in the law; or if any of the citizens be in
perpetual exile, and also childless, that house shall first of all be
purified and undergo expiation according to law; and then let the kinsmen
of the house, as we were just now saying, and the guardians of the law,
meet and consider what family there is in the state which is of the
highest repute for virtue and also for good fortune, in which there are a
number of sons; from that family let them take one and introduce him to
the father and forefathers of the dead man as their son, and, for the sake
of the omen, let him be called so, that he may be the continuer of their
family, the keeper of their hearth, and the minister of their sacred rites
with better fortune than his father had; and when they have made this
supplication, they shall make him heir according to law, and the offending
person they shall leave nameless and childless and portionless when
calamities such as these overtake him.
Now the boundaries of some things do not touch one another, but there is a
borderland which comes in between, preventing them from touching. And we
were saying that actions done from passion are of this nature, and come in
between the voluntary and involuntary. If a person be convicted of having
inflicted wounds in a passion, in the first place he shall pay twice the
amount of the injury, if the wound be curable, or, if incurable, four
times the amount of the injury; or if the wound be curable, and at the
same time cause great and notable disgrace to the wounded person, he shall
pay fourfold. And whenever any one in wounding another injures not only
the sufferer, but also the city, and makes him incapable of defending his
country against the enemy, he, besides the other penalties, shall pay a
penalty for the loss which the state has incurred. And the penalty shall
be, that in addition to his own times of service, he shall serve on behalf
of the disabled person, and shall take his place in war; or, if he refuse,
he shall be liable to be convicted by law of refusal to serve. The
compensation for the injury, whether to be twofold or threefold or
fourfold, shall be fixed by the judges who convict him. And if, in like
manner, a brother wounds a brother, the parents and kindred of either sex,
including the children of cousins, whether on the male or female side,
shall meet, and when they have judged the cause, they shall entrust the
assessment of damages to the parents, as is natural; and if the estimate
be disputed, then the kinsmen on the male side shall make the estimate, or
if they cannot, they shall commit the matter to the guardians of the law.
And when similar charges of wounding are brought by children against their
parents, those who are more than sixty years of age, having children of
their own, not adopted, shall be required to decide; and if any one is
convicted, they shall determine whether he or she ought to die, or suffer
some other punishment either greater than death, or, at any rate, not much
less. A kinsman of the offender shall not be allowed to judge the cause,
not even if he be of the age which is prescribed by the law. If a slave in
a fit of anger wound a freeman, the owner of the slave shall give him up
to the wounded man, who may do as he pleases with him, and if he do not
give him up he shall himself make good the injury. And if any one says
that the slave and the wounded man are conspiring together, let him argue
the point, and if he is cast, he shall pay for the wrong three times over,
but if he gains his case, the freeman who conspired with the slave shall
be liable to an action for kidnapping. And if any one unintentionally
wounds another he shall simply pay for the harm, for no legislator is able
to control chance. In such a case the judges shall be the same as those
who are appointed in the case of children suing their parents; and they
shall estimate the amount of the injury.
All the preceding injuries and every kind of assault are deeds of
violence; and every man, woman, or child ought to consider that the elder
has the precedence of the younger in honour, both among the Gods and also
among men who would live in security and happiness. Wherefore it is a foul
thing and hateful to the Gods to see an elder man assaulted by a younger
in the city, and it is reasonable that a young man when struck by an elder
should lightly endure his anger, laying up in store for himself a like
honour when he is old. Let this be the law: Every one shall reverence his
elder in word and deed; he shall respect any one who is twenty years older
than himself, whether male or female, regarding him or her as his father
or mother; and he shall abstain from laying hands on any one who is of an
age to have been his father or mother, out of reverence to the Gods who
preside over birth; similarly he shall keep his hands from a stranger,
whether he be an old inhabitant or newly arrived; he shall not venture to
correct such an one by blows, either as the aggressor or in self-defence.
If he thinks that some stranger has struck him out of wantonness or
insolence, and ought to be punished, he shall take him to the wardens of
the city, but let him not strike him, that the stranger may be kept far
away from the possibility of lifting up his hand against a citizen, and
let the wardens of the city take the offender and examine him, not
forgetting their duty to the God of Strangers, and in case the stranger
appears to have struck the citizen unjustly, let them inflict upon him as
many blows with the scourge as he was himself inflicted, and quell his
presumption. But if he be innocent, they shall threaten and rebuke the man
who arrested him, and let them both go. If a person strikes another of the
same age or somewhat older than himself, who has no children, whether he
be an old man who strikes an old man or a young man who strikes a young
man, let the person struck defend himself in the natural way without a
weapon and with his hands only. He who, being more than forty years of
age, dares to fight with another, whether he be the aggressor or in self-
defence, shall be regarded as rude and ill-mannered and slavish--this will
be a disgraceful punishment, and therefore suitable to him. The obedient
nature will readily yield to such exhortations, but the disobedient, who
heeds not the prelude, shall have the law ready for him: If any man smite
another who is older than himself, either by twenty or by more years, in
the first place, he who is at hand, not being younger than the combatants,
nor their equal in age, shall separate them, or be disgraced according to
law; but if he be the equal in age of the person who is struck or younger,
he shall defend the person injured as he would a brother or father or
still older relative. Further, let him who dares to smite an elder be
tried for assault, as I have said, and if he be found guilty, let him be
imprisoned for a period of not less than a year, or if the judges approve
of a longer period, their decision shall be final. But if a stranger or
metic smite one who is older by twenty years or more, the same law shall
hold about the bystanders assisting, and he who is found guilty in such a
suit, if he be a stranger but not resident, shall be imprisoned during a
period of two years; and a metic who disobeys the laws shall be imprisoned
for three years, unless the court assign him a longer term. And let him
who was present in any of these cases and did not assist according to law
be punished, if he be of the highest class, by paying a fine of a mina; or
if he be of the second class, of fifty drachmas; or if of the third class,
by a fine of thirty drachmas; or if he be of the fourth class, by a fine
of twenty drachmas; and the generals and taxiarchs and phylarchs and
hipparchs shall form the court in such cases.
Laws are partly framed for the sake of good men, in order to instruct them
how they may live on friendly terms with one another, and partly for the
sake of those who refuse to be instructed, whose spirit cannot be subdued,
or softened, or hindered from plunging into evil. These are the persons
who cause the word to be spoken which I am about to utter; for them the
legislator legislates of necessity, and in the hope that there may be no
need of his laws. He who shall dare to lay violent hands upon his father
or mother, or any still older relative, having no fear either of the wrath
of the Gods above, or of the punishments that are spoken of in the world
below, but transgresses in contempt of ancient and universal traditions as
though he were too wise to believe in them, requires some extreme measure
of prevention. Now death is not the worst that can happen to men; far
worse are the punishments which are said to pursue them in the world
below. But although they are most true tales, they work on such souls no
prevention; for if they had any effect there would be no slayers of
mothers, or impious hands lifted up against parents; and therefore the
punishments of this world which are inflicted during life ought not in
such cases to fall short, if possible, of the terrors of the world below.
Let our enactment then be as follows: If a man dare to strike his father
or his mother, or their fathers or mothers, he being at the time of sound
mind, then let any one who is at hand come to the rescue as has been
already said, and the metic or stranger who comes to the rescue shall be
called to the first place in the games; but if he do not come he shall
suffer the punishment of perpetual exile. He who is not a metic, if he
comes to the rescue, shall have praise, and if he do not come, blame. And
if a slave come to the rescue, let him be made free, but if he do not come
to the rescue, let him receive 100 strokes of the whip, by order of the
wardens of the agora, if the occurrence take place in the agora; or if
somewhere in the city beyond the limits of the agora, any warden of the
city who is in residence shall punish him; or if in the country, then the
commanders of the wardens of the country. If those who are near at the
time be inhabitants of the same place, whether they be youths, or men, or
women, let them come to the rescue and denounce him as the impious one;
and he who does not come to the rescue shall fall under the curse of Zeus,
the God of kindred and of ancestors, according to law. And if any one is
found guilty of assaulting a parent, let him in the first place be forever
banished from the city into the country, and let him abstain from the
temples; and if he do not abstain, the wardens of the country shall punish
him with blows, or in any way which they please, and if he return he shall
be put to death. And if any freeman eat or drink, or have any other sort
of intercourse with him, or only meeting him have voluntarily touched him,
he shall not enter into any temple, nor into the agora, nor into the city,
until he is purified; for he should consider that he has become tainted by
a curse. And if he disobeys the law, and pollutes the city and the temples
contrary to law, and one of the magistrates sees him and does not indict
him, when he gives in his account this omission shall be a most serious
charge.
If a slave strike a freeman, whether a stranger or a citizen, let any one
who is present come to the rescue, or pay the penalty already mentioned;
and let the bystanders bind him, and deliver him up to the injured person,
and he receiving him shall put him in chains, and inflict on him as many
stripes as he pleases; but having punished him he must surrender him to
his master according to law, and not deprive him of his property. Let the
law be as follows: The slave who strikes a freeman, not at the command of
the magistrates, his owner shall receive bound from the man whom he has
stricken, and not release him until the slave has persuaded the man whom
he has stricken that he ought to be released. And let there be the same
laws about women in relation to women, and about men and women in relation
to one another.