Laws: Introduction and Analysis

Introduction and Analysis

The genuineness of the Laws is sufficiently proved (1) by more than twenty
citations of them in the writings of Aristotle, who was residing at Athens
during the last twenty years of the life of Plato, and who, having left it
after his death (B.C. 347), returned thither twelve years later (B.C. 335);
(2) by the allusion of Isocrates

(Oratio ad Philippum missa, p.84: To men tais paneguresin enochlein kai
pros apantas legein tous sunprechontas en autais pros oudena legein estin,
all omoios oi toioutoi ton logon (sc. speeches in the assembly) akuroi
tugchanousin ontes tois nomois kai tais politeiais tais upo ton sophiston
gegrammenais.)

--writing 346 B.C., a year after the death of Plato, and probably not more
than three or four years after the composition of the Laws--who speaks of
the Laws and Republics written by philosophers (upo ton sophiston); (3) by
the reference (Athen.) of the comic poet Alexis, a younger contemporary of
Plato (fl. B.C 356-306), to the enactment about prices, which occurs in
Laws xi., viz that the same goods should not be offered at two prices on
the same day

(Ou gegone kreitton nomothetes tou plousiou
Aristonikou tithesi gar nuni nomon,
ton ichthuopolon ostis an polon tini
ichthun upotimesas apodot elattonos
es eipe times, eis to desmoterion
euthus apagesthai touton, ina dedoikotes
tes axias agaposin, e tes esperas
saprous apantas apopherosin oikade.

Meineke, Frag. Com. Graec.);
(4) by the unanimous voice of later antiquity and the absence of any
suspicion among ancient writers worth speaking of to the contrary; for it
is not said of Philippus of Opus that he composed any part of the Laws,
but only that he copied them out of the waxen tablets, and was thought by
some to have written the Epinomis (Diog. Laert.) That the longest and one
of the best writings bearing the name of Plato should be a forgery, even
if its genuineness were unsupported by external testimony, would be a
singular phenomenon in ancient literature; and although the critical worth
of the consensus of late writers is generally not to be compared with the
express testimony of contemporaries, yet a somewhat greater value may be
attributed to their consent in the present instance, because the admission
of the Laws is combined with doubts about the Epinomis, a spurious
writing, which is a kind of epilogue to the larger work probably of a much
later date. This shows that the reception of the Laws was not altogether
undiscriminating.

The suspicion which has attached to the Laws of Plato in the judgment of
some modern writers appears to rest partly (1) on differences in the style
and form of the work, and (2) on differences of thought and opinion which
they observe in them. Their suspicion is increased by the fact that these
differences are accompanied by resemblances as striking to passages in
other Platonic writings. They are sensible of a want of point in the
dialogue and a general inferiority in the ideas, plan, manners, and style.
They miss the poetical flow, the dramatic verisimilitude, the life and
variety of the characters, the dialectic subtlety, the Attic purity, the
luminous order, the exquisite urbanity; instead of which they find
tautology, obscurity, self-sufficiency, sermonizing, rhetorical
declamation, pedantry, egotism, uncouth forms of sentences, and
peculiarities in the use of words and idioms. They are unable to discover
any unity in the patched, irregular structure. The speculative element
both in government and education is superseded by a narrow economical or
religious vein. The grace and cheerfulness of Athenian life have
disappeared; and a spirit of moroseness and religious intolerance has
taken their place. The charm of youth is no longer there; the mannerism of
age makes itself unpleasantly felt. The connection is often imperfect; and
there is a want of arrangement, exhibited especially in the enumeration of
the laws towards the end of the work. The Laws are full of flaws and
repetitions. The Greek is in places very ungrammatical and intractable. A
cynical levity is displayed in some passages, and a tone of disappointment
and lamentation over human things in others. The critics seem also to
observe in them bad imitations of thoughts which are better expressed in
Plato's other writings. Lastly, they wonder how the mind which conceived
the Republic could have left the Critias, Hermocrates, and Philosophus
incomplete or unwritten, and have devoted the last years of life to the
Laws.

The questions which have been thus indirectly suggested may be considered
by us under five or six heads: I, the characters; II, the plan; III, the
style; IV, the imitations of other writings of Plato; V; the more general
relation of the Laws to the Republic and the other dialogues; and VI, to
the existing Athenian and Spartan states.

I. Already in the Philebus the distinctive character of Socrates has
disappeared; and in the Timaeus, Sophist, and Statesman his function of
chief speaker is handed over to the Pythagorean philosopher Timaeus, and
to the Eleatic Stranger, at whose feet he sits, and is silent. More and
more Plato seems to have felt in his later writings that the character and
method of Socrates were no longer suited to be the vehicle of his own
philosophy. He is no longer interrogative but dogmatic; not 'a hesitating
enquirer,' but one who speaks with the authority of a legislator. Even in
the Republic we have seen that the argument which is carried on by
Socrates in the old style with Thrasymachus in the first book, soon passes
into the form of exposition. In the Laws he is nowhere mentioned. Yet so
completely in the tradition of antiquity is Socrates identified with
Plato, that in the criticism of the Laws which we find in the so-called
Politics of Aristotle he is supposed by the writer still to be playing his
part of the chief speaker (compare Pol.).

The Laws are discussed by three representatives of Athens, Crete, and
Sparta. The Athenian, as might be expected, is the protagonist or chief
speaker, while the second place is assigned to the Cretan, who, as one of
the leaders of a new colony, has a special interest in the conversation.
At least four-fifths of the answers are put into his mouth. The Spartan is
every inch a soldier, a man of few words himself, better at deeds than
words. The Athenian talks to the two others, although they are his equals
in age, in the style of a master discoursing to his scholars; he
frequently praises himself; he entertains a very poor opinion of the
understanding of his companions. Certainly the boastfulness and rudeness
of the Laws is the reverse of the refined irony and courtesy which
characterize the earlier dialogues. We are no longer in such good company
as in the Phaedrus and Symposium. Manners are lost sight of in the
earnestness of the speakers, and dogmatic assertions take the place of
poetical fancies.

The scene is laid in Crete, and the conversation is held in the course of
a walk from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus, which takes place on
one of the longest and hottest days of the year. The companions start at
dawn, and arrive at the point in their conversation which terminates the
fourth book, about noon. The God to whose temple they are going is the
lawgiver of Crete, and this may be supposed to be the very cave at which
he gave his oracles to Minos. But the externals of the scene, which are
briefly and inartistically described, soon disappear, and we plunge
abruptly into the subject of the dialogue. We are reminded by contrast of
the higher art of the Phaedrus, in which the summer's day, and the cool
stream, and the chirping of the grasshoppers, and the fragrance of the
agnus castus, and the legends of the place are present to the imagination
throughout the discourse.

The typical Athenian apologizes for the tendency of his countrymen 'to
spin a long discussion out of slender materials,' and in a similar spirit
the Lacedaemonian Megillus apologizes for the Spartan brevity (compare
Thucydid.), acknowledging at the same time that there may be occasions
when long discourses are necessary. The family of Megillus is the proxenus
of Athens at Sparta; and he pays a beautiful compliment to the Athenian,
significant of the character of the work, which, though borrowing many
elements from Sparta, is also pervaded by an Athenian spirit. A good
Athenian, he says, is more than ordinarily good, because he is inspired by
nature and not manufactured by law. The love of listening which is
attributed to the Timocrat in the Republic is also exhibited in him. The
Athenian on his side has a pleasure in speaking to the Lacedaemonian of
the struggle in which their ancestors were jointly engaged against the
Persians. A connexion with Athens is likewise intimated by the Cretan
Cleinias. He is the relative of Epimenides, whom, by an anachronism of a
century,--perhaps arising as Zeller suggests (Plat. Stud.) out of a
confusion of the visit of Epimenides and Diotima (Symp.),--he describes as
coming to Athens, not after the attempt of Cylon, but ten years before the
Persian war. The Cretan and Lacedaemonian hardly contribute at all to the
argument of which the Athenian is the expounder; they only supply
information when asked about the institutions of their respective
countries. A kind of simplicity or stupidity is ascribed to them. At
first, they are dissatisfied with the free criticisms which the Athenian
passes upon the laws of Minos and Lycurgus, but they acquiesce in his
greater experience and knowledge of the world. They admit that there can
be no objection to the enquiry; for in the spirit of the legislator
himself, they are discussing his laws when there are no young men present
to listen. They are unwilling to allow that the Spartan and Cretan
lawgivers can have been mistaken in honouring courage as the first part of
virtue, and are puzzled at hearing for the first time that 'Goods are only
evil to the evil.' Several times they are on the point of quarrelling, and
by an effort learn to restrain their natural feeling (compare Shakespeare,
Henry V, act iii. sc. 2). In Book vii., the Lacedaemonian expresses a
momentary irritation at the accusation which the Athenian brings against
the Spartan institutions, of encouraging licentiousness in their women,
but he is reminded by the Cretan that the permission to criticize them
freely has been given, and cannot be retracted. His only criterion of
truth is the authority of the Spartan lawgiver; he is 'interested,' in the
novel speculations of the Athenian, but inclines to prefer the ordinances
of Lycurgus.

The three interlocutors all of them speak in the character of old men,
which forms a pleasant bond of union between them. They have the feelings
of old age about youth, about the state, about human things in general.
Nothing in life seems to be of much importance to them; they are
spectators rather than actors, and men in general appear to the Athenian
speaker to be the playthings of the Gods and of circumstances. Still they
have a fatherly care of the young, and are deeply impressed by sentiments
of religion. They would give confidence to the aged by an increasing use
of wine, which, as they get older, is to unloose their tongues and make
them sing. The prospect of the existence of the soul after death is
constantly present to them; though they can hardly be said to have the
cheerful hope and resignation which animates Socrates in the Phaedo or
Cephalus in the Republic. Plato appears to be expressing his own feelings
in remarks of this sort. For at the time of writing the first book of the
Laws he was at least seventy-four years of age, if we suppose him to
allude to the victory of the Syracusans under Dionysius the Younger over
the Locrians, which occurred in the year 356. Such a sadness was the
natural effect of declining years and failing powers, which make men ask,
'After all, what profit is there in life?' They feel that their work is
beginning to be over, and are ready to say, 'All the world is a stage;'
or, in the actual words of Plato, 'Let us play as good plays as we can,'
though 'we must be sometimes serious, which is not agreeable, but
necessary.' These are feelings which have crossed the minds of reflective
persons in all ages, and there is no reason to connect the Laws any more
than other parts of Plato's writings with the very uncertain narrative of
his life, or to imagine that this melancholy tone is attributable to
disappointment at having failed to convert a Sicilian tyrant into a
philosopher.

II. The plan of the Laws is more irregular and has less connexion than any
other of the writings of Plato. As Aristotle says in the Politics, 'The
greater part consists of laws'; in Books v, vi, xi, xii the dialogue
almost entirely disappears. Large portions of them are rather the
materials for a work than a finished composition which may rank with the
other Platonic dialogues. To use his own image, 'Some stones are regularly
inserted in the building; others are lying on the ground ready for use.'
There is probably truth in the tradition that the Laws were not published
until after the death of Plato. We can easily believe that he has left
imperfections, which would have been removed if he had lived a few years
longer. The arrangement might have been improved; the connexion of the
argument might have been made plainer, and the sentences more accurately
framed. Something also may be attributed to the feebleness of old age.
Even a rough sketch of the Phaedrus or Symposium would have had a very
different look. There is, however, an interest in possessing one writing
of Plato which is in the process of creation.

We must endeavour to find a thread of order which will carry us through
this comparative disorder. The first four books are described by Plato
himself as the preface or preamble. Having arrived at the conclusion that
each law should have a preamble, the lucky thought occurs to him at the
end of the fourth book that the preceding discourse is the preamble of the
whole. This preamble or introduction may be abridged as follows:--

The institutions of Sparta and Crete are admitted by the Lacedaemonian and
Cretan to have one aim only: they were intended by the legislator to
inspire courage in war. To this the Athenian objects that the true
lawgiver should frame his laws with a view to all the virtues and not to
one only. Better is he who has temperance as well as courage, than he who
has courage only; better is he who is faithful in civil broils, than he
who is a good soldier only. Better, too, is peace than war; the
reconciliation than the defeat of an enemy. And he who would attain all
virtue should be trained amid pleasures as well as pains. Hence there
should be convivial intercourse among the citizens, and a man's temperance
should be tested in his cups, as we test his courage amid dangers. He
should have a fear of the right sort, as well as a courage of the right
sort.

At the beginning of the second book the subject of pleasure leads to
education, which in the early years of life is wholly a discipline
imparted by the means of pleasure and pain. The discipline of pleasure is
implanted chiefly by the practice of the song and the dance. Of these the
forms should be fixed, and not allowed to depend on the fickle breath of
the multitude. There will be choruses of boys, girls, and grown-up
persons, and all will be heard repeating the same strain, that 'virtue is
happiness.' One of them will give the law to the rest; this will be the
chorus of aged minstrels, who will sing the most beautiful and the most
useful of songs. They will require a little wine, to mellow the austerity
of age, and make them amenable to the laws.

After having laid down as the first principle of politics, that peace, and
not war, is the true aim of the legislator, and briefly discussed music
and festive intercourse, at the commencement of the third book Plato makes
a digression, in which he speaks of the origin of society. He describes,
first of all, the family; secondly, the patriarchal stage, which is an
aggregation of families; thirdly, the founding of regular cities, like
Ilium; fourthly, the establishment of a military and political system,
like that of Sparta, with which he identifies Argos and Messene, dating
from the return of the Heraclidae. But the aims of states should be good,
or else, like the prayer of Theseus, they may be ruinous to themselves.
This was the case in two out of three of the Heracleid kingdoms. They did
not understand that the powers in a state should be balanced. The balance
of powers saved Sparta, while the excess of tyranny in Persia and the
excess of liberty at Athens have been the ruin of both...This discourse on
politics is suddenly discovered to have an immediate practical use; for
Cleinias the Cretan is about to give laws to a new colony.

At the beginning of the fourth book, after enquiring into the
circumstances and situation of the colony, the Athenian proceeds to make
further reflections. Chance, and God, and the skill of the legislator, all
co-operate in the formation of states. And the most favourable condition
for the foundation of a new one is when the government is in the hands of
a virtuous tyrant who has the good fortune to be the contemporary of a
great legislator. But a virtuous tyrant is a contradiction in terms; we
can at best only hope to have magistrates who are the servants of reason
and the law. This leads to the enquiry, what is to be the polity of our
new state. And the answer is, that we are to fear God, and honour our
parents, and to cultivate virtue and justice; these are to be our first
principles. Laws must be definite, and we should create in the citizens a
predisposition to obey them. The legislator will teach as well as command;
and with this view he will prefix preambles to his principal laws.

The fifth book commences in a sort of dithyramb with another and higher
preamble about the honour due to the soul, whence are deduced the duties
of a man to his parents and his friends, to the suppliant and stranger. He
should be true and just, free from envy and excess of all sorts, forgiving
to crimes which are not incurable and are partly involuntary; and he
should have a true taste. The noblest life has the greatest pleasures and
the fewest pains...Having finished the preamble, and touched on some other
preliminary considerations, we proceed to the Laws, beginning with the
constitution of the state. This is not the best or ideal state, having all
things common, but only the second-best, in which the land and houses are
to be distributed among 5040 citizens divided into four classes. There is
to be no gold or silver among them, and they are to have moderate wealth,
and to respect number and numerical order in all things.

In the first part of the sixth book, Plato completes his sketch of the
constitution by the appointment of officers. He explains the manner in
which guardians of the law, generals, priests, wardens of town and
country, ministers of education, and other magistrates are to be
appointed; and also in what way courts of appeal are to be constituted,
and omissions in the law to be supplied. Next--and at this point the Laws
strictly speaking begin--there follow enactments respecting marriage and
the procreation of children, respecting property in slaves as well as of
other kinds, respecting houses, married life, common tables for men and
women. The question of age in marriage suggests the consideration of a
similar question about the time for holding offices, and for military
service, which had been previously omitted.

Resuming the order of the discussion, which was indicated in the previous
book, from marriage and birth we proceed to education in the seventh book.
Education is to begin at or rather before birth; to be continued for a
time by mothers and nurses under the supervision of the state; finally, to
comprehend music and gymnastics. Under music is included reading, writing,
playing on the lyre, arithmetic, geometry, and a knowledge of astronomy
sufficient to preserve the minds of the citizens from impiety in after-
life. Gymnastics are to be practised chiefly with a view to their use in
war. The discussion of education, which was lightly touched upon in Book
ii, is here completed.

The eighth book contains regulations for civil life, beginning with
festivals, games, and contests, military exercises and the like. On such
occasions Plato seems to see young men and maidens meeting together, and
hence he is led into discussing the relations of the sexes, the evil
consequences which arise out of the indulgence of the passions, and the
remedies for them. Then he proceeds to speak of agriculture, of arts and
trades, of buying and selling, and of foreign commerce.

The remaining books of the Laws, ix-xii, are chiefly concerned with
criminal offences. In the first class are placed offences against the
Gods, especially sacrilege or robbery of temples: next follow offences
against the state,--conspiracy, treason, theft. The mention of thefts
suggests a distinction between voluntary and involuntary, curable and
incurable offences. Proceeding to the greater crime of homicide, Plato
distinguishes between mere homicide, manslaughter, which is partly
voluntary and partly involuntary, and murder, which arises from avarice,
ambition, fear. He also enumerates murders by kindred, murders by slaves,
wounds with or without intent to kill, wounds inflicted in anger, crimes
of or against slaves, insults to parents. To these, various modes of
purification or degrees of punishment are assigned, and the terrors of
another world are also invoked against them.

At the beginning of Book x, all acts of violence, including sacrilege, are
summed up in a single law. The law is preceded by an admonition, in which
the offenders are informed that no one ever did an unholy act or said an
unlawful word while he retained his belief in the existence of the Gods;
but either he denied their existence, or he believed that they took no
care of man, or that they might be turned from their course by sacrifices
and prayers. The remainder of the book is devoted to the refutation of
these three classes of unbelievers, and concludes with the means to be
taken for their reformation, and the announcement of their punishments if
they continue obstinate and impenitent.

The eleventh book is taken up with laws and with admonitions relating to
individuals, which follow one another without any exact order. There are
laws concerning deposits and the finding of treasure; concerning slaves
and freedmen; concerning retail trade, bequests, divorces, enchantments,
poisonings, magical arts, and the like. In the twelfth book the same
subjects are continued. Laws are passed concerning violations of military
discipline, concerning the high office of the examiners and their burial;
concerning oaths and the violation of them, and the punishments of those
who neglect their duties as citizens. Foreign travel is then discussed,
and the permission to be accorded to citizens of journeying in foreign
parts; the strangers who may come to visit the city are also spoken of,
and the manner in which they are to be received. Laws are added respecting
sureties, searches for property, right of possession by prescription,
abduction of witnesses, theatrical competition, waging of private warfare,
and bribery in offices. Rules are laid down respecting taxation,
respecting economy in sacred rites, respecting judges, their duties and
sentences, and respecting sepulchral places and ceremonies. Here the Laws
end. Lastly, a Nocturnal Council is instituted for the preservation of the
state, consisting of older and younger members, who are to exhibit in
their lives that virtue which is the basis of the state, to know the one
in many, and to be educated in divine and every other kind of knowledge
which will enable them to fulfil their office.

III. The style of the Laws differs in several important respects from that
of the other dialogues of Plato: (1) in the want of character, power, and
lively illustration; (2) in the frequency of mannerisms (compare
Introduction to the Philebus); (3) in the form and rhythm of the
sentences; (4) in the use of words. On the other hand, there are many
passages (5) which are characterized by a sort of ethical grandeur; and
(6) in which, perhaps, a greater insight into human nature, and a greater
reach of practical wisdom is shown, than in any other of Plato's writings.

1. The discourse of the three old men is described by themselves as an old
man's game of play. Yet there is little of the liveliness of a game in
their mode of treating the subject. They do not throw the ball to and fro,
but two out of the three are listeners to the third, who is constantly
asserting his superior wisdom and opportunities of knowledge, and
apologizing (not without reason) for his own want of clearness of speech.
He will 'carry them over the stream;' he will answer for them when the
argument is beyond their comprehension; he is afraid of their ignorance of
mathematics, and thinks that gymnastic is likely to be more intelligible
to them;--he has repeated his words several times, and yet they cannot
understand him. The subject did not properly take the form of dialogue,
and also the literary vigour of Plato had passed away. The old men speak
as they might be expected to speak, and in this there is a touch of
dramatic truth. Plato has given the Laws that form or want of form which
indicates the failure of natural power. There is no regular plan--none of
that consciousness of what has preceded and what is to follow, which makes
a perfect style,--but there are several attempts at a plan; the argument
is 'pulled up,' and frequent explanations are offered why a particular
topic was introduced.

The fictions of the Laws have no longer the verisimilitude which is
characteristic of the Phaedrus and the Timaeus, or even of the Statesman.
We can hardly suppose that an educated Athenian would have placed the
visit of Epimenides to Athens ten years before the Persian war, or have
imagined that a war with Messene prevented the Lacedaemonians from coming
to the rescue of Hellas. The narrative of the origin of the Dorian
institutions, which are said to have been due to a fear of the growing
power of the Assyrians, is a plausible invention, which may be compared
with the tale of the island of Atlantis and the poem of Solon, but is not
accredited by similar arts of deception. The other statement that the
Dorians were Achaean exiles assembled by Dorieus, and the assertion that
Troy was included in the Assyrian Empire, have some foundation (compare
for the latter point, Diod. Sicul.). Nor is there anywhere in the Laws
that lively enargeia, that vivid mise en scene, which is as characteristic
of Plato as of some modern novelists.

The old men are afraid of the ridicule which 'will fall on their heads
more than enough,' and they do not often indulge in a joke. In one of the
few which occur, the book of the Laws, if left incomplete, is compared to
a monster wandering about without a head. But we no longer breathe the
atmosphere of humour which pervades the Symposium and the Euthydemus, in
which we pass within a few sentences from the broadest Aristophanic joke
to the subtlest refinement of wit and fancy; instead of this, in the Laws
an impression of baldness and feebleness is often left upon our minds.
Some of the most amusing descriptions, as, for example, of children
roaring for the first three years of life; or of the Athenians walking
into the country with fighting-cocks under their arms; or of the slave
doctor who knocks about his patients finely; and the gentleman doctor who
courteously persuades them; or of the way of keeping order in the theatre,
'by a hint from a stick,' are narrated with a commonplace gravity; but
where we find this sort of dry humour we shall not be far wrong in
thinking that the writer intended to make us laugh. The seriousness of age
takes the place of the jollity of youth. Life should have holidays and
festivals; yet we rebuke ourselves when we laugh, and take our pleasures
sadly. The irony of the earlier dialogues, of which some traces occur in
the tenth book, is replaced by a severity which hardly condescends to
regard human things. 'Let us say, if you please, that man is of some
account, but I was speaking of him in comparison with God.'

The imagery and illustrations are poor in themselves, and are not assisted
by the surrounding phraseology. We have seen how in the Republic, and in
the earlier dialogues, figures of speech such as 'the wave,' 'the drone,'
'the chase,' 'the bride,' appear and reappear at intervals. Notes are
struck which are repeated from time to time, as in a strain of music.
There is none of this subtle art in the Laws. The illustrations, such as
the two kinds of doctors, 'the three kinds of funerals,' the fear potion,
the puppet, the painter leaving a successor to restore his picture, the
'person stopping to consider where three ways meet,' the 'old laws about
water of which he will not divert the course,' can hardly be said to do
much credit to Plato's invention. The citations from the poets have lost
that fanciful character which gave them their charm in the earlier
dialogues. We are tired of images taken from the arts of navigation, or
archery, or weaving, or painting, or medicine, or music. Yet the
comparisons of life to a tragedy, or of the working of mind to the
revolution of the self-moved, or of the aged parent to the image of a God
dwelling in the house, or the reflection that 'man is made to be the
plaything of God, and that this rightly considered is the best of him,'
have great beauty.

2. The clumsiness of the style is exhibited in frequent mannerisms and
repetitions. The perfection of the Platonic dialogue consists in the
accuracy with which the question and answer are fitted into one another,
and the regularity with which the steps of the argument succeed one
another. This finish of style is no longer discernible in the Laws. There
is a want of variety in the answers; nothing can be drawn out of the
respondents but 'Yes' or 'No,' 'True,' 'To be sure,' etc.; the insipid
forms, 'What do you mean?' 'To what are you referring?' are constantly
returning. Again and again the speaker is charged, or charges himself,
with obscurity; and he repeats again and again that he will explain his
views more clearly. The process of thought which should be latent in the
mind of the writer appears on the surface. In several passages the
Athenian praises himself in the most unblushing manner, very unlike the
irony of the earlier dialogues, as when he declares that 'the laws are a
divine work given by some inspiration of the Gods,' and that 'youth should
commit them to memory instead of the compositions of the poets.' The
prosopopoeia which is adopted by Plato in the Protagoras and other
dialogues is repeated until we grow weary of it. The legislator is always
addressing the speakers or the youth of the state, and the speakers are
constantly making addresses to the legislator. A tendency to a paradoxical
manner of statement is also observable. 'We must have drinking,' 'we must
have a virtuous tyrant'--this is too much for the duller wits of the
Lacedaemonian and Cretan, who at first start back in surprise. More than
in any other writing of Plato the tone is hortatory; the laws are sermons
as well as laws; they are considered to have a religious sanction, and to
rest upon a religious sentiment in the mind of the citizens. The words of
the Athenian are attributed to the Lacedaemonian and Cretan, who are
supposed to have made them their own, after the manner of the earlier
dialogues. Resumptions of subjects which have been half disposed of in a
previous passage constantly occur: the arrangement has neither the
clearness of art nor the freedom of nature. Irrelevant remarks are made
here and there, or illustrations used which are not properly fitted in.
The dialogue is generally weak and laboured, and is in the later books
fairly given up, apparently, because unsuited to the subject of the work.
The long speeches or sermons of the Athenian, often extending over several
pages, have never the grace and harmony which are exhibited in the earlier
dialogues. For Plato is incapable of sustained composition; his genius is
dramatic rather than oratorical; he can converse, but he cannot make a
speech. Even the Timaeus, which is one of his most finished works, is full
of abrupt transitions. There is the same kind of difference between the
dialogue and the continuous discourse of Plato as between the narrative
and speeches of Thucydides.

3. The perfection of style is variety in unity, freedom, ease, clearness,
the power of saying anything, and of striking any note in the scale of
human feelings without impropriety; and such is the divine gift of
language possessed by Plato in the Symposium and Phaedrus. From this there
are many fallings-off in the Laws: first, in the structure of the
sentences, which are rhythmical and monotonous,--the formal and
sophistical manner of the age is superseding the natural genius of Plato:
secondly, many of them are of enormous length, and the latter end often
forgets the beginning of them,--they seem never to have received the
second thoughts of the author; either the emphasis is wrongly placed, or
there is a want of point in a clause; or an absolute case occurs which is
not properly separated from the rest of the sentence; or words are
aggregated in a manner which fails to show their relation to one another;
or the connecting particles are omitted at the beginning of sentences; the
uses of the relative and antecedent are more indistinct, the changes of
person and number more frequent, examples of pleonasm, tautology, and
periphrasis, antitheses of positive and negative, false emphasis, and
other affectations, are more numerous than in the other writings of Plato;
there is also a more common and sometimes unmeaning use of qualifying
formulae, os epos eipein, kata dunamin, and of double expressions, pante
pantos, oudame oudamos, opos kai ope--these are too numerous to be
attributed to errors in the text; again, there is an over-curious
adjustment of verb and participle, noun and epithet, and other artificial
forms of cadence and expression take the place of natural variety:
thirdly, the absence of metaphorical language is remarkable--the style is
not devoid of ornament, but the ornament is of a debased rhetorical kind,
patched on to instead of growing out of the subject; there is a great
command of words, and a laboured use of them; forced attempts at metaphor
occur in several passages,--e.g. parocheteuein logois; ta men os tithemena
ta d os paratithemena; oinos kolazomenos upo nephontos eterou theou; the
plays on the word nomos = nou dianome, ode etara: fourthly, there is a
foolish extravagance of language in other passages,--'the swinish
ignorance of arithmetic;' 'the justice and suitableness of the discourse
on laws;' over-emphasis; 'best of Greeks,' said of all the Greeks, and
the like: fifthly, poor and insipid illustrations are also common:
sixthly, we may observe an excessive use of climax and hyperbole, aischron
legein chre pros autous doulon te kai doulen kai paida kai ei pos oion te
olen ten oikian: dokei touto to epitedeuma kata phusin tas peri ta
aphrodisia edonas ou monon anthropon alla kai therion diephtharkenai.

4. The peculiarities in the use of words which occur in the Laws have been
collected by Zeller (Platonische Studien) and Stallbaum (Legg.): first, in
the use of nouns, such as allodemia, apeniautesis, glukuthumia, diatheter,
thrasuxenia, koros, megalonoia, paidourgia: secondly, in the use of
adjectives, such as aistor, biodotes, echthodopos, eitheos, chronios, and
of adverbs, such as aniditi, anatei, nepoivei: thirdly, in the use of
verbs, such as athurein, aissein (aixeien eipein), euthemoneisthai,
parapodizesthai, sebein, temelein, tetan. These words however, as
Stallbaum remarks, are formed according to analogy, and nearly all
of them have the support of some poetical or other authority.

Zeller and Stallbaum have also collected forms of words in the Laws,
differing from the forms of the same words which occur in other places:
e.g. blabos for blabe, abios for abiotos, acharistos for acharis, douleios
for doulikos, paidelos for paidikos, exagrio for exagriaino, ileoumai for
ilaskomai, and the Ionic word sophronistus, meaning 'correction.' Zeller
has noted a fondness for substantives ending in -ma and -sis, such as
georgema, diapauma, epithumema, zemioma, komodema, omilema; blapsis,
loidoresis, paraggelsis, and others; also a use of substantives in the
plural, which are commonly found only in the singular, maniai, atheotetes,
phthonoi, phoboi, phuseis; also, a peculiar use of prepositions in
composition, as in eneirgo, apoblapto, dianomotheteo, dieiretai,
dieulabeisthai, and other words; also, a frequent occurrence of the Ionic
datives plural in -aisi and -oisi, perhaps used for the sake of giving an
ancient or archaic effect.

To these peculiarities of words he has added a list of peculiar
expressions and constructions. Among the most characteristic are the
following: athuta pallakon spermata; amorphoi edrai; osa axiomata pros
archontas; oi kata polin kairoi; muthos, used in several places of 'the
discourse about laws;' and connected with this the frequent use of
paramuthion and paramutheisthai in the general sense of 'address,'
'addressing'; aimulos eros; ataphoi praxeis; muthos akephalos; ethos
euthuporon. He remarks also on the frequent employment of the abstract for
the concrete; e.g. uperesia for uperetai, phugai for phugades, mechanai in
the sense of 'contrivers,' douleia for douloi, basileiai for basileis,
mainomena kedeumata for ganaika mainomenen; e chreia ton paidon in the
sense of 'indigent children,' and paidon ikanotes; to ethos tes apeirias
for e eiothuia apeiria; kuparitton upse te kai kalle thaumasia for
kuparittoi mala upselai kai kalai. He further notes some curious uses of
the genitive case, e.g. philias omologiai, maniai orges, laimargiai
edones, cheimonon anupodesiai, anosioi plegon tolmai; and of the dative,
omiliai echthrois, nomothesiai, anosioi plegon tolmai; and of the dative
omiliai echthrois, nomothesiai epitropois; and also some rather uncommon
periphrases, thremmata Neilou, xuggennetor teknon for alochos, Mouses
lexis for poiesis, zographon paides, anthropon spermata and the like; the
fondness for particles of limitation, especially tis and ge, sun tisi
charisi, tois ge dunamenois and the like; the pleonastic use of tanun, of
os, of os eros eipein, of ekastote; and the periphrastic use of the
preposition peri. Lastly, he observes the tendency to hyperbata or
transpositions of words, and to rhythmical uniformity as well as
grammatical irregularity in the structure of the sentences.

For nearly all the expressions which are adduced by Zeller as arguments
against the genuineness of the Laws, Stallbaum finds some sort of
authority. There is no real ground for doubting that the work was written
by Plato, merely because several words occur in it which are not found in
his other writings. An imitator may preserve the usual phraseology of a
writer better than he would himself. But, on the other hand, the fact that
authorities may be quoted in support of most of these uses of words, does
not show that the diction is not peculiar. Several of them seem to be
poetical or dialectical, and exhibit an attempt to enlarge the limits of
Greek prose by the introduction of Homeric and tragic expressions. Most of
them do not appear to have retained any hold on the later language of
Greece. Like several experiments in language of the writers of the
Elizabethan age, they were afterwards lost; and though occasionally found
in Plutarch and imitators of Plato, they have not been accepted by
Aristotle or passed into the common dialect of Greece.

5. Unequal as the Laws are in style, they contain a few passages which are
very grand and noble. For example, the address to the poets: 'Best of
strangers, we also are poets of the best and noblest tragedy; for our
whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which we affirm
to be indeed the very truth of tragedy.' Or again, the sight of young men
and maidens in friendly intercourse with one another, suggesting the
dangers to which youth is liable from the violence of passion; or the
eloquent denunciation of unnatural lusts in the same passage; or the
charming thought that the best legislator 'orders war for the sake of
peace and not peace for the sake of war;' or the pleasant allusion, 'O
Athenian--inhabitant of Attica, I will not say, for you seem to me worthy
to be named after the Goddess Athene because you go back to first
principles;' or the pithy saying, 'Many a victory has been and will be
suicidal to the victors, but education is never suicidal;' or the fine
expression that 'the walls of a city should be allowed to sleep in the
earth, and that we should not attempt to disinter them;' or the remark
that 'God is the measure of all things in a sense far higher than any man
can be;' or that 'a man should be from the first a partaker of the truth,
that he may live a true man as long as possible;' or the principle
repeatedly laid down, that 'the sins of the fathers are not to be visited
on the children;' or the description of the funeral rites of those
priestly sages who depart in innocence; or the noble sentiment, that we
should do more justice to slaves than to equals; or the curious
observation, founded, perhaps, on his own experience, that there are a few
'divine men in every state however corrupt, whose conversation is of
inestimable value;' or the acute remark, that public opinion is to be
respected, because the judgments of mankind about virtue are better than
their practice; or the deep religious and also modern feeling which
pervades the tenth book (whatever may be thought of the arguments); the
sense of the duty of living as a part of a whole, and in dependence on the
will of God, who takes care of the least things as well as the greatest;
and the picture of parents praying for their children--not as we may say,
slightly altering the words of Plato, as if there were no truth or reality
in the Gentile religions, but as if there were the greatest--are very
striking to us. We must remember that the Laws, unlike the Republic, do
not exhibit an ideal state, but are supposed to be on the level of human
motives and feelings; they are also on the level of the popular religion,
though elevated and purified: hence there is an attempt made to show that
the pleasant is also just. But, on the other hand, the priority of the
soul to the body, and of God to the soul, is always insisted upon as the
true incentive to virtue; especially with great force and eloquence at the
commencement of Book v. And the work of legislation is carried back to the
first principles of morals.

6. No other writing of Plato shows so profound an insight into the world
and into human nature as the Laws. That 'cities will never cease from ill
until they are better governed,' is the text of the Laws as well as of the
Statesman and Republic. The principle that the balance of power preserves
states; the reflection that no one ever passed his whole life in disbelief
of the Gods; the remark that the characters of men are best seen in
convivial intercourse; the observation that the people must be allowed to
share not only in the government, but in the administration of justice;
the desire to make laws, not with a view to courage only, but to all
virtue; the clear perception that education begins with birth, or even, as
he would say, before birth; the attempt to purify religion; the modern
reflections, that punishment is not vindictive, and that limits must be
set to the power of bequest; the impossibility of undeceiving the victims
of quacks and jugglers; the provision for water, and for other
requirements of health, and for concealing the bodies of the dead with as
little hurt as possible to the living; above all, perhaps, the distinct
consciousness that under the actual circumstances of mankind the ideal
cannot be carried out, and yet may be a guiding principle--will appear to
us, if we remember that we are still in the dawn of politics, to show a
great depth of political wisdom.

IV. The Laws of Plato contain numerous passages which closely resemble
other passages in his writings. And at first sight a suspicion arises that
the repetition shows the unequal hand of the imitator. For why should a
writer say over again, in a more imperfect form, what he had already said
in his most finished style and manner? And yet it may be urged on the
other side that an author whose original powers are beginning to decay
will be very liable to repeat himself, as in conversation, so in books. He
may have forgotten what he had written before; he may be unconscious of
the decline of his own powers. Hence arises a question of great interest,
bearing on the genuineness of ancient writers. Is there any criterion by
which we can distinguish the genuine resemblance from the spurious, or, in
other words, the repetition of a thought or passage by an author himself
from the appropriation of it by another? The question has, perhaps, never
been fully discussed; and, though a real one, does not admit of a precise
answer. A few general considerations on the subject may be offered:--

(a) Is the difference such as might be expected to arise at different
times of life or under different circumstances?--There would be nothing
surprising in a writer, as he grew older, losing something of his own
originality, and falling more and more under the spirit of his age. 'What
a genius I had when I wrote that book!' was the pathetic exclamation of a
famous English author, when in old age he chanced to take up one of his
early works. There would be nothing surprising again in his losing
somewhat of his powers of expression, and becoming less capable of framing
language into a harmonious whole. There would also be a strong presumption
that if the variation of style was uniform, it was attributable to some
natural cause, and not to the arts of the imitator. The inferiority might
be the result of feebleness and of want of activity of mind. But the
natural weakness of a great author would commonly be different from the
artificial weakness of an imitator; it would be continuous and uniform.
The latter would be apt to fill his work with irregular patches, sometimes
taken verbally from the writings of the author whom he personated, but
rarely acquiring his spirit. His imitation would be obvious, irregular,
superficial. The patches of purple would be easily detected among his
threadbare and tattered garments. He would rarely take the pains to put
the same thought into other words. There were many forgeries in English
literature which attained a considerable degree of success 50 or 100 years
ago; but it is doubtful whether attempts such as these could now escape
detection, if there were any writings of the same author or of the same
age to be compared with them. And ancient forgers were much less skilful
than modern; they were far from being masters in the art of deception, and
had rarely any motive for being so.

(b) But, secondly, the imitator will commonly be least capable of
understanding or imitating that part of a great writer which is most
characteristic of him. In every man's writings there is something like
himself and unlike others, which gives individuality. To appreciate this
latent quality would require a kindred mind, and minute study and
observation. There are a class of similarities which may be called
undesigned coincidences, which are so remote as to be incapable of being
borrowed from one another, and yet, when they are compared, find a natural
explanation in their being the work of the same mind. The imitator might
copy the turns of style--he might repeat images or illustrations, but he
could not enter into the inner circle of Platonic philosophy. He would
understand that part of it which became popular in the next generation, as
for example, the doctrine of ideas or of numbers: he might approve of
communism. But the higher flights of Plato about the science of dialectic,
or the unity of virtue, or a person who is above the law, would be
unintelligible to him.

(c) The argument from imitation assumes a different character when the
supposed imitations are associated with other passages having the impress
of original genius. The strength of the argument from undesigned
coincidences of style is much increased when they are found side by side
with thoughts and expressions which can only have come from a great
original writer. The great excellence, not only of the whole, but even of
the parts of writings, is a strong proof of their genuineness--for
although the great writer may fall below, the forger or imitator cannot
rise much above himself. Whether we can attribute the worst parts of a
work to a forger and the best to a great writer,--as for example, in the
case of some of Shakespeare's plays,--depends upon the probability that
they have been interpolated, or have been the joint work of two writers;
and this can only be established either by express evidence or by a
comparison of other writings of the same class. If the interpolation or
double authorship of Greek writings in the time of Plato could be shown to
be common, then a question, perhaps insoluble, would arise, not whether
the whole, but whether parts of the Platonic dialogues are genuine, and,
if parts only, which parts. Hebrew prophecies and Homeric poems and Laws
of Manu may have grown together in early times, but there is no reason to
think that any of the dialogues of Plato is the result of a similar
process of accumulation. It is therefore rash to say with Oncken (Die
Staatslehre des Aristoteles) that the form in which Aristotle knew the
Laws of Plato must have been different from that in which they have come
down to us.

It must be admitted that these principles are difficult of application.
Yet a criticism may be worth making which rests only on probabilities or
impressions. Great disputes will arise about the merits of different
passages, about what is truly characteristic and original or trivial and
borrowed. Many have thought the Laws to be one of the greatest of Platonic
writings, while in the judgment of Mr. Grote they hardly rise above the
level of the forged epistles. The manner in which a writer would or would
not have written at a particular time of life must be acknowledged to be a
matter of conjecture. But enough has been said to show that similarities
of a certain kind, whether criticism is able to detect them or not, may be
such as must be attributed to an original writer, and not to a mere
imitator.

(d) Applying these principles to the case of the Laws, we have now to
point out that they contain the class of refined or unconscious
similarities which are indicative of genuineness. The parallelisms are
like the repetitions of favourite thoughts into which every one is apt to
fall unawares in conversation or in writing. They are found in a work
which contains many beautiful and remarkable passages. We may therefore
begin by claiming this presumption in their favour. Such undesigned
coincidences, as we may venture to call them, are the following. The
conception of justice as the union of temperance, wisdom, courage (Laws;
Republic): the latent idea of dialectic implied in the notion of dividing
laws after the kinds of virtue (Laws); the approval of the method of
looking at one idea gathered from many things, 'than which a truer was
never discovered by any man' (compare Republic): or again the description
of the Laws as parents (Laws; Republic): the assumption that religion has
been already settled by the oracle of Delphi (Laws; Republic), to which an
appeal is also made in special cases (Laws): the notion of the battle with
self, a paradox for which Plato in a manner apologizes both in the Laws
and the Republic: the remark (Laws) that just men, even when they are
deformed in body, may still be perfectly beautiful in respect of the
excellent justice of their minds (compare Republic): the argument that
ideals are none the worse because they cannot be carried out (Laws;
Republic): the near approach to the idea of good in 'the principle which
is common to all the four virtues,' a truth which the guardians must be
compelled to recognize (Laws; compare Republic): or again the recognition
by reason of the right pleasure and pain, which had previously been matter
of habit (Laws; Republic): or the blasphemy of saying that the excellency
of music is to give pleasure (Laws; Republic): again the story of the
Sidonian Cadmus (Laws), which is a variation of the Phoenician tale of the
earth-born men (Republic): the comparison of philosophy to a yelping she-
dog, both in the Republic and in the Laws: the remark that no man can
practise two trades (Laws; Republic): or the advantage of the middle
condition (Laws; Republic): the tendency to speak of principles as moulds
or forms; compare the ekmageia of song (Laws), and the tupoi of religion
(Republic): or the remark (Laws) that 'the relaxation of justice makes
many cities out of one,' which may be compared with the Republic: or the
description of lawlessness 'creeping in little by little in the fashions
of music and overturning all things,'--to us a paradox, but to Plato's
mind a fixed idea, which is found in the Laws as well as in the Republic:
or the figure of the parts of the human body under which the parts of the
state are described (Laws; Republic): the apology for delay and
diffuseness, which occurs not unfrequently in the Republic, is carried to
an excess in the Laws (compare Theaet.): the remarkable thought (Laws)
that the soul of the sun is better than the sun, agrees with the relation
in which the idea of good stands to the sun in the Republic, and with the
substitution of mind for the idea of good in the Philebus: the passage
about the tragic poets (Laws) agrees generally with the treatment of them
in the Republic, but is more finely conceived, and worked out in a nobler
spirit. Some lesser similarities of thought and manner should not be
omitted, such as the mention of the thirty years' old students in the
Republic, and the fifty years' old choristers in the Laws; or the making
of the citizens out of wax (Laws) compared with the other image
(Republic); or the number of the tyrant (729), which is NEARLY equal with
the number of days and nights in the year (730), compared with the 'slight
correction' of the sacred number 5040, which is divisible by all the
numbers from 1 to 12 except 11, and divisible by 11, if two families be
deducted; or once more, we may compare the ignorance of solid geometry of
which he complains in the Republic and the puzzle about fractions with the
difficulty in the Laws about commensurable and incommensurable quantities
--and the malicious emphasis on the word gunaikeios (Laws) with the use of
the same word (Republic). These and similar passages tend to show that the
author of the Republic is also the author of the Laws. They are echoes of
the same voice, expressions of the same mind, coincidences too subtle to
have been invented by the ingenuity of any imitator. The force of the
argument is increased, if we remember that no passage in the Laws is
exactly copied,--nowhere do five or six words occur together which are
found together elsewhere in Plato's writings.

In other dialogues of Plato, as well as in the Republic, there are to be
found parallels with the Laws. Such resemblances, as we might expect,
occur chiefly (but not exclusively) in the dialogues which, on other
grounds, we may suppose to be of later date. The punishment of evil is to
be like evil men (Laws), as he says also in the Theaetetus. Compare again
the dependence of tragedy and comedy on one another, of which he gives the
reason in the Laws--'For serious things cannot be understood without
laughable, nor opposites at all without opposites, if a man is really to
have intelligence of either'; here he puts forward the principle which is
the groundwork of the thesis of Socrates in the Symposium, 'that the
genius of tragedy is the same as that of comedy, and that the writer of
comedy ought to be a writer of tragedy also.' There is a truth and right
which is above Law (Laws), as we learn also from the Statesman. That men
are the possession of the Gods (Laws), is a reflection which likewise
occurs in the Phaedo. The remark, whether serious or ironical (Laws), that
'the sons of the Gods naturally believed in the Gods, because they had the
means of knowing about them,' is found in the Timaeus. The reign of
Cronos, who is the divine ruler (Laws), is a reminiscence of the
Statesman. It is remarkable that in the Sophist and Statesman (Soph.),
Plato, speaking in the character of the Eleatic Stranger, has already put
on the old man. The madness of the poets, again, is a favourite notion of
Plato's, which occurs also in the Laws, as well as in the Phaedrus, Ion,
and elsewhere. There are traces in the Laws of the same desire to base
speculation upon history which we find in the Critias. Once more, there is
a striking parallel with the paradox of the Gorgias, that 'if you do evil,
it is better to be punished than to be unpunished,' in the Laws: 'To live
having all goods without justice and virtue is the greatest of evils if
life be immortal, but not so great if the bad man lives but a short time.'

The point to be considered is whether these are the kind of parallels
which would be the work of an imitator. Would a forger have had the wit to
select the most peculiar and characteristic thoughts of Plato; would he
have caught the spirit of his philosophy; would he, instead of openly
borrowing, have half concealed his favourite ideas; would he have formed
them into a whole such as the Laws; would he have given another the credit
which he might have obtained for himself; would he have remembered and
made use of other passages of the Platonic writings and have never
deviated into the phraseology of them? Without pressing such arguments as
absolutely certain, we must acknowledge that such a comparison affords a
new ground of real weight for believing the Laws to be a genuine writing
of Plato.

V. The relation of the Republic to the Laws is clearly set forth by Plato
in the Laws. The Republic is the best state, the Laws is the best possible
under the existing conditions of the Greek world. The Republic is the
ideal, in which no man calls anything his own, which may or may not have
existed in some remote clime, under the rule of some God, or son of a God
(who can say?), but is, at any rate, the pattern of all other states and
the exemplar of human life. The Laws distinctly acknowledge what the
Republic partly admits, that the ideal is inimitable by us, but that we
should 'lift up our eyes to the heavens' and try to regulate our lives
according to the divine image. The citizens are no longer to have wives
and children in common, and are no longer to be under the government of
philosophers. But the spirit of communism or communion is to continue
among them, though reverence for the sacredness of the family, and respect
of children for parents, not promiscuous hymeneals, are now the foundation
of the state; the sexes are to be as nearly on an equality as possible;
they are to meet at common tables, and to share warlike pursuits (if the
women will consent), and to have a common education. The legislator has
taken the place of the philosopher, but a council of elders is retained,
who are to fulfil the duties of the legislator when he has passed out of
life. The addition of younger persons to this council by co-optation is an
improvement on the governing body of the Republic. The scheme of education
in the Laws is of a far lower kind than that which Plato had conceived in
the Republic. There he would have his rulers trained in all knowledge
meeting in the idea of good, of which the different branches of
mathematical science are but the hand-maidens or ministers; here he treats
chiefly of popular education, stopping short with the preliminary
sciences,--these are to be studied partly with a view to their practical
usefulness, which in the Republic he holds cheap, and even more with a
view to avoiding impiety, of which in the Republic he says nothing; he
touches very lightly on dialectic, which is still to be retained for the
rulers. Yet in the Laws there remain traces of the old educational ideas.
He is still for banishing the poets; and as he finds the works of prose
writers equally dangerous, he would substitute for them the study of his
own laws. He insists strongly on the importance of mathematics as an
educational instrument. He is no more reconciled to the Greek mythology
than in the Republic, though he would rather say nothing about it out of a
reverence for antiquity; and he is equally willing to have recourse to
fictions, if they have a moral tendency. His thoughts recur to a golden
age in which the sanctity of oaths was respected and in which men living
nearer the Gods were more disposed to believe in them; but we must
legislate for the world as it is, now that the old beliefs have passed
away. Though he is no longer fired with dialectical enthusiasm, he would
compel the guardians to 'look at one idea gathered from many things,' and
to 'perceive the principle which is the same in all the four virtues.' He
still recognizes the enormous influence of music, in which every youth is
to be trained for three years; and he seems to attribute the existing
degeneracy of the Athenian state and the laxity of morals partly to
musical innovation, manifested in the unnatural divorce of the instrument
and the voice, of the rhythm from the words, and partly to the influence
of the mob who ruled at the theatres. He assimilates the education of the
two sexes, as far as possible, both in music and gymnastic, and, as in the
Republic, he would give to gymnastic a purely military character. In
marriage, his object is still to produce the finest children for the
state. As in the Statesman, he would unite in wedlock dissimilar natures--
the passionate with the dull, the courageous with the gentle. And the
virtuous tyrant of the Statesman, who has no place in the Republic, again
appears. In this, as in all his writings, he has the strongest sense of
the degeneracy and incapacity of the rulers of his own time.

In the Laws, the philosophers, if not banished, like the poets, are at
least ignored; and religion takes the place of philosophy in the
regulation of human life. It must however be remembered that the religion
of Plato is co-extensive with morality, and is that purified religion and
mythology of which he speaks in the second book of the Republic. There is
no real discrepancy in the two works. In a practical treatise, he speaks
of religion rather than of philosophy; just as he appears to identify
virtue with pleasure, and rather seeks to find the common element of the
virtues than to maintain his old paradoxical theses that they are one, or
that they are identical with knowledge. The dialectic and the idea of
good, which even Glaucon in the Republic could not understand, would be
out of place in a less ideal work. There may also be a change in his own
mind, the purely intellectual aspect of philosophy having a diminishing
interest to him in his old age.

Some confusion occurs in the passage in which Plato speaks of the
Republic, occasioned by his reference to a third state, which he proposes
(D.V.) hereafter to expound. Like many other thoughts in the Laws, the
allusion is obscure from not being worked out. Aristotle (Polit.) speaks
of a state which is neither the best absolutely, nor the best under
existing conditions, but an imaginary state, inferior to either,
destitute, as he supposes, of the necessaries of life--apparently such a
beginning of primitive society as is described in Laws iii. But it is not
clear that by this the third state of Plato is intended. It is possible
that Plato may have meant by his third state an historical sketch, bearing
the same relation to the Laws which the unfinished Critias would have
borne to the Republic; or he may, perhaps, have intended to describe a
state more nearly approximating than the Laws to existing Greek states.

The Statesman is a mere fragment when compared with the Laws, yet
combining a second interest of dialectic as well as politics, which is
wanting in the larger work. Several points of similarity and contrast may
be observed between them. In some respects the Statesman is even more
ideal than the Republic, looking back to a former state of paradisiacal
life, in which the Gods ruled over mankind, as the Republic looks forward
to a coming kingdom of philosophers. Of this kingdom of Cronos there is
also mention in the Laws. Again, in the Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger
rises above law to the conception of the living voice of the lawgiver, who
is able to provide for individual cases. A similar thought is repeated in
the Laws: 'If in the order of nature, and by divine destiny, a man were
able to apprehend the truth about these things, he would have no need of
laws to rule over him; for there is no law or order above knowledge, nor
can mind without impiety be deemed the subject or slave of any, but rather
the lord of all.' The union of opposite natures, who form the warp and the
woof of the political web, is a favourite thought which occurs in both
dialogues (Laws; Statesman).

The Laws are confessedly a Second-best, an inferior Ideal, to which Plato
has recourse, when he finds that the city of Philosophers is no longer
'within the horizon of practical politics.' But it is curious to observe
that the higher Ideal is always returning (compare Arist. Polit.), and
that he is not much nearer the actual fact, nor more on the level of
ordinary life in the Laws than in the Republic. It is also interesting to
remark that the new Ideal is always falling away, and that he hardly
supposes the one to be more capable of being realized than the other.
Human beings are troublesome to manage; and the legislator cannot adapt
his enactments to the infinite variety of circumstances; after all he must
leave the administration of them to his successors; and though he would
have liked to make them as permanent as they are in Egypt, he cannot
escape from the necessity of change. At length Plato is obliged to
institute a Nocturnal Council which is supposed to retain the mind of the
legislator, and of which some of the members are even supposed to go
abroad and inspect the institutions of foreign countries, as a foundation
for changes in their own. The spirit of such changes, though avoiding the
extravagance of a popular assembly, being only so much change as the
conservative temper of old members is likely to allow, is nevertheless
inconsistent with the fixedness of Egypt which Plato wishes to impress
upon Hellenic institutions. He is inconsistent with himself as the truth
begins to dawn upon him that 'in the execution things for the most part
fall short of our conception of them' (Republic).

And is not this true of ideals of government in general? We are always
disappointed in them. Nothing great can be accomplished in the short space
of human life; wherefore also we look forward to another (Republic). As we
grow old, we are sensible that we have no power actively to pursue our
ideals any longer. We have had our opportunity and do not aspire to be
more than men: we have received our 'wages and are going home.' Neither do
we despair of the future of mankind, because we have been able to do so
little in comparison of the whole. We look in vain for consistency either
in men or things. But we have seen enough of improvement in our own time
to justify us in the belief that the world is worth working for and that a
good man's life is not thrown away. Such reflections may help us to bring
home to ourselves by inward sympathy the language of Plato in the Laws,
and to combine into something like a whole his various and at first sight
inconsistent utterances.

VI. The Republic may be described as the Spartan constitution appended to
a government of philosophers. But in the Laws an Athenian element is also
introduced. Many enactments are taken from the Athenian; the four classes
are borrowed from the constitution of Cleisthenes, which Plato regards as
the best form of Athenian government, and the guardians of the law bear a
certain resemblance to the archons. In the constitution of the Laws nearly
all officers are elected by a vote more or less popular and by lot. But
the assembly only exists for the purposes of election, and has no
legislative or executive powers. The Nocturnal Council, which is the
highest body in the state, has several of the functions of the ancient
Athenian Areopagus, after which it appears to be modelled. Life is to
wear, as at Athens, a joyous and festive look; there are to be Bacchic
choruses, and men of mature age are encouraged in moderate potations. On
the other hand, the common meals, the public education, the crypteia are
borrowed from Sparta and not from Athens, and the superintendence of
private life, which was to be practised by the governors, has also its
prototype in Sparta. The extravagant dislike which Plato shows both to a
naval power and to extreme democracy is the reverse of Athenian.

The best-governed Hellenic states traced the origin of their laws to
individual lawgivers. These were real persons, though we are uncertain how
far they originated or only modified the institutions which are ascribed
to them. But the lawgiver, though not a myth, was a fixed idea in the mind
of the Greek,--as fixed as the Trojan war or the earth-born Cadmus. 'This
was what Solon meant or said'--was the form in which the Athenian
expressed his own conception of right and justice, or argued a disputed
point of law. And the constant reference in the Laws of Plato to the
lawgiver is altogether in accordance with Greek modes of thinking and
speaking.

There is also, as in the Republic, a Pythagorean element. The highest
branch of education is arithmetic; to know the order of the heavenly
bodies, and to reconcile the apparent contradiction of their movements, is
an important part of religion; the lives of the citizens are to have a
common measure, as also their vessels and coins; the great blessing of the
state is the number 5040. Plato is deeply impressed by the antiquity of
Egypt, and the unchangeableness of her ancient forms of song and dance.
And he is also struck by the progress which the Egyptians had made in the
mathematical sciences--in comparison of them the Greeks appeared to him to
be little better than swine. Yet he censures the Egyptian meanness and
inhospitality to strangers. He has traced the growth of states from their
rude beginnings in a philosophical spirit; but of any life or growth of
the Hellenic world in future ages he is silent. He has made the reflection
that past time is the maker of states (Book iii.); but he does not argue
from the past to the future, that the process is always going on, or that
the institutions of nations are relative to their stage of civilization.
If he could have stamped indelibly upon Hellenic states the will of the
legislator, he would have been satisfied. The utmost which he expects of
future generations is that they should supply the omissions, or correct
the errors which younger statesmen detect in his enactments. When
institutions have been once subjected to this process of criticism, he
would have them fixed for ever.

THE PREAMBLE.

BOOK I. Strangers, let me ask a question of you--Was a God or a man the
author of your laws? 'A God, Stranger. In Crete, Zeus is said to have been
the author of them; in Sparta, as Megillus will tell you, Apollo.' You
Cretans believe, as Homer says, that Minos went every ninth year to
converse with his Olympian sire, and gave you laws which he brought from
him. 'Yes; and there was Rhadamanthus, his brother, who is reputed among
us to have been a most righteous judge.' That is a reputation worthy of
the son of Zeus. And as you and Megillus have been trained under these
laws, I may ask you to give me an account of them. We can talk about them
in our walk from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus. I am told that the
distance is considerable, but probably there are shady places under the
trees, where, being no longer young, we may often rest and converse. 'Yes,
Stranger, a little onward there are beautiful groves of cypresses, and
green meadows in which we may repose.'

My first question is, Why has the law ordained that you should have common
meals, and practise gymnastics, and bear arms? 'My answer is, that all our
institutions are of a military character. We lead the life of the camp
even in time of peace, keeping up the organization of an army, and having
meals in common; and as our country, owing to its ruggedness, is ill-
suited for heavy-armed cavalry or infantry, our soldiers are archers,
equipped with bows and arrows. The legislator was under the idea that war
was the natural state of all mankind, and that peace is only a pretence;
he thought that no possessions had any value which were not secured
against enemies.' And do you think that superiority in war is the proper
aim of government? 'Certainly I do, and my Spartan friend will agree with
me.' And are there wars, not only of state against state, but of village
against village, of family against family, of individual against
individual? 'Yes.' And is a man his own enemy? 'There you come to first
principles, like a true votary of the goddess Athene; and this is all the
better, for you will the sooner recognize the truth of what I am saying--
that all men everywhere are the enemies of all, and each individual of
every other and of himself; and, further, that there is a victory and
defeat--the best and the worst--which each man sustains, not at the hands
of another, but of himself.' And does this extend to states and villages
as well as to individuals? 'Certainly; there is a better in them which
conquers or is conquered by the worse.' Whether the worse ever really
conquers the better, is a question which may be left for the present; but
your meaning is, that bad citizens do sometimes overcome the good, and
that the state is then conquered by herself, and that when they are
defeated the state is victorious over herself. Or, again, in a family
there may be several brothers, and the bad may be a majority; and when the
bad majority conquer the good minority, the family are worse than
themselves. The use of the terms 'better or worse than himself or
themselves' may be doubtful, but about the thing meant there can be no
dispute. 'Very true.' Such a struggle might be determined by a judge. And
which will be the better judge--he who destroys the worse and lets the
better rule, or he who lets the better rule and makes the others
voluntarily obey; or, thirdly, he who destroys no one, but reconciles the
two parties? 'The last, clearly.' But the object of such a judge or
legislator would not be war. 'True.' And as there are two kinds of war,
one without and one within a state, of which the internal is by far the
worse, will not the legislator chiefly direct his attention to this
latter? He will reconcile the contending factions, and unite them against
their external enemies. 'Certainly.' Every legislator will aim at the
greatest good, and the greatest good is not victory in war, whether civil
or external, but mutual peace and good-will, as in the body health is
preferable to the purgation of disease. He who makes war his object
instead of peace, or who pursues war except for the sake of peace, is not
a true statesman. 'And yet, Stranger, the laws both of Crete and Sparta
aim entirely at war.' Perhaps so; but do not let us quarrel about your
legislators--let us be gentle; they were in earnest quite as much as we
are, and we must try to discover their meaning. The poet Tyrtaeus (you
know his poems in Crete, and my Lacedaemonian friend is only too familiar
with them)--he was an Athenian by birth, and a Spartan citizen:--'Well,'
he says, 'I sing not, I care not about any man, however rich or happy,
unless he is brave in war.' Now I should like, in the name of us all, to
ask the poet a question. Oh Tyrtaeus, I would say to him, we agree with
you in praising those who excel in war, but which kind of war do you
mean?--that dreadful war which is termed civil, or the milder sort which
is waged against foreign enemies? You say that you abominate 'those who
are not eager to taste their enemies' blood,' and you seem to mean chiefly
their foreign enemies. 'Certainly he does.' But we contend that there are
men better far than your heroes, Tyrtaeus, concerning whom another poet,
Theognis the Sicilian, says that 'in a civil broil they are worth their
weight in gold and silver.' For in a civil war, not only courage, but
justice and temperance and wisdom are required, and all virtue is better
than a part. The mercenary soldier is ready to die at his post; yet he is
commonly a violent, senseless creature. And the legislator, whether
inspired or uninspired, will make laws with a view to the highest virtue;
and this is not brute courage, but loyalty in the hour of danger. The
virtue of Tyrtaeus, although needful enough in his own time, is really of
a fourth-rate description. 'You are degrading our legislator to a very low
level.' Nay, we degrade not him, but ourselves, if we believe that the
laws of Lycurgus and Minos had a view to war only. A divine lawgiver would
have had regard to all the different kinds of virtue, and have arranged
his laws in corresponding classes, and not in the modern fashion, which
only makes them after the want of them is felt,--about inheritances and
heiresses and assaults, and the like. As you truly said, virtue is the
business of the legislator; but you went wrong when you referred all
legislation to a part of virtue, and to an inferior part. For the object
of laws, whether the Cretan or any other, is to make men happy. Now
happiness or good is of two kinds--there are divine and there are human
goods. He who has the divine has the human added to him; but he who has
lost the greater is deprived of both. The lesser goods are health, beauty,
strength, and, lastly, wealth; not the blind God, Pluto, but one who has
eyes to see and follow wisdom. For mind or wisdom is the most divine of
all goods; and next comes temperance, and justice springs from the union
of wisdom and temperance with courage, which is the fourth or last. These
four precede other goods, and the legislator will arrange all his
ordinances accordingly, the human going back to the divine, and the divine
to their leader mind. There will be enactments about marriage, about
education, about all the states and feelings and experiences of men and
women, at every age, in weal and woe, in war and peace; upon all the law
will fix a stamp of praise and blame. There will also be regulations about
property and expenditure, about contracts, about rewards and punishments,
and finally about funeral rites and honours of the dead. The lawgiver will
appoint guardians to preside over these things; and mind will harmonize
his ordinances, and show them to be in agreement with temperance and
justice. Now I want to know whether the same principles are observed in
the laws of Lycurgus and Minos, or, as I should rather say, of Apollo and
Zeus. We must go through the virtues, beginning with courage, and then we
will show that what has preceded has relation to virtue.

'I wish,' says the Lacedaemonian, 'that you, Stranger, would first
criticize Cleinias and the Cretan laws.' Yes, is the reply, and I will
criticize you and myself, as well as him. Tell me, Megillus, were not the
common meals and gymnastic training instituted by your legislator with a
view to war? 'Yes; and next in the order of importance comes hunting, and
fourth the endurance of pain in boxing contests, and in the beatings which
are the punishment of theft. There is, too, the so-called Crypteia or
secret service, in which our youth wander about the country night and day
unattended, and even in winter go unshod and have no beds to lie on.
Moreover they wrestle and exercise under a blazing sun, and they have many
similar customs.' Well, but is courage only a combat against fear and
pain, and not against pleasure and flattery? 'Against both, I should say.'
And which is worse,--to be overcome by pain, or by pleasure? 'The latter.'
But did the lawgivers of Crete and Sparta legislate for a courage which is
lame of one leg,--able to meet the attacks of pain but not those of
pleasure, or for one which can meet both? 'For a courage which can meet
both, I should say.' But if so, where are the institutions which train
your citizens to be equally brave against pleasure and pain, and superior
to enemies within as well as without? 'We confess that we have no
institutions worth mentioning which are of this character.' I am not
surprised, and will therefore only request forbearance on the part of us
all, in case the love of truth should lead any of us to censure the laws
of the others. Remember that I am more in the way of hearing criticisms of
your laws than you can be; for in well-ordered states like Crete and
Sparta, although an old man may sometimes speak of them in private to a
ruler or elder, a similar liberty is not allowed to the young. But now
being alone we shall not offend your legislator by a friendly examination
of his laws. 'Take any freedom which you like.'

My first observation is, that your lawgiver ordered you to endure
hardships, because he thought that those who had not this discipline would
run away from those who had. But he ought to have considered further, that
those who had never learned to resist pleasure would be equally at the
mercy of those who had, and these are often among the worst of mankind.
Pleasure, like fear, would overcome them and take away their courage and
freedom. 'Perhaps; but I must not be hasty in giving my assent.'

Next as to temperance: what institutions have you which are adapted to
promote temperance? 'There are the common meals and gymnastic exercises.'
These are partly good and partly bad, and, as in medicine, what is good at
one time and for one person, is bad at another time and for another
person. Now although gymnastics and common meals do good, they are also a
cause of evil in civil troubles, and they appear to encourage unnatural
love, as has been shown at Miletus, in Boeotia, and at Thurii. And the
Cretans are said to have invented the tale of Zeus and Ganymede in order
to justify their evil practices by the example of the God who was their
lawgiver. Leaving the story, we may observe that all law has to do with
pleasure and pain; these are two fountains which are ever flowing in human
nature, and he who drinks of them when and as much as he ought, is happy,
and he who indulges in them to excess, is miserable. 'You may be right,
but I still incline to think that the Lacedaemonian lawgiver did well in
forbidding pleasure, if I may judge from the result. For there is no
drunken revelry in Sparta, and any one found in a state of intoxication is
severely punished; he is not excused as an Athenian would be at Athens on
account of a festival. I myself have seen the Athenians drunk at the
Dionysia--and at our colony, Tarentum, on a similar occasion, I have
beheld the whole city in a state of intoxication.' I admit that these
festivals should be properly regulated. Yet I might reply, 'Yes, Spartans,
that is not your vice; but look at home and remember the licentiousness of
your women.' And to all such accusations every one of us may reply in
turn:--'Wonder not, Stranger; there are different customs in different
countries.' Now this may be a sufficient answer; but we are speaking about
the wisdom of lawgivers and not about the customs of men. To return to the
question of drinking: shall we have total abstinence, as you have, or hard
drinking, like the Scythians and Thracians, or moderate potations like the
Persians? 'Give us arms, and we send all these nations flying before us.'
My good friend, be modest; victories and defeats often arise from unknown
causes, and afford no proof of the goodness or badness of institutions.
The stronger overcomes the weaker, as the Athenians have overcome the
Ceans, or the Syracusans the Locrians, who are, perhaps, the best governed
state in that part of the world. People are apt to praise or censure
practices without enquiring into the nature of them. This is the way with
drink: one person brings many witnesses, who sing the praises of wine;
another declares that sober men defeat drunkards in battle; and he again
is refuted in turn. I should like to conduct the argument on some other
method; for if you regard numbers, there are two cities on one side, and
ten thousand on the other. 'I am ready to pursue any method which is
likely to lead us to the truth.' Let me put the matter thus: Somebody
praises the useful qualities of a goat; another has seen goats running
about wild in a garden, and blames a goat or any other animal which
happens to be without a keeper. 'How absurd!' Would a pilot who is sea-
sick be a good pilot? 'No.' Or a general who is sick and drunk with fear
and ignorant of war a good general? 'A general of old women he ought to
be.' But can any one form an estimate of any society, which is intended to
have a ruler, and which he only sees in an unruly and lawless state? 'No.'
There is a convivial form of society--is there not? 'Yes.' And has this
convivial society ever been rightly ordered? Of course you Spartans and
Cretans have never seen anything of the kind, but I have had wide
experience, and made many enquiries about such societies, and have hardly
ever found anything right or good in them. 'We acknowledge our want of
experience, and desire to learn of you.' Will you admit that in all
societies there must be a leader? 'Yes.' And in time of war he must be a
man of courage and absolutely devoid of fear, if this be possible?
'Certainly.' But we are talking now of a general who shall preside at
meetings of friends--and as these have a tendency to be uproarious, they
ought above all others to have a governor. 'Very good.' He should be a
sober man and a man of the world, who will keep, make, and increase the
peace of the society; a drunkard in charge of drunkards would be
singularly fortunate if he avoided doing a serious mischief. 'Indeed he
would.' Suppose a person to censure such meetings--he may be right, but
also he may have known them only in their disorderly state, under a
drunken master of the feast; and a drunken general or pilot cannot save
his army or his ships. 'True; but although I see the advantage of an army
having a good general, I do not equally see the good of a feast being well
managed.' If you mean to ask what good accrues to the state from the right
training of a single youth or a single chorus, I should reply, 'Not much';
but if you ask what is the good of education in general, I answer, that
education makes good men, and that good men act nobly and overcome their
enemies in battle. Victory is often suicidal to the victors, because it
creates forgetfulness of education, but education itself is never
suicidal. 'You imply that the regulation of convivial meetings is a part
of education; how will you prove this?' I will tell you. But first let me
offer a word of apology. We Athenians are always thought to be fond of
talking, whereas the Lacedaemonian is celebrated for brevity, and the
Cretan is considered to be sagacious and reserved. Now I fear that I may
be charged with spinning a long discourse out of slender materials. For
drinking cannot be rightly ordered without correct principles of music,
and music runs up into education generally, and to discuss all these
matters may be tedious; if you like, therefore, we will pass on to another
part of our subject. 'Are you aware, Athenian, that our family is your
proxenus at Sparta, and that from my boyhood I have regarded Athens as a
second country, and having often fought your battles in my youth, I have
become attached to you, and love the sound of the Attic dialect? The
saying is true, that the best Athenians are more than ordinarily good,
because they are good by nature; therefore, be assured that I shall be
glad to hear you talk as much as you please.' 'I, too,' adds Cleinias,
'have a tie which binds me to you. You know that Epimenides, the Cretan
prophet, came and offered sacrifices in your city by the command of an
oracle ten years before the Persian war. He told the Athenians that the
Persian host would not come for ten years, and would go away again, having
suffered more harm than they had inflicted. Now Epimenides was of my
family, and when he visited Athens he entered into friendship with your
forefathers.' I see that you are willing to listen, and I have the will to
speak, if I had only the ability. But, first, I must define the nature and
power of education, and by this road we will travel on to the God
Dionysus. The man who is to be good at anything must have early training;
--the future builder must play at building, and the husbandman at digging;
the soldier must learn to ride, and the carpenter to measure and use the
rule,--all the thoughts and pleasures of children should bear on their
after-profession.--Do you agree with me? 'Certainly.' And we must remember
further that we are speaking of the education, not of a trainer, or of the
captain of a ship, but of a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and how
to obey; and such an education aims at virtue, and not at wealth or
strength or mere cleverness. To the good man, education is of all things
the most precious, and is also in constant need of renovation. 'We agree.'
And we have before agreed that good men are those who are able to control
themselves, and bad men are those who are not. Let me offer you an
illustration which will assist our argument. Man is one; but in one and
the same man are two foolish counsellors who contend within him--pleasure
and pain, and of either he has expectations which we call hope and fear;
and he is able to reason about good and evil, and reason, when affirmed by
the state, becomes law. 'We cannot follow you.' Let me put the matter in
another way: Every creature is a puppet of the Gods--whether he is a mere
plaything or has any serious use we do not know; but this we do know, that
he is drawn different ways by cords and strings. There is a soft golden
cord which draws him towards virtue--this is the law of the state; and
there are other cords made of iron and hard materials drawing him other
ways. The golden reasoning influence has nothing of the nature of force,
and therefore requires ministers in order to vanquish the other
principles. This explains the doctrine that cities and citizens both
conquer and are conquered by themselves. The individual follows reason,
and the city law, which is embodied reason, either derived from the Gods
or from the legislator. When virtue and vice are thus distinguished,
education will be better understood, and in particular the relation of
education to convivial intercourse. And now let us set wine before the
puppet. You admit that wine stimulates the passions? 'Yes.' And does wine
equally stimulate the reasoning faculties? 'No; it brings the soul back to
a state of childhood.' In such a state a man has the least control over
himself, and is, therefore, worst. 'Very true.' Then how can we believe
that drinking should be encouraged? 'You seem to think that it ought to
be.' And I am ready to maintain my position. 'We should like to hear you
prove that a man ought to make a beast of himself.' You are speaking of
the degradation of the soul: but how about the body? Would any man
willingly degrade or weaken that? 'Certainly not.' And yet if he goes to a
doctor or a gymnastic master, does he not make himself ill in the hope of
getting well? for no one would like to be always taking medicine, or
always to be in training. 'True.' And may not convivial meetings have a
similar remedial use? And if so, are they not to be preferred to other
modes of training because they are painless? 'But have they any such use?'
Let us see: Are there not two kinds of fear--fear of evil and fear of an
evil reputation? 'There are.' The latter kind of fear is opposed both to
the fear of pain and to the love of pleasure. This is called by the
legislator reverence, and is greatly honoured by him and by every good
man; whereas confidence, which is the opposite quality, is the worst fault
both of individuals and of states. This sort of fear or reverence is one
of the two chief causes of victory in war, fearlessness of enemies being
the other. 'True.' Then every one should be both fearful and fearless?
'Yes.' The right sort of fear is infused into a man when he comes face to
face with shame, or cowardice, or the temptations of pleasure, and has to
conquer them. He must learn by many trials to win the victory over
himself, if he is ever to be made perfect. 'That is reasonable enough.'
And now, suppose that the Gods had given mankind a drug, of which the
effect was to exaggerate every sort of evil and danger, so that the
bravest man entirely lost his presence of mind and became a coward for a
time:--would such a drug have any value? 'But is there such a drug?' No;
but suppose that there were; might not the legislator use such a mode of
testing courage and cowardice? 'To be sure.' The legislator would induce
fear in order to implant fearlessness; and would give rewards or
punishments to those who behaved well or the reverse, under the influence
of the drug? 'Certainly.' And this mode of training, whether practised in
the case of one or many, whether in solitude or in the presence of a large
company--if a man have sufficient confidence in himself to drink the
potion amid his boon companions, leaving off in time and not taking too
much,--would be an equally good test of temperance? 'Very true.' Let us
return to the lawgiver and say to him, 'Well, lawgiver, no such fear-
producing potion has been given by God or invented by man, but there is a
potion which will make men fearless.' 'You mean wine.' Yes; has not wine
an effect the contrary of that which I was just now describing,--first
mellowing and humanizing a man, and then filling him with confidence,
making him ready to say or do anything? 'Certainly.' Let us not forget
that there are two qualities which should be cultivated in the soul--
first, the greatest fearlessness, and, secondly, the greatest fear, which
are both parts of reverence. Courage and fearlessness are trained amid
dangers; but we have still to consider how fear is to be trained. We
desire to attain fearlessness and confidence without the insolence and
boldness which commonly attend them. For do not love, ignorance, avarice,
wealth, beauty, strength, while they stimulate courage, also madden and
intoxicate the soul? What better and more innocent test of character is
there than festive intercourse? Would you make a bargain with a man in
order to try whether he is honest? Or would you ascertain whether he is
licentious by putting your wife or daughter into his hands? No one would
deny that the test proposed is fairer, speedier, and safer than any other.
And such a test will be particularly useful in the political science,
which desires to know human natures and characters. 'Very true.'

BOOK II. And are there any other uses of well-ordered potations? There
are; but in order to explain them, I must repeat what I mean by right
education; which, if I am not mistaken, depends on the due regulation of
convivial intercourse. 'A high assumption.' I believe that virtue and vice
are originally present to the mind of children in the form of pleasure and
pain; reason and fixed principles come later, and happy is he who acquires
them even in declining years; for he who possesses them is the perfect
man. When pleasure and pain, and love and hate, are rightly implanted in
the yet unconscious soul, and after the attainment of reason are
discovered to be in harmony with her, this harmony of the soul is virtue,
and the preparatory stage, anticipating reason, I call education. But the
finer sense of pleasure and pain is apt to be impaired in the course of
life; and therefore the Gods, pitying the toils and sorrows of mortals,
have allowed them to have holidays, and given them the Muses and Apollo
and Dionysus for leaders and playfellows. All young creatures love motion
and frolic, and utter sounds of delight; but man only is capable of taking
pleasure in rhythmical and harmonious movements. With these education
begins; and the uneducated is he who has never known the discipline of the
chorus, and the educated is he who has. The chorus is partly dance and
partly song, and therefore the well-educated must sing and dance well. But
when we say, 'He sings and dances well,' we mean that he sings and dances
what is good. And if he thinks that to be good which is really good, he
will have a much higher music and harmony in him, and be a far greater
master of imitation in sound and gesture than he who is not of this
opinion. 'True.' Then, if we know what is good and bad in song and dance,
we shall know what education is? 'Very true.' Let us now consider the
beauty of figure, melody, song, and dance. Will the same figures or sounds
be equally well adapted to the manly and the cowardly when they are in
trouble? 'How can they be, when the very colours of their faces are
different?' Figures and melodies have a rhythm and harmony which are
adapted to the expression of different feelings (I may remark, by the way,
that the term 'colour,' which is a favourite word of music-masters, is not
really applicable to music). And one class of harmonies is akin to courage
and all virtue, the other to cowardice and all vice. 'We agree.' And do
all men equally like all dances? 'Far otherwise.' Do some figures, then,
appear to be beautiful which are not? For no one will admit that the forms
of vice are more beautiful than the forms of virtue, or that he prefers
the first kind to the second. And yet most persons say that the merit of
music is to give pleasure. But this is impiety. There is, however, a more
plausible account of the matter given by others, who make their likes or
dislikes the criterion of excellence. Sometimes nature crosses habit, or
conversely, and then they say that such and such fashions or gestures are
pleasant, but they do not like to exhibit them before men of sense,
although they enjoy them in private. 'Very true.' And do vicious measures
and strains do any harm, or good measures any good to the lovers of them?
'Probably.' Say, rather 'Certainly': for the gentle indulgence which we
often show to vicious men inevitably makes us become like them. And what
can be worse than this? 'Nothing.' Then in a well-administered city, the
poet will not be allowed to make the songs of the people just as he
pleases, or to train his choruses without regard to virtue and vice.
'Certainly not.' And yet he may do this anywhere except in Egypt; for
there ages ago they discovered the great truth which I am now asserting,
that the young should be educated in forms and strains of virtue. These
they fixed and consecrated in their temples; and no artist or musician is
allowed to deviate from them. They are literally the same which they were
ten thousand years ago. And this practice of theirs suggests the
reflection that legislation about music is not an impossible thing. But
the particular enactments must be the work of God or of some God-inspired
man, as in Egypt their ancient chants are said to be the composition of
the goddess Isis. The melodies which have a natural truth and correctness
should be embodied in a law, and then the desire of novelty is not strong
enough to change the old fashions. Is not the origin of music as follows?
We rejoice when we think that we prosper, and we think that we prosper
when we rejoice, and at such times we cannot rest, but our young men dance
dances and sing songs, and our old men, who have lost the elasticity of
youth, regale themselves with the memory of the past, while they
contemplate the life and activity of the young. 'Most true.' People say
that he who gives us most pleasure at such festivals is to win the palm:
are they right? 'Possibly.' Let us not be hasty in deciding, but first
imagine a festival at which the lord of the festival, having assembled the
citizens, makes a proclamation that he shall be crowned victor who gives
the most pleasure, from whatever source derived. We will further suppose
that there are exhibitions of rhapsodists and musicians, tragic and comic
poets, and even marionette-players--which of the pleasure-makers will win?
Shall I answer for you?--the marionette-players will please the children;
youths will decide for comedy; young men, educated women, and people in
general will prefer tragedy; we old men are lovers of Homer and Hesiod.
Now which of them is right? If you and I are asked, we shall certainly say
that the old men's way of thinking ought to prevail. 'Very true.' So far I
agree with the many that the excellence of music is to be measured by
pleasure; but then the pleasure must be that of the good and educated, or
better still, of one supremely virtuous and educated man. The true judge
must have both wisdom and courage. For he must lead the multitude and not
be led by them, and must not weakly yield to the uproar of the theatre,
nor give false judgment out of that mouth which has just appealed to the
Gods. The ancient custom of Hellas, which still prevails in Italy and
Sicily, left the judgment to the spectators, but this custom has been the
ruin of the poets, who seek only to please their patrons, and has degraded
the audience by the representation of inferior characters. What is the
inference? The same which we have often drawn, that education is the
training of the young idea in what the law affirms and the elders approve.
And as the soul of a child is too young to be trained in earnest, a kind
of education has been invented which tempts him with plays and songs, as
the sick are tempted by pleasant meats and drinks. And the wise legislator
will compel the poet to express in his poems noble thoughts in fitting
words and rhythms. 'But is this the practice elsewhere than in Crete and
Lacedaemon? In other states, as far as I know, dances and music are
constantly changed at the pleasure of the hearers.' I am afraid that I
misled you; not liking to be always finding fault with mankind as they
are, I described them as they ought to be. But let me understand: you say
that such customs exist among the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and that the
rest of the world would be improved by adopting them? 'Much improved.' And
you compel your poets to declare that the righteous are happy, and that
the wicked man, even if he be as rich as Midas, is unhappy? Or, in the
words of Tyrtaeus, 'I sing not, I care not about him' who is a great
warrior not having justice; if he be unjust, 'I would not have him look
calmly upon death or be swifter than the wind'; and may he be deprived of
every good--that is, of every true good. For even if he have the goods
which men regard, these are not really goods: first health; beauty next;
thirdly wealth; and there are others. A man may have every sense purged
and improved; he may be a tyrant, and do what he likes, and live for ever:
but you and I will maintain that all these things are goods to the just,
but to the unjust the greatest of evils, if life be immortal; not so great
if he live for a short time only. If a man had health and wealth, and
power, and was insolent and unjust, his life would still be miserable; he
might be fair and rich, and do what he liked, but he would live basely,
and if basely evilly, and if evilly painfully. 'There I cannot agree with
you.' Then may heaven give us the spirit of agreement, for I am as
convinced of the truth of what I say as that Crete is an island; and, if I
were a lawgiver, I would exercise a censorship over the poets, and I would
punish them if they said that the wicked are happy, or that injustice is
profitable. And these are not the only matters in which I should make my
citizens talk in a different way to the world in general. If I asked Zeus
and Apollo, the divine legislators of Crete and Sparta,--'Are the just and
pleasant life the same or not the same'?--and they replied,--'Not the
same'; and I asked again--'Which is the happier'? And they said'--'The
pleasant life,' this is an answer not fit for a God to utter, and
therefore I ought rather to put the same question to some legislator. And
if he replies 'The pleasant,' then I should say to him, 'O my father, did
you not tell me that I should live as justly as possible'? and if to be
just is to be happy, what is that principle of happiness or good which is
superior to pleasure? Is the approval of gods and men to be deemed good
and honourable, but unpleasant, and their disapproval the reverse? Or is
the neither doing nor suffering evil good and honourable, although not
pleasant? But you cannot make men like what is not pleasant, and therefore
you must make them believe that the just is pleasant. The business of the
legislator is to clear up this confusion. He will show that the just and
the unjust are identical with the pleasurable and the painful, from the
point of view of the just man, of the unjust the reverse. And which is the
truer judgment? Surely that of the better soul. For if not the truth, it
is the best and most moral of fictions; and the legislator who desires to
propagate this useful lie, may be encouraged by remarking that mankind
have believed the story of Cadmus and the dragon's teeth, and therefore he
may be assured that he can make them believe anything, and need only
consider what fiction will do the greatest good. That the happiest is also
the holiest, this shall be our strain, which shall be sung by all three
choruses alike. First will enter the choir of children, who will lift up
their voices on high; and after them the young men, who will pray the God
Paean to be gracious to the youth, and to testify to the truth of their
words; then will come the chorus of elder men, between thirty and sixty;
and, lastly, there will be the old men, and they will tell stories
enforcing the same virtues, as with the voice of an oracle. 'Whom do you
mean by the third chorus?' You remember how I spoke at first of the
restless nature of young creatures, who jumped about and called out in a
disorderly manner, and I said that no other animal attained any perception
of rhythm; but that to us the Gods gave Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus
to be our playfellows. Of the two first choruses I have already spoken,
and I have now to speak of the third, or Dionysian chorus, which is
composed of those who are between thirty and sixty years old. 'Let us
hear.' We are agreed (are we not?) that men, women, and children should be
always charming themselves with strains of virtue, and that there should
be a variety in the strains, that they may not weary of them? Now the
fairest and most useful of strains will be uttered by the elder men, and
therefore we cannot let them off. But how can we make them sing? For a
discreet elderly man is ashamed to hear the sound of his own voice in
private, and still more in public. The only way is to give them drink;
this will mellow the sourness of age. No one should be allowed to taste
wine until they are eighteen; from eighteen to thirty they may take a
little; but when they have reached forty years, they may be initiated into
the mystery of drinking. Thus they will become softer and more
impressible; and when a man's heart is warm within him, he will be more
ready to charm himself and others with song. And what songs shall he sing?
'At Crete and Lacedaemon we only know choral songs.' Yes; that is because
your way of life is military. Your young men are like wild colts feeding
in a herd together; no one takes the individual colt and trains him apart,
and tries to give him the qualities of a statesman as well as of a
soldier. He who was thus trained would be a greater warrior than those of
whom Tyrtaeus speaks, for he would be courageous, and yet he would know
that courage was only fourth in the scale of virtue. 'Once more, I must
say, Stranger, that you run down our lawgivers.' Not intentionally, my
good friend, but whither the argument leads I follow; and I am trying to
find some style of poetry suitable for those who dislike the common sort.
'Very good.' In all things which have a charm, either this charm is their
good, or they have some accompanying truth or advantage. For example, in
eating and drinking there is pleasure and also profit, that is to say,
health; and in learning there is a pleasure and also truth. There is a
pleasure or charm, too, in the imitative arts, as well as a law of
proportion or equality; but the pleasure which they afford, however
innocent, is not the criterion of their truth. The test of pleasure cannot
be applied except to that which has no other good or evil, no truth or
falsehood. But that which has truth must be judged of by the standard of
truth, and therefore imitation and proportion are to be judged of by their
truth alone. 'Certainly.' And as music is imitative, it is not to be
judged by the criterion of pleasure, and the Muse whom we seek is the muse
not of pleasure but of truth, for imitation has a truth. 'Doubtless.' And
if so, the judge must know what is being imitated before he decides on the
quality of the imitation, and he who does not know what is true will not
know what is good. 'He will not.' Will any one be able to imitate the
human body, if he does not know the number, proportion, colour, or figure
of the limbs? 'How can he?' But suppose we know some picture or figure to
be an exact resemblance of a man, should we not also require to know
whether the picture is beautiful or not? 'Quite right.' The judge of the
imitation is required to know, therefore, first the original, secondly the
truth, and thirdly the merit of the execution? 'True.' Then let us not
weary in the attempt to bring music to the standard of the Muses and of
truth. The Muses are not like human poets; they never spoil or mix rhythms
or scales, or mingle instruments and human voices, or confuse the manners
and strains of men and women, or of freemen and slaves, or of rational
beings and brute animals. They do not practise the baser sorts of musical
arts, such as the 'matured judgments,' of whom Orpheus speaks, would
ridicule. But modern poets separate metre from music, and melody and
rhythm from words, and use the instrument alone without the voice. The
consequence is, that the meaning of the rhythm and of the time are not
understood. I am endeavouring to show how our fifty-year-old choristers
are to be trained, and what they are to avoid. The opinion of the
multitude about these matters is worthless; they who are only made to step
in time by sheer force cannot be critics of music. 'Impossible.' Then our
newly-appointed minstrels must be trained in music sufficiently to
understand the nature of rhythms and systems; and they should select such
as are suitable to men of their age, and will enable them to give and
receive innocent pleasure. This is a knowledge which goes beyond that
either of the poets or of their auditors in general. For although the poet
must understand rhythm and music, he need not necessarily know whether the
imitation is good or not, which was the third point required in a judge;
but our chorus of elders must know all three, if they are to be the
instructors of youth.

And now we will resume the original argument, which may be summed up as
follows: A convivial meeting is apt to grow tumultuous as the drinking
proceeds; every man becomes light-headed, and fancies that he can rule the
whole world. 'Doubtless.' And did we not say that the souls of the
drinkers, when subdued by wine, are made softer and more malleable at the
hand of the legislator? the docility of childhood returns to them. At
times however they become too valiant and disorderly, drinking out of
their turn, and interrupting one another. And the business of the
legislator is to infuse into them that divine fear, which we call shame,
in opposition to this disorderly boldness. But in order to discipline them
there must be guardians of the law of drinking, and sober generals who
shall take charge of the private soldiers; they are as necessary in
drinking as in fighting, and he who disobeys these Dionysiac commanders
will be equally disgraced. 'Very good.' If a drinking festival were well
regulated, men would go away, not as they now do, greater enemies, but
better friends. Of the greatest gift of Dionysus I hardly like to speak,
lest I should be misunderstood. 'What is that?' According to tradition
Dionysus was driven mad by his stepmother Here, and in order to revenge
himself he inspired mankind with Bacchic madness. But these are stories
which I would rather not repeat. However I do acknowledge that all men are
born in an imperfect state, and are at first restless, irrational
creatures: this, as you will remember, has been already said by us. 'I
remember.' And that Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus gave us harmony and
rhythm? 'Very true.' The other story implies that wine was given to punish
us and make us mad; but we contend that wine is a balm and a cure; a
spring of modesty in the soul, and of health and strength in the body.
Again, the work of the chorus is co-extensive with the work of education;
rhythm and melody answer to the voice, and the motions of the body
correspond to all three, and the sound enters in and educates the soul in
virtue. 'Yes.' And the movement which, when pursued as an amusement, is
termed dancing, when studied with a view to the improvement of the body,
becomes gymnastic. Shall we now proceed to speak of this? 'What Cretan or
Lacedaemonian would approve of your omitting gymnastic?' Your question
implies assent; and you will easily understand a subject which is familiar
to you. Gymnastic is based on the natural tendency of every animal to
rapid motion; and man adds a sense of rhythm, which is awakened by music;
music and dancing together form the choral art. But before proceeding I
must add a crowning word about drinking. Like other pleasures, it has a
lawful use; but if a state or an individual is inclined to drink at will,
I cannot allow them. I would go further than Crete or Lacedaemon and have
the law of the Carthaginians, that no slave of either sex should drink
wine at all, and no soldier while he is on a campaign, and no magistrate
or officer while he is on duty, and that no one should drink by daylight
or on a bridal night. And there are so many other occasions on which wine
ought to be prohibited, that there will not be many vines grown or
vineyards required in the state.

BOOK III. If a man wants to know the origin of states and societies, he
should behold them from the point of view of time. Thousands of cities
have come into being and have passed away again in infinite ages, every
one of them having had endless forms of government; and if we can
ascertain the cause of these changes in states, that will probably explain
their origin. What do you think of ancient traditions about deluges and
destructions of mankind, and the preservation of a remnant? 'Every one
believes in them.' Then let us suppose the world to have been destroyed by
a deluge. The survivors would be hill-shepherds, small sparks of the human
race, dwelling in isolation, and unacquainted with the arts and vices of
civilization. We may further suppose that the cities on the plain and on
the coast have been swept away, and that all inventions, and every sort of
knowledge, have perished. 'Why, if all things were as they now are,
nothing would have ever been invented. All our famous discoveries have
been made within the last thousand years, and many of them are but of
yesterday.' Yes, Cleinias, and you must not forget Epimenides, who was
really of yesterday; he practised the lesson of moderation and abstinence
which Hesiod only preached. 'True.' After the great destruction we may
imagine that the earth was a desert, in which there were a herd or two of
oxen and a few goats, hardly enough to support those who tended them;
while of politics and governments the survivors would know nothing. And
out of this state of things have arisen arts and laws, and a great deal of
virtue and a great deal of vice; little by little the world has come to be
what it is. At first, the few inhabitants would have had a natural fear of
descending into the plains; although they would want to have intercourse
with one another, they would have a difficulty in getting about, having
lost the arts, and having no means of extracting metals from the earth, or
of felling timber; for even if they had saved any tools, these would soon
have been worn out, and they could get no more until the art of metallurgy
had been again revived. Faction and war would be extinguished among them,
for being solitary they would incline to be friendly; and having abundance
of pasture and plenty of milk and flesh, they would have nothing to
quarrel about. We may assume that they had also dwellings, clothes,
pottery, for the weaving and plastic arts do not require the use of
metals. In those days they were neither poor nor rich, and there was no
insolence or injustice among them; for they were of noble natures, and
lived up to their principles, and believed what they were told; knowing
nothing of land or naval warfare, or of legal practices or party
conflicts, they were simpler and more temperate, and also more just than
the men of our day. 'Very true.' I am showing whence the need of lawgivers
arises, for in primitive ages they neither had nor wanted them. Men lived
according to the customs of their fathers, in a simple manner, under a
patriarchal government, such as still exists both among Hellenes and
barbarians, and is described in Homer as prevailing among the Cyclopes:--

'They have no laws, and they dwell in rocks or on the tops of mountains,
and every one is the judge of his wife and children, and they do not
trouble themselves about one another.'

'That is a charming poet of yours, though I know little of him, for in
Crete foreign poets are not much read.' 'But he is well known in Sparta,
though he describes Ionian rather than Dorian manners, and he seems to
take your view of primitive society.' May we not suppose that government
arose out of the union of single families who survived the destruction,
and were under the rule of patriarchs, because they had originally
descended from a single father and mother? 'That is very probable.' As
time went on, men increased in number, and tilled the ground, living in a
common habitation, which they protected by walls against wild beasts; but
the several families retained the laws and customs which they separately
received from their first parents. They would naturally like their own
laws better than any others, and would be already formed by them when they
met in a common society: thus legislation imperceptibly began among them.
For in the next stage the associated families would appoint
plenipotentiaries, who would select and present to the chiefs those of all
their laws which they thought best. The chiefs in turn would make a
further selection, and would thus become the lawgivers of the state, which
they would form into an aristocracy or a monarchy. 'Probably.' In the
third stage various other forms of government would arise. This state of
society is described by Homer in speaking of the foundation of Dardania,
which, he says,

'was built at the foot of many-fountained Ida, for Ilium, the city of the
plain, as yet was not.'

Here, as also in the account of the Cyclopes, the poet by some divine
inspiration has attained truth. But to proceed with our tale. Ilium was
built in a wide plain, on a low hill, which was surrounded by streams
descending from Ida. This shows that many ages must have passed; for the
men who remembered the deluge would never have placed their city at the
mercy of the waters. When mankind began to multiply, many other cities
were built in similar situations. These cities carried on a ten years' war
against Troy, by sea as well as land, for men were ceasing to be afraid of
the sea, and, in the meantime, while the chiefs of the army were at Troy,
their homes fell into confusion. The youth revolted and refused to receive
their own fathers; deaths, murders, exiles ensued. Under the new name of
Dorians, which they received from their chief Dorieus, the exiles
returned: the rest of the story is part of the history of Sparta.

Thus, after digressing from the subject of laws into music and drinking,
we return to the settlement of Sparta, which in laws and institutions is
the sister of Crete. We have seen the rise of a first, second, and third
state, during the lapse of ages; and now we arrive at a fourth state, and
out of the comparison of all four we propose to gather the nature of laws
and governments, and the changes which may be desirable in them. 'If,'
replies the Spartan, 'our new discussion is likely to be as good as the
last, I would think the longest day too short for such an employment.'

Let us imagine the time when Lacedaemon, and Argos, and Messene were all
subject, Megillus, to your ancestors. Afterwards, they distributed the
army into three portions, and made three cities--Argos, Messene,
Lacedaemon. 'Yes.' Temenus was the king of Argos, Cresphontes of Messene,
Procles and Eurysthenes ruled at Lacedaemon. 'Just so.' And they all swore
to assist any one of their number whose kingdom was subverted. 'Yes.' But
did we not say that kingdoms or governments can only be subverted by
themselves? 'That is true.' Yes, and the truth is now proved by facts:
there were certain conditions upon which the three kingdoms were to assist
one another; the government was to be mild and the people obedient, and
the kings and people were to unite in assisting either of the two others
when they were wronged. This latter condition was a great security.
'Clearly.' Such a provision is in opposition to the common notion that the
lawgiver should make only such laws as the people like; but we say that he
should rather be like a physician, prepared to effect a cure even at the
cost of considerable suffering. 'Very true.' The early lawgivers had
another great advantage--they were saved from the reproach which attends a
division of land and the abolition of debts. No one could quarrel with the
Dorians for dividing the territory, and they had no debts of long
standing. 'They had not.' Then what was the reason why their legislation
signally failed? For there were three kingdoms, two of them quickly lost
their original constitution. That is a question which we cannot refuse to
answer, if we mean to proceed with our old man's game of enquiring into
laws and institutions. And the Dorian institutions are more worthy of
consideration than any other, having been evidently intended to be a
protection not only to the Peloponnese, but to all the Hellenes against
the Barbarians. For the capture of Troy by the Achaeans had given great
offence to the Assyrians, of whose empire it then formed part, and they
were likely to retaliate. Accordingly the royal Heraclid brothers devised
their military constitution, which was organised on a far better plan than
the old Trojan expedition; and the Dorians themselves were far superior to
the Achaeans, who had taken part in that expedition, and had been
conquered by them. Such a scheme, undertaken by men who had shared with
one another toils and dangers, sanctioned by the Delphian oracle, under
the guidance of the Heraclidae, seemed to have a promise of permanence.
'Naturally.' Yet this has not proved to be the case. Instead of the three
being one, they have always been at war; had they been united, in
accordance with the original intention, they would have been invincible.

And what caused their ruin? Did you ever observe that there are beautiful
things of which men often say, 'What wonders they would have effected if
rightly used?' and yet, after all, this may be a mistake. And so I say of
the Heraclidae and their expedition, which I may perhaps have been
justified in admiring, but which nevertheless suggests to me the general
reflection,--'What wonders might not strength and military resources have
accomplished, if the possessor had only known how to use them!' For
consider: if the generals of the army had only known how to arrange their
forces, might they not have given their subjects everlasting freedom, and
the power of doing what they would in all the world? 'Very true.' Suppose
a person to express his admiration of wealth or rank, does he not do so
under the idea that by the help of these he can attain his desires? All
men wish to obtain the control of all things, and they are always praying
for what they desire. 'Certainly.' And we ask for our friends what they
ask for themselves. 'Yes.' Dear is the son to the father, and yet the son,
if he is young and foolish, will often pray to obtain what the father will
pray that he may not obtain. 'True.' And when the father, in the heat of
youth or the dotage of age, makes some rash prayer, the son, like
Hippolytus, may have reason to pray that the word of his father may be
ineffectual. 'You mean that a man should pray to have right desires,
before he prays that his desires may be fulfilled; and that wisdom should
be the first object of our prayers?' Yes; and you will remember my saying
that wisdom should be the principal aim of the legislator; but you said
that defence in war came first. And I replied, that there were four
virtues, whereas you acknowledged one only--courage, and not wisdom which
is the guide of all the rest. And I repeat--in jest if you like, but I am
willing that you should receive my words in earnest--that 'the prayer of a
fool is full of danger.' I will prove to you, if you will allow me, that
the ruin of those states was not caused by cowardice or ignorance in war,
but by ignorance of human affairs. 'Pray proceed: our attention will show
better than compliments that we prize your words.' I maintain that
ignorance is, and always has been, the ruin of states; wherefore the
legislator should seek to banish it from the state; and the greatest
ignorance is the love of what is known to be evil, and the hatred of what
is known to be good; this is the last and greatest conflict of pleasure
and reason in the soul. I say the greatest, because affecting the greater
part of the soul; for the passions are in the individual what the people
are in a state. And when they become opposed to reason or law, and
instruction no longer avails--that is the last and greatest ignorance of
states and men. 'I agree.' Let this, then, be our first principle:--That
the citizen who does not know how to choose between good and evil must not
have authority, although he possess great mental gifts, and many
accomplishments; for he is really a fool. On the other hand, he who has
this knowledge may be unable either to read or swim; nevertheless, he
shall be counted wise and permitted to rule. For how can there be wisdom
where there is no harmony?--the wise man is the saviour, and he who is
devoid of wisdom is the destroyer of states and households. There are
rulers and there are subjects in states. And the first claim to rule is
that of parents to rule over their children; the second, that of the noble
to rule over the ignoble; thirdly, the elder must govern the younger; in
the fourth place, the slave must obey his master; fifthly, there is the
power of the stronger, which the poet Pindar declares to be according to
nature; sixthly, there is the rule of the wiser, which is also according
to nature, as I must inform Pindar, if he does not know, and is the rule
of law over obedient subjects. 'Most true.' And there is a seventh kind of
rule which the Gods love,--in this the ruler is elected by lot.

Then, now, we playfully say to him who fancies that it is easy to make
laws:--You see, legislator, the many and inconsistent claims to authority;
here is a spring of troubles which you must stay. And first of all you
must help us to consider how the kings of Argos and Messene in olden days
destroyed their famous empire--did they forget the saying of Hesiod, that
'the half is better than the whole'? And do we suppose that the ignorance
of this truth is less fatal to kings than to peoples? 'Probably the evil
is increased by their way of life.' The kings of those days transgressed
the laws and violated their oaths. Their deeds were not in harmony with
their words, and their folly, which seemed to them wisdom, was the ruin of
the state. And how could the legislator have prevented this evil?--the
remedy is easy to see now, but was not easy to foresee at the time. 'What
is the remedy?' The institutions of Sparta may teach you, Megillus.
Wherever there is excess, whether the vessel has too large a sail, or the
body too much food, or the mind too much power, there destruction is
certain. And similarly, a man who possesses arbitrary power is soon
corrupted, and grows hateful to his dearest friends. In order to guard
against this evil, the God who watched over Sparta gave you two kings
instead of one, that they might balance one another; and further to lower
the pulse of your body politic, some human wisdom, mingled with divine
power, tempered the strength and self-sufficiency of youth with the
moderation of age in the institution of your senate. A third saviour
bridled your rising and swelling power by ephors, whom he assimilated to
officers elected by lot: and thus the kingly power was preserved, and
became the preserver of all the rest. Had the constitution been arranged
by the original legislators, not even the portion of Aristodemus would
have been saved; for they had no political experience, and imagined that a
youthful spirit invested with power could be restrained by oaths. Now that
God has instructed us in the arts of legislation, there is no merit in
seeing all this, or in learning wisdom after the event. But if the coming
danger could have been foreseen, and the union preserved, then no Persian
or other enemy would have dared to attack Hellas; and indeed there was not
so much credit to us in defeating the enemy, as discredit in our
disloyalty to one another. For of the three cities one only fought on
behalf of Hellas; and of the two others, Argos refused her aid; and
Messenia was actually at war with Sparta: and if the Lacedaemonians and
Athenians had not united, the Hellenes would have been absorbed in the
Persian empire, and dispersed among the barbarians. We make these
reflections upon past and present legislators because we desire to find
out what other course could have been followed. We were saying just now,
that a state can only be free and wise and harmonious when there is a
balance of powers. There are many words by which we express the aims of
the legislator,--temperance, wisdom, friendship; but we need not be
disturbed by the variety of expression,--these words have all the same
meaning. 'I should like to know at what in your opinion the legislator
should aim.' Hear me, then. There are two mother forms of states--one
monarchy, and the other democracy: the Persians have the first in the
highest form, and the Athenians the second; and no government can be well
administered which does not include both. There was a time when both the
Persians and Athenians had more the character of a constitutional state
than they now have. In the days of Cyrus the Persians were freemen as well
as lords of others, and their soldiers were free and equal, and the kings
used and honoured all the talent which they could find, and so the nation
waxed great, because there was freedom and friendship and communion of
soul. But Cyrus, though a wise general, never troubled himself about the
education of his family. He was a soldier from his youth upward, and left
his children who were born in the purple to be educated by women, who
humoured and spoilt them. 'A rare education, truly!' Yes, such an
education as princesses who had recently grown rich might be expected to
give them in a country where the men were solely occupied with warlike
pursuits. 'Likely enough.' Their father had possessions of men and
animals, and never considered that the race to whom he was about to make
them over had been educated in a very different school, not like the
Persian shepherd, who was well able to take care of himself and his own.
He did not see that his children had been brought up in the Median
fashion, by women and eunuchs. The end was that one of the sons of Cyrus
slew the other, and lost the kingdom by his own folly. Observe, again,
that Darius, who restored the kingdom, had not received a royal education.
He was one of the seven chiefs, and when he came to the throne he divided
the empire into seven provinces; and he made equal laws, and implanted
friendship among the people. Hence his subjects were greatly attached to
him, and cheerfully helped him to extend his empire. Next followed Xerxes,
who had received the same royal education as Cambyses, and met with a
similar fate. The reflection naturally occurs to us--How could Darius,
with all his experience, have made such a mistake! The ruin of Xerxes was
not a mere accident, but the evil life which is generally led by the sons
of very rich and royal persons; and this is what the legislator has
seriously to consider. Justly may the Lacedaemonians be praised for not
giving special honour to birth or wealth; for such advantages are not to
be highly esteemed without virtue, and not even virtue is to be esteemed
unless it be accompanied by temperance. 'Explain.' No one would like to
live in the same house with a courageous man who had no control over
himself, nor with a clever artist who was a rogue. Nor can justice and
wisdom ever be separated from temperance. But considering these qualities
with reference to the honour and dishonour which is to be assigned to them
in states, would you say, on the other hand, that temperance, if existing
without the other virtues in the soul, is worth anything or nothing? 'I
cannot tell.' You have answered well. It would be absurd to speak of
temperance as belonging to the class of honourable or of dishonourable
qualities, because all other virtues in their various classes require
temperance to be added to them; having the addition, they are honoured not
in proportion to that, but to their own excellence. And ought not the
legislator to determine these classes? 'Certainly.' Suppose then that,
without going into details, we make three great classes of them. Most
honourable are the goods of the soul, always assuming temperance as a
condition of them; secondly, those of the body; thirdly, external
possessions. The legislator who puts them in another order is doing an
unholy and unpatriotic thing.

These remarks were suggested by the history of the Persian kings; and to
them I will now return. The ruin of their empire was caused by the loss of
freedom and the growth of despotism; all community of feeling disappeared.
Hatred and spoliation took the place of friendship; the people no longer
fought heartily for their masters; the rulers, finding their myriads
useless on the field of battle, resorted to mercenaries as their only
salvation, and were thus compelled by their circumstances to proclaim the
stupidest of falsehoods--that virtue is a trifle in comparison of money.

But enough of the Persians: a different lesson is taught by the Athenians,
whose example shows that a limited freedom is far better than an
unlimited. Ancient Athens, at the time of the Persian invasion, had such a
limited freedom. The people were divided into four classes, according to
the amount of their property, and the universal love of order, as well as
the fear of the approaching host, made them obedient and willing citizens.
For Darius had sent Datis and Artaphernes, commanding them under pain of
death to subjugate the Eretrians and Athenians. A report, whether true or
not, came to Athens that all the Eretrians had been 'netted'; and the
Athenians in terror sent all over Hellas for assistance. None came to
their relief except the Lacedaemonians, and they arrived a day too late,
when the battle of Marathon had been already fought. In process of time
Xerxes came to the throne, and the Athenians heard of nothing but the
bridge over the Hellespont, and the canal of Athos, and the innumerable
host and fleet. They knew that these were intended to avenge the defeat of
Marathon. Their case seemed desperate, for there was no Hellene likely to
assist them by land, and at sea they were attacked by more than a thousand
vessels;--their only hope, however slender, was in victory; so they
relied upon themselves and upon the Gods. Their common danger, and the
influence of their ancient constitution, greatly tended to promote harmony
among them. Reverence and fear--that fear which the coward never knows--
made them fight for their altars and their homes, and saved them from
being dispersed all over the world. 'Your words, Athenian, are worthy of
your country.' And you Megillus, who have inherited the virtues of your
ancestors, are worthy to hear them. Let me ask you to take the moral of my
tale. The Persians have lost their liberty in absolute slavery, and we in
absolute freedom. In ancient times the Athenian people were not the
masters, but the servants of the laws. 'Of what laws?' In the first place,
there were laws about music, and the music was of various kinds: there was
one kind which consisted of hymns, another of lamentations; there was also
the paean and the dithyramb, and the so-called 'laws' (nomoi) or strains,
which were played upon the harp. The regulation of such matters was not
left to the whistling and clapping of the crowd; there was silence while
the judges decided, and the boys, and the audience in general, were kept
in order by raps of a stick. But after a while there arose a new race of
poets, men of genius certainly, however careless of musical truth and
propriety, who made pleasure the only criterion of excellence. That was a
test which the spectators could apply for themselves; the whole audience,
instead of being mute, became vociferous, and a theatrocracy took the
place of an aristocracy. Could the judges have been free, there would have
been no great harm done; a musical democracy would have been well enough--
but conceit has been our ruin. Everybody knows everything, and is ready to
say anything; the age of reverence is gone, and the age of irreverence and
licentiousness has succeeded. 'Most true.' And with this freedom comes
disobedience to rulers, parents, elders,--in the latter days to the law
also; the end returns to the beginning, and the old Titanic nature
reappears--men have no regard for the Gods or for oaths; and the evils of
the human race seem as if they would never cease. Whither are we running
away? Once more we must pull up the argument with bit and curb, lest, as
the proverb says, we should fall off our ass. 'Good.' Our purpose in what
we have been saying is to prove that the legislator ought to aim at
securing for a state three things--freedom, friendship, wisdom. And we
chose two states;--one was the type of freedom, and the other of
despotism; and we showed that when in a mean they attained their highest
perfection. In a similar spirit we spoke of the Dorian expedition, and of
the settlement on the hills and in the plains of Troy; and of music, and
the use of wine, and of all that preceded.

And now, has our discussion been of any use? 'Yes, stranger; for by a
singular coincidence the Cretans are about to send out a colony, of which
the settlement has been confided to the Cnosians. Ten commissioners, of
whom I am one, are to give laws to the colonists, and we may give any
which we please--Cretan or foreign. And therefore let us make a selection
from what has been said, and then proceed with the construction of the
state.' Very good: I am quite at your service. 'And I too,' says Megillus.

BOOK IV. And now, what is this city? I do not want to know what is to be
the name of the place (for some accident,--a river or a local deity, will
determine that), but what the situation is, whether maritime or inland.
'The city will be about eleven miles from the sea.' Are there harbours?
'Excellent.' And is the surrounding country self-supporting? 'Almost.' Any
neighbouring states? 'No; and that is the reason for choosing the place,
which has been deserted from time immemorial.' And is there a fair
proportion of hill and plain and wood? 'Like Crete in general, more hill
than plain.' Then there is some hope for your citizens; had the city been
on the sea, and dependent for support on other countries, no human power
could have preserved you from corruption. Even the distance of eleven
miles is hardly enough. For the sea, although an agreeable, is a dangerous
companion, and a highway of strange morals and manners as well as of
commerce. But as the country is only moderately fertile there will be no
great export trade and no great returns of gold and silver, which are the
ruin of states. Is there timber for ship-building? 'There is no pine, nor
much cypress; and very little stone-pine or plane wood for the interior of
ships.' That is good. 'Why?' Because the city will not be able to imitate
the bad ways of her enemies. 'What is the bearing of that remark?' To
explain my meaning, I would ask you to remember what we said about the
Cretan laws, that they had an eye to war only; whereas I maintained that
they ought to have included all virtue. And I hope that you in your turn
will retaliate upon me if I am false to my own principle. For I consider
that the lawgiver should go straight to the mark of virtue and justice,
and disregard wealth and every other good when separated from virtue. What
further I mean, when I speak of the imitation of enemies, I will
illustrate by the story of Minos, if our Cretan friend will allow me to
mention it. Minos, who was a great sea-king, imposed upon the Athenians a
cruel tribute, for in those days they were not a maritime power; they had
no timber for ship-building, and therefore they could not 'imitate their
enemies'; and better far, as I maintain, would it have been for them to
have lost many times over the lives which they devoted to the tribute than
to have turned soldiers into sailors. Naval warfare is not a very
praiseworthy art; men should not be taught to leap on shore, and then
again to hurry back to their ships, or to find specious excuses for
throwing away their arms; bad customs ought not to be gilded with fine
words. And retreat is always bad, as we are taught in Homer, when he
introduces Odysseus, setting forth to Agamemnon the danger of ships being
at hand when soldiers are disposed to fly. An army of lions trained in
such ways would fly before a herd of deer. Further, a city which owes its
preservation to a crowd of pilots and oarsmen and other undeserving
persons, cannot bestow rewards of honour properly; and this is the ruin of
states. 'Still, in Crete we say that the battle of Salamis was the
salvation of Hellas.' Such is the prevailing opinion. But I and Megillus
say that the battle of Marathon began the deliverance, and that the battle
of Plataea completed it; for these battles made men better, whereas the
battles of Salamis and Artemisium made them no better. And we further
affirm that mere existence is not the great political good of individuals
or states, but the continuance of the best existence. 'Certainly.' Let us
then endeavour to follow this principle in colonization and legislation.

And first, let me ask you who are to be the colonists? May any one come
from any city of Crete? For you would surely not send a general invitation
to all Hellas. Yet I observe that in Crete there are people who have come
from Argos and Aegina and other places. 'Our recruits will be drawn from
all Crete, and of other Hellenes we should prefer Peloponnesians. As you
observe, there are Argives among the Cretans; moreover the Gortynians, who
are the best of all Cretans, have come from Gortys in Peloponnesus.'

Colonization is in some ways easier when the colony goes out in a swarm
from one country, owing to the pressure of population, or revolution, or
war. In this case there is the advantage that the new colonists have a
community of race, language, and laws. But then again, they are less
obedient to the legislator; and often they are anxious to keep the very
laws and customs which caused their ruin at home. A mixed multitude, on
the other hand, is more tractable, although there is a difficulty in
making them pull together. There is nothing, however, which perfects men's
virtue more than legislation and colonization. And yet I have a word to
say which may seem to be depreciatory of legislators. 'What is that?'

I was going to make the saddening reflection, that accidents of all sorts
are the true legislators,--wars and pestilences and famines and the
frequent recurrence of bad seasons. The observer will be inclined to say
that almost all human things are chance; and this is certainly true about
navigation and medicine, and the art of the general. But there is another
thing which may equally be said. 'What is it?' That God governs all
things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with Him. And according
to yet a third view, art has part with them, for surely in a storm it is
well to have a pilot? And the same is true of legislation: even if
circumstances are favourable, a skilful lawgiver is still necessary. 'Most
true.' All artists would pray for certain conditions under which to
exercise their art: and would not the legislator do the same? 'Certainly?'
Come, legislator, let us say to him, and what are the conditions which you
would have? He will answer, Grant me a city which is ruled by a tyrant;
and let the tyrant be young, mindful, teachable, courageous, magnanimous;
and let him have the inseparable condition of all virtue, which is
temperance--not prudence, but that natural temperance which is the gift of
children and animals, and is hardly reckoned among goods--with this he
must be endowed, if the state is to acquire the form most conducive to
happiness in the speediest manner. And I must add one other condition: the
tyrant must be fortunate, and his good fortune must consist in his having
the co-operation of a great legislator. When God has done all this, He has
done the best which He can for a state; not so well if He has given them
two legislators instead of one, and less and less well if He has given
them a great many. An orderly tyranny most easily passes into the perfect
state; in the second degree, a monarchy; in the third degree, a democracy;
an oligarchy is worst of all. 'I do not understand.' I suppose that you
have never seen a city which is subject to a tyranny? 'I have no desire to
see one.' You would have seen what I am describing, if you ever had. The
tyrant can speedily change the manners of a state, and affix the stamp of
praise or blame on any action which he pleases; for the citizens readily
follow the example which he sets. There is no quicker way of making
changes; but there is a counterbalancing difficulty. It is hard to find
the divine love of temperance and justice existing in any powerful form of
government, whether in a monarchy or an oligarchy. In olden days there
were chiefs like Nestor, who was the most eloquent and temperate of
mankind, but there is no one his equal now. If such an one ever arises
among us, blessed will he be, and blessed they who listen to his words.
For where power and wisdom and temperance meet in one, there are the best
laws and constitutions. I am endeavouring to show you how easy under the
conditions supposed, and how difficult under any other, is the task of
giving a city good laws. 'How do you mean?' Let us old men attempt to
mould in words a constitution for your new state, as children make figures
out of wax. 'Proceed. What constitution shall we give--democracy,
oligarchy, or aristocracy?' To which of these classes, Megillus, do you
refer your own state? 'The Spartan constitution seems to me to contain all
these elements. Our state is a democracy and also an aristocracy; the
power of the Ephors is tyrannical, and we have an ancient monarchy.' 'Much
the same,' adds Cleinias, 'may be said of Cnosus.' The reason is that you
have polities, but other states are mere aggregations of men dwelling
together, which are named after their several ruling powers; whereas a
state, if an 'ocracy' at all, should be called a theocracy. A tale of old
will explain my meaning. There is a tradition of a golden age, in which
all things were spontaneous and abundant. Cronos, then lord of the world,
knew that no mortal nature could endure the temptations of power, and
therefore he appointed demons or demi-gods, who are of a superior race, to
have dominion over man, as man has dominion over the animals. They took
care of us with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us;
and the tradition says that only when God, and not man, is the ruler, can
the human race cease from ill. This was the manner of life which prevailed
under Cronos, and which we must strive to follow so far as the principle
of immortality still abides in us and we live according to law and the
dictates of right reason. But in an oligarchy or democracy, when the
governing principle is athirst for pleasure, the laws are trampled under
foot, and there is no possibility of salvation. Is it not often said that
there are as many forms of laws as there are governments, and that they
have no concern either with any one virtue or with all virtue, but are
relative to the will of the government? Which is as much as to say that
'might makes right.' 'What do you mean?' I mean that governments enact
their own laws, and that every government makes self-preservation its
principal aim. He who transgresses the laws is regarded as an evil-doer,
and punished accordingly. This was one of the unjust principles of
government which we mentioned when speaking of the different claims to
rule. We were agreed that parents should rule their children, the elder
the younger, the noble the ignoble. But there were also several other
principles, and among them Pindar's 'law of violence.' To whom then is our
state to be entrusted? For many a government is only a victorious faction
which has a monopoly of power, and refuses any share to the conquered,
lest when they get into office they should remember their wrongs. Such
governments are not polities, but parties; nor are any laws good which are
made in the interest of particular classes only, and not of the whole. And
in our state I mean to protest against making any man a ruler because he
is rich, or strong, or noble. But those who are obedient to the laws, and
who win the victory of obedience, shall be promoted to the service of the
Gods according to the degree of their obedience. When I call the ruler the
servant or minister of the law, this is not a mere paradox, but I mean to
say that upon a willingness to obey the law the existence of the state
depends. 'Truly, Stranger, you have a keen vision.' Why, yes; every man
when he is old has his intellectual vision most keen. And now shall we
call in our colonists and make a speech to them? Friends, we say to them,
God holds in His hand the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and He
moves in a straight line towards the accomplishment of His will. Justice
always bears Him company, and punishes those who fall short of His laws.
He who would be happy follows humbly in her train; but he who is lifted up
with pride, or wealth, or honour, or beauty, is soon deserted by God, and,
being deserted, he lives in confusion and disorder. To many he seems a
great man; but in a short time he comes to utter destruction. Wherefore,
seeing these things, what ought we to do or think? 'Every man ought to
follow God.' What life, then, is pleasing to God? There is an old saying
that 'like agrees with like, measure with measure,' and God ought to be
our measure in all things. The temperate man is the friend of God because
he is like Him, and the intemperate man is not His friend, because he is
not like Him. And the conclusion is, that the best of all things for a
good man is to pray and sacrifice to the Gods; but the bad man has a
polluted soul; and therefore his service is wasted upon the Gods, while
the good are accepted of them. I have told you the mark at which we ought
to aim. You will say, How, and with what weapons? In the first place we
affirm, that after the Olympian Gods and the Gods of the state, honour
should be given to the Gods below, and to them should be offered
everything in even numbers and of the second choice; the auspicious odd
numbers and everything of the first choice are reserved for the Gods
above. Next demi-gods or spirits must be honoured, and then heroes, and
after them family gods, who will be worshipped at their local seats
according to law. Further, the honour due to parents should not be
forgotten; children owe all that they have to them, and the debt must be
repaid by kindness and attention in old age. No unbecoming word must be
uttered before them; for there is an avenging angel who hears them when
they are angry, and the child should consider that the parent when he has
been wronged has a right to be angry. After their death let them have a
moderate funeral, such as their fathers have had before them; and there
shall be an annual commemoration of them. Living on this wise, we shall be
accepted of the Gods, and shall pass our days in good hope. The law will
determine all our various duties towards relatives and friends and other
citizens, and the whole state will be happy and prosperous. But if the
legislator would persuade as well as command, he will add prefaces to his
laws which will predispose the citizens to virtue. Even a little
accomplished in the way of gaining the hearts of men is of great value.
For most men are in no particular haste to become good. As Hesiod says:

'Long and steep is the first half of the way to virtue, But when you have
reached the top the rest is easy.'

'Those are excellent words.' Yes; but may I tell you the effect which the
preceding discourse has had upon me? I will express my meaning in an
address to the lawgiver:--O lawgiver, if you know what we ought to do and
say, you can surely tell us;--you are not like the poet, who, as you were
just now saying, does not know the effect of his own words. And the poet
may reply, that when he sits down on the tripod of the Muses he is not in
his right mind, and that being a mere imitator he may be allowed to say
all sorts of opposite things, and cannot tell which of them is true. But
this licence cannot be allowed to the lawgiver. For example, there are
three kinds of funerals; one of them is excessive, another mean, a third
moderate, and you say that the last is right. Now if I had a rich wife,
and she told me to bury her, and I were to sing of her burial, I should
praise the extravagant kind; a poor man would commend a funeral of the
meaner sort, and a man of moderate means would prefer a moderate funeral.
But you, as legislator, would have to say exactly what you meant by
'moderate.' 'Very true.' And is our lawgiver to have no preamble or
interpretation of his laws, never offering a word of advice to his
subjects, after the manner of some doctors? For of doctors are there not
two kinds? The one gentle and the other rough, doctors who are freemen and
learn themselves and teach their pupils scientifically, and doctor's
assistants who get their knowledge empirically by attending on their
masters? 'Of course there are.' And did you ever observe that the
gentlemen doctors practise upon freemen, and that slave doctors confine
themselves to slaves? The latter go about the country or wait for the
slaves at the dispensaries. They hold no parley with their patients about
their diseases or the remedies of them; they practise by the rule of
thumb, and give their decrees in the most arbitrary manner. When they have
doctored one patient they run off to another, whom they treat with equal
assurance, their duty being to relieve the master of the care of his sick
slaves. But the other doctor, who practises on freemen, proceeds in quite
a different way. He takes counsel with his patient and learns from him,
and never does anything until he has persuaded him of what he is doing. He
trusts to influence rather than force. Now is not the use of both methods
far better than the use of either alone? And both together may be
advantageously employed by us in legislation.

We may illustrate our proposal by an example. The laws relating to
marriage naturally come first, and therefore we may begin with them. The
simple law would be as follows:--A man shall marry between the ages of
thirty and thirty-five; if he do not, he shall be fined or deprived of
certain privileges. The double law would add the reason why: Forasmuch as
man desires immortality, which he attains by the procreation of children,
no one should deprive himself of his share in this good. He who obeys the
law is blameless, but he who disobeys must not be a gainer by his
celibacy; and therefore he shall pay a yearly fine, and shall not be
allowed to receive honour from the young. That is an example of what I
call the double law, which may enable us to judge how far the addition of
persuasion to threats is desirable. 'Lacedaemonians in general, Stranger,
are in favour of brevity; in this case, however, I prefer length. But
Cleinias is the real lawgiver, and he ought to be first consulted.' 'Thank
you, Megillus.' Whether words are to be many or few, is a foolish
question:--the best and not the shortest forms are always to be approved.
And legislators have never thought of the advantages which they might gain
by using persuasion as well as force, but trust to force only. And I have
something else to say about the matter. Here have we been from early dawn
until noon, discoursing about laws, and all that we have been saying is
only the preamble of the laws which we are about to give. I tell you this,
because I want you to observe that songs and strains have all of them
preludes, but that laws, though called by the same name (nomoi), have
never any prelude. Now I am disposed to give preludes to laws, dividing
them into two parts--one containing the despotic command, which I
described under the image of the slave doctor--the other the persuasive
part, which I term the preamble. The legislator should give preludes or
preambles to his laws. 'That shall be the way in my colony.' I am glad
that you agree with me; this is a matter which it is important to
remember. A preamble is not always necessary to a law: the lawgiver must
determine when it is needed, as the musician determines when there is to
be a prelude to a song. 'Most true: and now, having a preamble, let us
recommence our discourse.' Enough has been said of Gods and parents, and
we may proceed to consider what relates to the citizens--their souls,
bodies, properties,--their occupations and amusements; and so arrive at
the nature of education.

The first word of the Laws somewhat abruptly introduces the thought which
is present to the mind of Plato throughout the work, namely, that Law is
of divine origin. In the words of a great English writer--'Her seat is the
bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world.' Though the particular
laws of Sparta and Crete had a narrow and imperfect aim, this is not true
of divine laws, which are based upon the principles of human nature, and
not framed to meet the exigencies of the moment. They have their natural
divisions, too, answering to the kinds of virtue; very unlike the
discordant enactments of an Athenian assembly or of an English Parliament.
Yet we may observe two inconsistencies in Plato's treatment of the
subject: first, a lesser, inasmuch as he does not clearly distinguish the
Cretan and Spartan laws, of which the exclusive aim is war, from those
other laws of Zeus and Apollo which are said to be divine, and to
comprehend all virtue. Secondly, we may retort on him his own complaint
against Sparta and Crete, that he has himself given us a code of laws,
which for the most part have a military character; and that we cannot
point to 'obvious examples of similar institutions which are concerned
with pleasure;' at least there is only one such, that which relates to
the regulation of convivial intercourse. The military spirit which is
condemned by him in the beginning of the Laws, reappears in the seventh
and eighth books.

The mention of Minos the great lawgiver, and of Rhadamanthus the righteous
administrator of the law, suggests the two divisions of the laws into
enactments and appointments of officers. The legislator and the judge
stand side by side, and their functions cannot be wholly distinguished.
For the judge is in some sort a legislator, at any rate in small matters;
and his decisions growing into precedents, must determine the innumerable
details which arise out of the conflict of circumstances. These Plato
proposes to leave to a younger generation of legislators. The action of
courts of law in making law seems to have escaped him, probably because
the Athenian law-courts were popular assemblies; and, except in a mythical
form, he can hardly be said to have had before his eyes the ideal of a
judge. In reading the Laws of Plato, or any other ancient writing about
Laws, we should consider how gradual the process is by which not only a
legal system, but the administration of a court of law, becomes perfected.

There are other subjects on which Plato breaks ground, as his manner is,
early in the work. First, he gives a sketch of the subject of laws; they
are to comprehend the whole of human life, from infancy to age, and from
birth to death, although the proposed plan is far from being regularly
executed in the books which follow, partly owing to the necessity of
describing the constitution as well as the laws of his new colony.
Secondly, he touches on the power of music, which may exercise so great an
influence on the character of men for good or evil; he refers especially
to the great offence--which he mentions again, and which he had condemned
in the Republic--of varying the modes and rhythms, as well as to that of
separating the words from the music. Thirdly, he reprobates the prevalence
of unnatural loves in Sparta and Crete, which he attributes to the
practice of syssitia and gymnastic exercises, and considers to be almost
inseparable from them. To this subject he again returns in the eighth
book. Fourthly, the virtues are affirmed to be inseparable from one
another, even if not absolutely one; this, too, is a principle which he
reasserts at the conclusion of the work. As in the beginnings of Plato's
other writings, we have here several 'notes' struck, which form the
preludes of longer discussions, although the hint is less ingeniously
given, and the promise more imperfectly fulfilled than in the earlier
dialogues.

The distinction between ethics and politics has not yet dawned upon
Plato's mind. To him, law is still floating in a region between the two.
He would have desired that all the acts and laws of a state should have
regard to all virtue. But he did not see that politics and law are subject
to their own conditions, and are distinguished from ethics by natural
differences. The actions of which politics take cognisance are necessarily
collective or representative; and law is limited to external acts which
affect others as well as the agents. Ethics, on the other hand, include
the whole duty of man in relation both to himself and others. But Plato
has never reflected on these differences. He fancies that the life of the
state can be as easily fashioned as that of the individual. He is
favourable to a balance of power, but never seems to have considered that
power might be so balanced as to produce an absolute immobility in the
state. Nor is he alive to the evils of confounding vice and crime; or to
the necessity of governments abstaining from excessive interference with
their subjects.

Yet this confusion of ethics and politics has also a better and a truer
side. If unable to grasp some important distinctions, Plato is at any rate
seeking to elevate the lower to the higher; he does not pull down the
principles of men to their practice, or narrow the conception of the state
to the immediate necessities of politics. Political ideals of freedom and
equality, of a divine government which has been or will be in some other
age or country, have greatly tended to educate and ennoble the human race.
And if not the first author of such ideals (for they are as old as
Hesiod), Plato has done more than any other writer to impress them on the
world. To those who censure his idealism we may reply in his own words--
'He is not the worse painter who draws a perfectly beautiful figure,
because no such figure of a man could ever have existed' (Republic).

A new thought about education suddenly occurs to him, and for a time
exercises a sort of fascination over his mind, though in the later books
of the Laws it is forgotten or overlooked. As true courage is allied to
temperance, so there must be an education which shall train mankind to
resist pleasure as well as to endure pain. No one can be on his guard
against that of which he has no experience. The perfectly trained citizen
should have been accustomed to look his enemy in the face, and to measure
his strength against her. This education in pleasure is to be given,
partly by festive intercourse, but chiefly by the song and dance. Youth
are to learn music and gymnastics; their elders are to be trained and
tested at drinking parties. According to the old proverb, in vino veritas,
they will then be open and visible to the world in their true characters;
and also they will be more amenable to the laws, and more easily moulded
by the hand of the legislator. The first reason is curious enough, though
not important; the second can hardly be thought deserving of much
attention. Yet if Plato means to say that society is one of the principal
instruments of education in after-life, he has expressed in an obscure
fashion a principle which is true, and to his contemporaries was also new.
That at a banquet a degree of moral discipline might be exercised is an
original thought, but Plato has not yet learnt to express his meaning in
an abstract form. He is sensible that moderation is better than total
abstinence, and that asceticism is but a one-sided training. He makes the
sagacious remark, that 'those who are able to resist pleasure may often be
among the worst of mankind.' He is as much aware as any modern utilitarian
that the love of pleasure is the great motive of human action. This cannot
be eradicated, and must therefore be regulated,--the pleasure must be of
the right sort. Such reflections seem to be the real, though imperfectly
expressed, groundwork of the discussion. As in the juxtaposition of the
Bacchic madness and the great gift of Dionysus, or where he speaks of the
different senses in which pleasure is and is not the object of imitative
art, or in the illustration of the failure of the Dorian institutions from
the prayer of Theseus, we have to gather his meaning as well as we can
from the connexion.

The feeling of old age is discernible in this as well as in several other
passages of the Laws. Plato has arrived at the time when men sit still and
look on at life; and he is willing to allow himself and others the few
pleasures which remain to them. Wine is to cheer them now that their limbs
are old and their blood runs cold. They are the best critics of dancing
and music, but cannot be induced to join in song unless they have been
enlivened by drinking. Youth has no need of the stimulus of wine, but age
can only be made young again by its invigorating influence. Total
abstinence for the young, moderate and increasing potations for the old,
is Plato's principle. The fire, of which there is too much in the one, has
to be brought to the other. Drunkenness, like madness, had a sacredness
and mystery to the Greek; if, on the one hand, as in the case of the
Tarentines, it degraded a whole population, it was also a mode of
worshipping the god Dionysus, which was to be practised on certain
occasions. Moreover, the intoxication produced by the fruit of the vine
was very different from the grosser forms of drunkenness which prevail
among some modern nations.

The physician in modern times would restrict the old man's use of wine
within narrow limits. He would tell us that you cannot restore strength by
a stimulus. Wine may call back the vital powers in disease, but cannot
reinvigorate old age. In his maxims of health and longevity, though aware
of the importance of a simple diet, Plato has omitted to dwell on the
perfect rule of moderation. His commendation of wine is probably a passing
fancy, and may have arisen out of his own habits or tastes. If so, he is
not the only philosopher whose theory has been based upon his practice.

Plato's denial of wine to the young and his approval of it for their
elders has some points of view which may be illustrated by the temperance
controversy of our own times. Wine may be allowed to have a religious as
well as a festive use; it is commended both in the Old and New Testament;
it has been sung of by nearly all poets; and it may be truly said to have
a healing influence both on body and mind. Yet it is also very liable to
excess and abuse, and for this reason is prohibited by Mahometans, as well
as of late years by many Christians, no less than by the ancient Spartans;
and to sound its praises seriously seems to partake of the nature of a
paradox. But we may rejoin with Plato that the abuse of a good thing does
not take away the use of it. Total abstinence, as we often say, is not the
best rule, but moderate indulgence; and it is probably true that a
temperate use of wine may contribute some elements of character to social
life which we can ill afford to lose. It draws men out of their reserve;
it helps them to forget themselves and to appear as they by nature are
when not on their guard, and therefore to make them more human and greater
friends to their fellow-men. It gives them a new experience; it teaches
them to combine self-control with a measure of indulgence; it may
sometimes restore to them the simplicity of childhood. We entirely agree
with Plato in forbidding the use of wine to the young; but when we are of
mature age there are occasions on which we derive refreshment and strength
from moderate potations. It is well to make abstinence the rule, but the
rule may sometimes admit of an exception. We are in a higher, as well as
in a lower sense, the better for the use of wine. The question runs up
into wider ones--What is the general effect of asceticism on human nature?
and, Must there not be a certain proportion between the aspirations of man
and his powers?--questions which have been often discussed both by ancient
and modern philosophers. So by comparing things old and new we may
sometimes help to realize to ourselves the meaning of Plato in the altered
circumstances of our own life.

Like the importance which he attaches to festive entertainments, his
depreciation of courage to the fourth place in the scale of virtue appears
to be somewhat rhetorical and exaggerated. But he is speaking of courage
in the lower sense of the term, not as including loyalty or temperance. He
does not insist in this passage, as in the Protagoras, on the unity of the
virtues; or, as in the Laches, on the identity of wisdom and courage. But
he says that they all depend upon their leader mind, and that, out of the
union of wisdom and temperance with courage, springs justice. Elsewhere he
is disposed to regard temperance rather as a condition of all virtue than
as a particular virtue. He generalizes temperance, as in the Republic he
generalizes justice. The nature of the virtues is to run up into one
another, and in many passages Plato makes but a faint effort to
distinguish them. He still quotes the poets, somewhat enlarging, as his
manner is, or playing with their meaning. The martial poet Tyrtaeus, and
the oligarch Theognis, furnish him with happy illustrations of the two
sorts of courage. The fear of fear, the division of goods into human and
divine, the acknowledgment that peace and reconciliation are better than
the appeal to the sword, the analysis of temperance into resistance of
pleasure as well as endurance of pain, the distinction between the
education which is suitable for a trade or profession, and for the whole
of life, are important and probably new ethical conceptions. Nor has Plato
forgotten his old paradox (Gorgias) that to be punished is better than to
be unpunished, when he says, that to the bad man death is the only
mitigation of his evil. He is not less ideal in many passages of the Laws
than in the Gorgias or Republic. But his wings are heavy, and he is
unequal to any sustained flight.

There is more attempt at dramatic effect in the first book than in the
later parts of the work. The outburst of martial spirit in the
Lacedaemonian, 'O best of men'; the protest which the Cretan makes against
the supposed insult to his lawgiver; the cordial acknowledgment on the
part of both of them that laws should not be discussed publicly by those
who live under their rule; the difficulty which they alike experience in
following the speculations of the Athenian, are highly characteristic.

In the second book, Plato pursues further his notion of educating by a
right use of pleasure. He begins by conceiving an endless power of
youthful life, which is to be reduced to rule and measure by harmony and
rhythm. Men differ from the lower animals in that they are capable of
musical discipline. But music, like all art, must be truly imitative, and
imitative of what is true and good. Art and morality agree in rejecting
pleasure as the criterion of good. True art is inseparable from the
highest and most ennobling ideas. Plato only recognizes the identity of
pleasure and good when the pleasure is of the higher kind. He is the enemy
of 'songs without words,' which he supposes to have some confusing or
enervating effect on the mind of the hearer; and he is also opposed to the
modern degeneracy of the drama, which he would probably have illustrated,
like Aristophanes, from Euripides and Agathon. From this passage may be
gathered a more perfect conception of art than from any other of Plato's
writings. He understands that art is at once imitative and ideal, an exact
representation of truth, and also a representation of the highest truth.
The same double view of art may be gathered from a comparison of the third
and tenth books of the Republic, but is here more clearly and pointedly
expressed.

We are inclined to suspect that both here and in the Republic Plato
exaggerates the influence really exercised by the song and the dance. But
we must remember also the susceptible nature of the Greek, and the
perfection to which these arts were carried by him. Further, the music had
a sacred and Pythagorean character; the dance too was part of a religious
festival. And only at such festivals the sexes mingled in public, and the
youths passed under the eyes of their elders.

At the beginning of the third book, Plato abruptly asks the question, What
is the origin of states? The answer is, Infinite time. We have already
seen--in the Theaetetus, where he supposes that in the course of ages
every man has had numberless progenitors, kings and slaves, Greeks and
barbarians; and in the Critias, where he says that nine thousand years
have elapsed since the island of Atlantis fought with Athens--that Plato
is no stranger to the conception of long periods of time. He imagines
human society to have been interrupted by natural convulsions; and
beginning from the last of these, he traces the steps by which the family
has grown into the state, and the original scattered society, becoming
more and more civilised, has finally passed into military organizations
like those of Crete and Sparta. His conception of the origin of states is
far truer in the Laws than in the Republic; but it must be remembered that
here he is giving an historical, there an ideal picture of the growth of
society.

Modern enquirers, like Plato, have found in infinite ages the explanation
not only of states, but of languages, men, animals, the world itself; like
him, also, they have detected in later institutions the vestiges of a
patriarchal state still surviving. Thus far Plato speaks as 'the spectator
of all time and all existence,' who may be thought by some divine instinct
to have guessed at truths which were hereafter to be revealed. He is far
above the vulgar notion that Hellas is the civilized world (Statesman), or
that civilization only began when the Hellenes appeared on the scene. But
he has no special knowledge of 'the days before the flood'; and when he
approaches more historical times, in preparing the way for his own theory
of mixed government, he argues partially and erroneously. He is desirous
of showing that unlimited power is ruinous to any state, and hence he is
led to attribute a tyrannical spirit to the first Dorian kings. The decay
of Argos and the destruction of Messene are adduced by him as a manifest
proof of their failure; and Sparta, he thinks, was only preserved by the
limitations which the wisdom of successive legislators introduced into the
government. But there is no more reason to suppose that the Dorian rule of
life which was followed at Sparta ever prevailed in Argos and Messene,
than to assume that Dorian institutions were framed to protect the Greeks
against the power of Assyria; or that the empire of Assyria was in any way
affected by the Trojan war; or that the return of the Heraclidae was only
the return of Achaean exiles, who received a new name from their leader
Dorieus. Such fancies were chiefly based, as far as they had any
foundation, on the use of analogy, which played a great part in the dawn
of historical and geographical research. Because there was a Persian
empire which was the natural enemy of the Greek, there must also have been
an Assyrian empire, which had a similar hostility; and not only the fable
of the island of Atlantis, but the Trojan war, in Plato's mind derived
some features from the Persian struggle. So Herodotus makes the Nile
answer to the Ister, and the valley of the Nile to the Red Sea. In the
Republic, Plato is flying in the air regardless of fact and possibility--
in the Laws, he is making history by analogy. In the former, he appears to
be like some modern philosophers, absolutely devoid of historical sense;
in the latter, he is on a level, not with Thucydides, or the critical
historians of Greece, but with Herodotus, or even with Ctesias.

The chief object of Plato in tracing the origin of society is to show the
point at which regular government superseded the patriarchical authority,
and the separate customs of different families were systematized by
legislators, and took the form of laws consented to by them all. According
to Plato, the only sound principle on which any government could be based
was a mixture or balance of power. The balance of power saved Sparta, when
the two other Heraclid states fell into disorder. Here is probably the
first trace of a political idea, which has exercised a vast influence both
in ancient and modern times. And yet we might fairly ask, a little
parodying the language of Plato--O legislator, is unanimity only 'the
struggle for existence'; or is the balance of powers in a state better
than the harmony of them?

In the fourth book we approach the realities of politics, and Plato begins
to ascend to the height of his great argument. The reign of Cronos has
passed away, and various forms of government have succeeded, which are all
based on self-interest and self-preservation. Right and wrong, instead of
being measured by the will of God, are created by the law of the state.
The strongest assertions are made of the purely spiritual nature of
religion--'Without holiness no man is accepted of God'; and of the duty of
filial obedience,--'Honour thy parents.' The legislator must teach these
precepts as well as command them. He is to be the educator as well as the
lawgiver of future ages, and his laws are themselves to form a part of the
education of the state. Unlike the poet, he must be definite and rational;
he cannot be allowed to say one thing at one time, and another thing at
another--he must know what he is about. And yet legislation has a poetical
or rhetorical element, and must find words which will wing their way to
the hearts of men. Laws must be promulgated before they are put in
execution, and mankind must be reasoned with before they are punished. The
legislator, when he promulgates a particular law, will courteously entreat
those who are willing to hear his voice. Upon the rebellious only does the
heavy blow descend. A sermon and a law in one, blending the secular
punishment with the religious sanction, appeared to Plato a new idea which
might have a great result in reforming the world. The experiment had never
been tried of reasoning with mankind; the laws of others had never had any
preambles, and Plato seems to have great pleasure in contemplating his
discovery.

In these quaint forms of thought and language, great principles of morals
and legislation are enunciated by him for the first time. They all go back
to mind and God, who holds the beginning, middle, and end of all things in
His hand. The adjustment of the divine and human elements in the world is
conceived in the spirit of modern popular philosophy, differing not much
in the mode of expression. At first sight the legislator appears to be
impotent, for all things are the sport of chance. But we admit also that
God governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with
Him (compare the saying, that chance is the name of the unknown cause).
Lastly, while we acknowledge that God and chance govern mankind and
provide the conditions of human action, experience will not allow us to
deny a place to art. We know that there is a use in having a pilot, though
the storm may overwhelm him; and a legislator is required to provide for
the happiness of a state, although he will pray for favourable conditions
under which he may exercise his art.

BOOK V. Hear now, all ye who heard the laws about Gods and ancestors: Of
all human possessions the soul is most divine, and most truly a man's own.
For in every man there are two parts--a better which rules, and an
inferior which serves; and the ruler is to be preferred to the servant.
Wherefore I bid every one next after the Gods to honour his own soul, and
he can only honour her by making her better. A man does not honour his
soul by flattery, or gifts, or self-indulgence, or conceit of knowledge,
nor when he blames others for his own errors; nor when he indulges in
pleasure or refuses to bear pain; nor when he thinks that life at any
price is a good, because he fears the world below, which, far from being
an evil, may be the greatest good; nor when he prefers beauty to virtue--
not reflecting that the soul, which came from heaven, is more honourable
than the body, which is earth-born; nor when he covets dishonest gains, of
which no amount is equal in value to virtue;--in a word, when he counts
that which the legislator pronounces evil to be good, he degrades his
soul, which is the divinest part of him. He does not consider that the
real punishment of evil-doing is to grow like evil men, and to shun the
conversation of the good: and that he who is joined to such men must do
and suffer what they by nature do and say to one another, which suffering
is not justice but retribution. For justice is noble, but retribution is
only the companion of injustice. And whether a man escapes punishment or
not, he is equally miserable; for in the one case he is not cured, and in
the other case he perishes that the rest may be saved.

The glory of man is to follow the better and improve the inferior. And the
soul is that part of man which is most inclined to avoid the evil and
dwell with the good. Wherefore also the soul is second only to the Gods in
honour, and in the third place the body is to be esteemed, which often has
a false honour. For honour is not to be given to the fair or the strong,
or the swift or the tall, or to the healthy, any more than to their
opposites, but to the mean states of all these habits; and so of property
and external goods. No man should heap up riches that he may leave them to
his children. The best condition for them as for the state is a middle
one, in which there is a freedom without luxury. And the best inheritance
of children is modesty. But modesty cannot be implanted by admonition
only--the elders must set the example. He who would train the young must
first train himself.

He who honours his kindred and family may fairly expect that the Gods will
give him children. He who would have friends must think much of their
favours to him, and little of his to them. He who prefers to an Olympic,
or any other victory, to win the palm of obedience to the laws, serves
best both the state and his fellow-citizens. Engagements with strangers
are to be deemed most sacred, because the stranger, having neither kindred
nor friends, is immediately under the protection of Zeus, the God of
strangers. A prudent man will not sin against the stranger; and still more
carefully will he avoid sinning against the suppliant, which is an offence
never passed over by the Gods.

I will now speak of those particulars which are matters of praise and
blame only, and which, although not enforced by the law, greatly affect
the disposition to obey the law. Truth has the first place among the gifts
of Gods and men, for truth begets trust; but he is not to be trusted who
loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a
fool. Neither the ignorant nor the untrustworthy man is happy; for they
have no friends in life, and die unlamented and untended. Good is he who
does no injustice--better who prevents others from doing any--best of all
who joins the rulers in punishing injustice. And this is true of goods and
virtues in general; he who has and communicates them to others is the man
of men; he who would, if he could, is second-best; he who has them and is
jealous of imparting them to others is to be blamed, but the good or
virtue which he has is to be valued still. Let every man contend in the
race without envy; for the unenvious man increases the strength of the
city; himself foremost in the race, he harms no one with calumny. Whereas
the envious man is weak himself, and drives his rivals to despair with his
slanders, thus depriving the whole city of incentives to the exercise of
virtue, and tarnishing her glory. Every man should be gentle, but also
passionate; for he must have the spirit to fight against incurable and
malignant evil. But the evil which is remediable should be dealt with more
in sorrow than anger. He who is unjust is to be pitied in any case; for no
man voluntarily does evil or allows evil to exist in his soul. And
therefore he who deals with the curable sort must be long-suffering and
forbearing; but the incurable shall have the vials of our wrath poured out
upon him. The greatest of all evils is self-love, which is thought to be
natural and excusable, and is enforced as a duty, and yet is the cause of
many errors. The lover is blinded about the beloved, and prefers his own
interests to truth and right; but the truly great man seeks justice before
all things. Self-love is the source of that ignorant conceit of knowledge
which is always doing and never succeeding. Wherefore let every man avoid
self-love, and follow the guidance of those who are better than himself.
There are lesser matters which a man should recall to mind; for wisdom is
like a stream, ever flowing in and out, and recollection flows in when
knowledge is failing. Let no man either laugh or grieve overmuch; but let
him control his feelings in the day of good- or ill-fortune, believing
that the Gods will diminish the evils and increase the blessings of the
righteous. These are thoughts which should ever occupy a good man's mind;
he should remember them both in lighter and in more serious hours, and
remind others of them.

So much of divine matters and the relation of man to God. But man is man,
and dependent on pleasure and pain; and therefore to acquire a true taste
respecting either is a great matter. And what is a true taste? This can
only be explained by a comparison of one life with another. Pleasure is an
object of desire, pain of avoidance; and the absence of pain is to be
preferred to pain, but not to pleasure. There are infinite kinds and
degrees of both of them, and we choose the life which has more pleasure
and avoid that which has less; but we do not choose that life in which the
elements of pleasure are either feeble or equally balanced with pain. All
the lives which we desire are pleasant; the choice of any others is due to
inexperience.

Now there are four lives--the temperate, the rational, the courageous, the
healthful; and to these let us oppose four others--the intemperate, the
foolish, the cowardly, the diseased. The temperate life has gentle pains
and pleasures and placid desires, the intemperate life has violent
delights, and still more violent desires. And the pleasures of the
temperate exceed the pains, while the pains of the intemperate exceed the
pleasures. But if this is true, none are voluntarily intemperate, but all
who lack temperance are either ignorant or wanting in self-control: for
men always choose the life which (as they think) exceeds in pleasure. The
wise, the healthful, the courageous life have a similar advantage--they
also exceed their opposites in pleasure. And, generally speaking, the life
of virtue is far more pleasurable and honourable, fairer and happier far,
than the life of vice. Let this be the preamble of our laws; the strain
will follow.

As in a web the warp is stronger than the woof, so should the rulers be
stronger than their half-educated subjects. Let us suppose, then, that in
the constitution of a state there are two parts, the appointment of the
rulers, and the laws which they have to administer. But, before going
further, there are some preliminary matters which have to be considered.

As of animals, so also of men, a selection must be made; the bad breed
must be got rid of, and the good retained. The legislator must purify
them, and if he be not a despot he will find this task to be a difficult
one. The severer kinds of purification are practised when great offenders
are punished by death or exile, but there is a milder process which is
necessary when the poor show a disposition to attack the property of the
rich, for then the legislator will send them off to another land, under
the name of a colony. In our case, however, we shall only need to purify
the streams before they meet. This is often a troublesome business, but in
theory we may suppose the operation performed, and the desired purity
attained. Evil men we will hinder from coming, and receive the good as
friends.

Like the old Heraclid colony, we are fortunate in escaping the abolition
of debts and the distribution of land, which are difficult and dangerous
questions. But, perhaps, now that we are speaking of the subject, we ought
to say how, if the danger existed, the legislator should try to avert it.
He would have recourse to prayers, and trust to the healing influence of
time. He would create a kindly spirit between creditors and debtors: those
who have should give to those who have not, and poverty should be held to
be rather the increase of a man's desires than the diminution of his
property. Good-will is the only safe and enduring foundation of the
political society; and upon this our city shall be built. The lawgiver, if
he is wise, will not proceed with the arrangement of the state until all
disputes about property are settled. And for him to introduce fresh
grounds of quarrel would be madness.

Let us now proceed to the distribution of our state, and determine the
size of the territory and the number of the allotments. The territory
should be sufficient to maintain the citizens in moderation, and the
population should be numerous enough to defend themselves, and sometimes
to aid their neighbours. We will fix the number of citizens at 5040, to
which the number of houses and portions of land shall correspond. Let the
number be divided into two parts and then into three; for it is very
convenient for the purposes of distribution, and is capable of fifty-nine
divisions, ten of which proceed without interval from one to ten. Here are
numbers enough for war and peace, and for all contracts and dealings.
These properties of numbers are true, and should be ascertained with a
view to use.

In carrying out the distribution of the land, a prudent legislator will be
careful to respect any provision for religious worship which has been
sanctioned by ancient tradition or by the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, or
Ammon. All sacrifices, and altars, and temples, whatever may be their
origin, should remain as they are. Every division should have a patron God
or hero; to these a portion of the domain should be appropriated, and at
their temples the inhabitants of the districts should meet together from
time to time, for the sake of mutual help and friendship. All the citizens
of a state should be known to one another; for where men are in the dark
about each other's characters, there can be no justice or right
administration. Every man should be true and single-minded, and should not
allow himself to be deceived by others.

And now the game opens, and we begin to move the pieces. At first sight,
our constitution may appear singular and ill-adapted to a legislator who
has not despotic power; but on second thoughts will be deemed to be, if
not the very best, the second best. For there are three forms of
government, a first, a second, and a third best, out of which Cleinias has
now to choose. The first and highest form is that in which friends have
all things in common, including wives and property,--in which they have
common fears, hopes, desires, and do not even call their eyes or their
hands their own. This is the ideal state; than which there never can be a
truer or better--a state, whether inhabited by Gods or sons of Gods, which
will make the dwellers therein blessed. Here is the pattern on which we
must ever fix our eyes; but we are now concerned with another, which comes
next to it, and we will afterwards proceed to a third.

Inasmuch as our citizens are not fitted either by nature or education to
receive the saying, Friends have all things in common, let them retain
their houses and private property, but use them in the service of their
country, who is their God and parent, and of the Gods and demigods of the
land. Their first care should be to preserve the number of their lots.
This may be secured in the following manner: when the possessor of a lot
dies, he shall leave his lot to his best-beloved child, who will become
the heir of all duties and interests, and will minister to the Gods and to
the family, to the living and to the dead. Of the remaining children, the
females must be given in marriage according to the law to be hereafter
enacted; the males may be assigned to citizens who have no children of
their own. How to equalize families and allotments will be one of the
chief cares of the guardians of the laws. When parents have too many
children they may give to those who have none, or couples may abstain from
having children, or, if there is a want of offspring, special care may be
taken to obtain them; or if the number of citizens becomes excessive, we
may send away the surplus to found a colony. If, on the other hand, a war
or plague diminishes the number of inhabitants, new citizens must be
introduced; and these ought not, if possible, to be men of low birth or
inferior training; but even God, it is said, cannot always fight against
necessity.

Wherefore we will thus address our citizens:--Good friends, honour order
and equality, and above all the number 5040. Secondly, respect the
original division of the lots, which must not be infringed by buying and
selling, for the law says that the land which a man has is sacred and is
given to him by God. And priests and priestesses will offer frequent
sacrifices and pray that he who alienates either house or lot may receive
the punishment which he deserves, and their prayers shall be inscribed on
tablets of cypress-wood for the instruction of posterity. The guardians
will keep a vigilant watch over the citizens, and they will punish those
who disobey God and the law.

To appreciate the benefit of such an institution a man requires to be well
educated; for he certainly will not make a fortune in our state, in which
all illiberal occupations are forbidden to freemen. The law also provides
that no private person shall have gold or silver, except a little coin for
daily use, which will not pass current in other countries. The state must
also possess a common Hellenic currency, but this is only to be used in
defraying the expenses of expeditions, or of embassies, or while a man is
on foreign travels; but in the latter case he must deliver up what is
over, when he comes back, to the treasury in return for an equal amount of
local currency, on pain of losing the sum in question; and he who does not
inform against an offender is to be mulcted in a like sum. No money is to
be given or taken as a dowry, or to be lent on interest. The law will not
protect a man in recovering either interest or principal. All these
regulations imply that the aim of the legislator is not to make the city
as rich or as mighty as possible, but the best and happiest. Now men can
hardly be at the same time very virtuous and very rich. And why? Because
he who makes twice as much and saves twice as much as he ought, receiving
where he ought not and not spending where he ought, will be at least twice
as rich as he who makes money where he ought, and spends where he ought.
On the other hand, an utterly bad man is generally profligate and poor,
while he who acquires honestly, and spends what he acquires on noble
objects, can hardly be very rich. A very rich man is therefore not a good
man, and therefore not a happy one. But the object of our laws is to make
the citizens as friendly and happy as possible, which they cannot be if
they are always at law and injuring each other in the pursuit of gain. And
therefore we say that there is to be no silver or gold in the state, nor
usury, nor the rearing of the meaner kinds of live-stock, but only
agriculture, and only so much of this as will not lead men to neglect that
for the sake of which money is made, first the soul and afterwards the
body; neither of which are good for much without music and gymnastic.
Money is to be held in honour last or third; the highest interests being
those of the soul, and in the second class are to be ranked those of the
body. This is the true order of legislation, which would be inverted by
placing health before temperance, and wealth before health.

It might be well if every man could come to the colony having equal
property; but equality is impossible, and therefore we must avoid causes
of offence by having property valued and by equalizing taxation. To this
end, let us make four classes in which the citizens may be placed
according to the measure of their original property, and the changes of
their fortune. The greatest of evils is revolution; and this, as the law
will say, is caused by extremes of poverty or wealth. The limit of poverty
shall be the lot, which must not be diminished, and may be increased
fivefold, but not more. He who exceeds the limit must give up the excess
to the state; but if he does not, and is informed against, the surplus
shall be divided between the informer and the Gods, and he shall pay a sum
equal to the surplus out Of his own property. All property other than the
lot must be inscribed in a register, so that any disputes which arise may
be easily determined.

The city shall be placed in a suitable situation, as nearly as possible in
the centre of the country, and shall be divided into twelve wards. First,
we will erect an acropolis, encircled by a wall, within which shall be
placed the temples of Hestia, and Zeus, and Athene. From this shall be
drawn lines dividing the city, and also the country, into twelve sections,
and the country shall be subdivided into 5040 lots. Each lot shall contain
two parts, one at a distance, the other near the city; and the distance of
one part shall be compensated by the nearness of the other, the badness
and goodness by the greater or less size. Twelve lots will be assigned to
twelve Gods, and they will give their names to the tribes. The divisions
of the city shall correspond to those of the country; and every man shall
have two habitations, one near the centre of the country, the other at the
extremity.

The objection will naturally arise, that all the advantages of which we
have been speaking will never concur. The citizens will not tolerate a
settlement in which they are deprived of gold and silver, and have the
number of their families regulated, and the sites of their houses fixed by
law. It will be said that our city is a mere image of wax. And the
legislator will answer: 'I know it, but I maintain that we ought to set
forth an ideal which is as perfect as possible. If difficulties arise in
the execution of the plan, we must avoid them and carry out the remainder.
But the legislator must first be allowed to complete his idea without
interruption.'

The number twelve, which we have chosen for the number of division, must
run through all parts of the state,--phratries, villages, ranks of
soldiers, coins, and measures wet and dry, which are all to be made
commensurable with one another. There is no meanness in requiring that the
smallest vessels should have a common measure; for the divisions of number
are useful in measuring height and depth, as well as sounds and motions,
upwards or downwards, or round and round. The legislator should impress on
his citizens the value of arithmetic. No instrument of education has so
much power; nothing more tends to sharpen and inspire the dull intellect.
But the legislator must be careful to instil a noble and generous spirit
into the students, or they will tend to become cunning rather than wise.
This may be proved by the example of the Egyptians and Phoenicians, who,
notwithstanding their knowledge of arithmetic, are degraded in their
general character; whether this defect in them is due to some natural
cause or to a bad legislator. For it is clear that there are great
differences in the power of regions to produce good men: heat and cold,
and water and food, have great effects both on body and soul; and those
spots are peculiarly fortunate in which the air is holy, and the Gods are
pleased to dwell. To all this the legislator must attend, so far as in him
lies.

BOOK VI. And now we are about to consider (1) the appointment of
magistrates; (2) the laws which they will have to administer must be
determined. I may observe by the way that laws, however good, are useless
and even injurious unless the magistrates are capable of executing them.
And therefore (1) the intended rulers of our imaginary state should be
tested from their youth upwards until the time of their election; and (2)
those who are to elect them ought to be trained in habits of law, that
they may form a right judgment of good and bad men. But uneducated
colonists, who are unacquainted with each other, will not be likely to
choose well. What, then, shall we do? I will tell you: The colony will
have to be intrusted to the ten commissioners, of whom you are one, and I
will help you and them, which is my reason for inventing this romance. And
I cannot bear that the tale should go wandering about the world without a
head,--it will be such an ugly monster. 'Very good.' Yes; and I will be as
good as my word, if God be gracious and old age permit. But let us not
forget what a courageously mad creation this our city is. 'What makes you
say so?' Why, surely our courage is shown in imagining that the new
colonists will quietly receive our laws? For no man likes to receive laws
when they are first imposed: could we only wait until those who had been
educated under them were grown up, and of an age to vote in the public
elections, there would be far greater reason to expect permanence in our
institutions. 'Very true.' The Cnosian founders should take the utmost
pains in the matter of the colony, and in the election of the higher
officers, particularly of the guardians of the law. The latter should be
appointed in this way: The Cnosians, who take the lead in the colony,
together with the colonists, will choose thirty-seven persons, of whom
nineteen will be colonists, and the remaining eighteen Cnosians--you must
be one of the eighteen yourself, and become a citizen of the new state.
'Why do not you and Megillus join us?' Athens is proud, and Sparta too;
and they are both a long way off. But let me proceed with my scheme. When
the state is permanently established, the mode of election will be as
follows: All who are serving, or have served, in the army will be
electors; and the election will be held in the most sacred of the temples.
The voter will place on the altar a tablet, inscribing thereupon the name
of the candidate whom he prefers, and of his father, tribe, and ward,
writing at the side of them his own name in like manner; and he may take
away any tablet which does not appear written to his mind, and place it in
the Agora for thirty days. The 300 who obtain the greatest number of votes
will be publicly announced, and out of them there will be a second
election of 100; and out of the 100 a third and final election of thirty-
seven, accompanied by the solemnity of the electors passing through
victims. But then who is to arrange all this? There is a common saying,
that the beginning is half the whole; and I should say a good deal more
than half. 'Most true.' The only way of making a beginning is from the
parent city; and though in after ages the tie may be broken, and quarrels
may arise between them, yet in early days the child naturally looks to the
mother for care and education. And, as I said before, the Cnosians ought
to take an interest in the colony, and select 100 elders of their own
citizens, to whom shall be added 100 of the colonists, to arrange and
supervise the first elections and scrutinies; and when the colony has been
started, the Cnosians may return home and leave the colonists to
themselves.

The thirty-seven magistrates who have been elected in the manner
described, shall have the following duties: first, they shall be guardians
of the law; secondly, of the registers of property in the four classes--
not including the one, two, three, four minae, which are allowed as a
surplus. He who is found to possess what is not entered in the registers,
in addition to the confiscation of such property shall be proceeded
against by law, and if he be cast he shall lose his share in the public
property and in distributions of money; and his sentence shall be
inscribed in some public place. The guardians are to continue in office
twenty years only, and to commence holding office at fifty years, or if
elected at sixty they are not to remain after seventy.

Generals have now to be elected, and commanders of horse and brigadiers of
foot. The generals shall be natives of the city, proposed by the guardians
of the law, and elected by those who are or have been of the age for
military service. Any one may challenge the person nominated and start
another candidate, whom he affirms upon oath to be better qualified. The
three who obtain the greatest number of votes shall be elected. The
generals thus elected shall propose the taxiarchs or brigadiers, and the
challenge may be made, and the voting shall take place, in the same manner
as before. The elective assembly will be presided over in the first
instance, and until the prytanes and council come into being, by the
guardians of the law in some holy place; and they shall divide the
citizens into three divisions,--hoplites, cavalry, and the rest of the
army--placing each of them by itself. All are to vote for generals and
cavalry officers. The brigadiers are to be voted for only by the hoplites.
Next, the cavalry are to choose phylarchs for the generals; but captains
of archers and other irregular troops are to be appointed by the generals
themselves. The cavalry-officers shall be proposed and voted upon by the
same persons who vote for the generals. The two who have the greatest
number of votes shall be leaders of all the horse. Disputes about the
voting may be raised once or twice, but, if a third time, the presiding
officers shall decide.

The council shall consist of 360, who may be conveniently divided into
four sections, making ninety councillors of each class. In the first
place, all the citizens shall select candidates from the first class; and
they shall be compelled to vote under pain of a fine. This shall be the
business of the first day. On the second day a similar selection shall be
made from the second class under the same conditions. On the third day,
candidates shall be selected from the third class; but the compulsion to
vote shall only extend to the voters of the first three classes. On the
fourth day, members of the council shall be selected from the fourth
class; they shall be selected by all, but the compulsion to vote shall
only extend to the second class, who, if they do not vote, shall pay a
fine of triple the amount which was exacted at first, and to the first
class, who shall pay a quadruple fine. On the fifth day, the names shall
be exhibited, and out of them shall be chosen by all the citizens 180 of
each class: these are severally to be reduced by lot to ninety, and 90 x 4
will form the council for the year.

The mode of election which has been described is a mean between monarchy
and democracy, and such a mean should ever be observed in the state. For
servants and masters cannot be friends, and, although equality makes
friendship, we must remember that there are two sorts of equality. One of
them is the rule of number and measure; but there is also a higher
equality, which is the judgment of Zeus. Of this he grants but little to
mortal men; yet that little is the source of the greatest good to cities
and individuals. It is proportioned to the nature of each man; it gives
more to the better and less to the inferior, and is the true political
justice; to this we in our state desire to look, as every legislator
should, not to the interests either of tyrants or mobs. But justice cannot
always be strictly enforced, and then equity and mercy have to be
substituted: and for a similar reason, when true justice will not be
endured, we must have recourse to the rougher justice of the lot, which
God must be entreated to guide.

These are the principal means of preserving the state, but perpetual care
will also be required. When a ship is sailing on the sea, vigilance must
not be relaxed night or day; and the vessel of state is tossing in a
political sea, and therefore watch must continually succeed watch, and
rulers must join hands with rulers. A small body will best perform this
duty, and therefore the greater part of the 360 senators may be permitted
to go and manage their own affairs, but a twelfth portion must be set
aside in each month for the administration of the state. Their business
will be to receive information and answer embassies; also they must
endeavour to prevent or heal internal disorders; and with this object they
must have the control of all assemblies of the citizens.

Besides the council, there must be wardens of the city and of the agora,
who will superintend houses, ways, harbours, markets, and fountains, in
the city and the suburbs, and prevent any injury being done to them by man
or beast. The temples, also, will require priests and priestesses. Those
who hold the priestly office by hereditary tenure shall not be disturbed;
but as there will probably be few or none such in a new colony, priests
and priestesses shall be appointed for the Gods who have no servants. Some
of these officers shall be elected by vote, some by lot; and all classes
shall mingle in a friendly manner at the elections. The appointment of
priests should be left to God,--that is, to the lot; but the person
elected must prove that he is himself sound in body and of legitimate
birth, and that his family has been free from homicide or any other stain
of impurity. Priests and priestesses are to be not less than sixty years
of age, and shall hold office for a year only. The laws which are to
regulate matters of religion shall be brought from Delphi, and
interpreters appointed to superintend their execution. These shall be
elected in the following manner:--The twelve tribes shall be formed into
three bodies of four, each of which shall select four candidates, and this
shall be done three times: of each twelve thus selected the three who
receive the largest number of votes, nine in all, after undergoing a
scrutiny shall go to Delphi, in order that the God may elect one out of
each triad. They shall be appointed for life; and when any of them dies,
another shall be elected by the four tribes who made the original
appointment. There shall also be treasurers of the temples; three for the
greater temples, two for the lesser, and one for those of least
importance.

The defence of the city should be committed to the generals and other
officers of the army, and to the wardens of the city and agora. The
defence of the country shall be on this wise:--The twelve tribes shall
allot among themselves annually the twelve divisions of the country, and
each tribe shall appoint five wardens and commanders of the watch. The
five wardens in each division shall choose out of their own tribe twelve
guards, who are to be between twenty-five and thirty years of age. Both
the wardens and the guards are to serve two years; and they shall make a
round of the divisions, staying a month in each. They shall go from West
to East during the first year, and back from East to West during the
second. Thus they will gain a perfect knowledge of the country at every
season of the year.

While on service, their first duty will be to see that the country is well
protected by means of fortifications and entrenchments; they will use the
beasts of burden and the labourers whom they find on the spot, taking care
however not to interfere with the regular course of agriculture. But while
they thus render the country as inaccessible as possible to enemies, they
will also make it as accessible as possible to friends by constructing and
maintaining good roads. They will restrain and preserve the rain which
comes down from heaven, making the barren places fertile, and the wet
places dry. They will ornament the fountains with plantations and
buildings, and provide water for irrigation at all seasons of the year.
They will lead the streams to the temples and groves of the Gods; and in
such spots the youth shall make gymnasia for themselves, and warm baths
for the aged; there the rustic worn with toil will receive a kindly
welcome, and be far better treated than at the hands of an unskilful
doctor.

These works will be both useful and ornamental; but the sixty wardens must
not fail to give serious attention to other duties. For they must watch
over the districts assigned to them, and also act as judges. In small
matters the five commanders shall decide: in greater matters up to three
minae, the five commanders and the twelve guards. Like all other judges,
except those who have the final decision, they shall be liable to give an
account. If the wardens impose unjust tasks on the villagers, or take by
force their crops or implements, or yield to flattery or bribes in
deciding suits, let them be publicly dishonoured. In regard to any other
wrong-doing, if the question be of a mina, let the neighbours decide; but
if the accused person will not submit, trusting that his monthly removals
will enable him to escape payment, and also in suits about a larger
amount, the injured party may have recourse to the common court; in the
former case, if successful, he may exact a double penalty.

The wardens and guards, while on their two years' service, shall live and
eat together, and the guard who is absent from the daily meals without
permission or sleeps out at night, shall be regarded as a deserter, and
may be punished by any one who meets him. If any of the commanders is
guilty of such an irregularity, the whole sixty shall have him punished;
and he of them who screens him shall suffer a still heavier penalty than
the offender himself. Now by service a man learns to rule; and he should
pride himself upon serving well the laws and the Gods all his life, and
upon having served ancient and honourable men in his youth. The twelve and
the five should be their own servants, and use the labour of the villagers
only for the good of the public. Let them search the country through, and
acquire a perfect knowledge of every locality; with this view, hunting and
field sports should be encouraged.

Next we have to speak of the elections of the wardens of the agora and of
the city. The wardens of the city shall be three in number, and they shall
have the care of the streets, roads, buildings, and also of the water-
supply. They shall be chosen out of the highest class, and when the number
of candidates has been reduced to six who have the greatest number of
votes, three out of the six shall be taken by lot, and, after a scrutiny,
shall be admitted to their office. The wardens of the agora shall be five
in number--ten are to be first elected, and every one shall vote for all
the vacant places; the ten shall be afterwards reduced to five by lot, as
in the former election. The first and second class shall be compelled to
go to the assembly, but not the third and fourth, unless they are
specially summoned. The wardens of the agora shall have the care of the
temples and fountains which are in the agora, and shall punish those who
injure them by stripes and bonds, if they be slaves or strangers; and by
fines, if they be citizens. And the wardens of the city shall have a
similar power of inflicting punishment and fines in their own department.

In the next place, there must be directors of music and gymnastic; one
class of them superintending gymnasia and schools, and the attendance and
lodging of the boys and girls--the other having to do with contests of
music and gymnastic. In musical contests there shall be one kind of judges
of solo singing or playing, who will judge of rhapsodists, flute-players,
harp-players and the like, and another of choruses. There shall be
choruses of men and boys and maidens--one director will be enough to
introduce them all, and he should not be less than forty years of age;
secondly, of solos also there shall be one director, aged not less than
thirty years; he will introduce the competitors and give judgment upon
them. The director of the choruses is to be elected in an assembly at
which all who take an interest in music are compelled to attend, and no
one else. Candidates must only be proposed for their fitness, and opposed
on the ground of unfitness. Ten are to be elected by vote, and the one of
these on whom the lot falls shall be director for a year. Next shall be
elected out of the second and third classes the judges of gymnastic
contests, who are to be three in number, and are to be tested, after being
chosen by lot out of twenty who have been elected by the three highest
classes--these being compelled to attend at the election.

One minister remains, who will have the general superintendence of
education. He must be not less than fifty years old, and be himself the
father of children born in wedlock. His office must be regarded by all as
the highest in the state. For the right growth of the first shoot in
plants and animals is the chief cause of matured perfection. Man is
supposed to be a tame animal, but he becomes either the gentlest or the
fiercest of creatures, accordingly as he is well or ill educated.
Wherefore he who is elected to preside over education should be the best
man possible. He shall hold office for five years, and shall be elected
out of the guardians of the law, by the votes of the other magistrates
with the exception of the senate and prytanes; and the election shall be
held by ballot in the temple of Apollo.

When a magistrate dies before his term of office has expired, another
shall be elected in his place; and, if the guardian of an orphan dies, the
relations shall appoint another within ten days, or be fined a drachma a
day for neglect.

The city which has no courts of law will soon cease to be a city; and a
judge who sits in silence and leaves the enquiry to the litigants, as in
arbitrations, is not a good judge. A few judges are better than many, but
the few must be good. The matter in dispute should be clearly elicited;
time and examination will find out the truth. Causes should first be tried
before a court of neighbours: if the decision is unsatisfactory, let them
be referred to a higher court; or, if necessary, to a higher still, of
which the decision shall be final.

Every magistrate is a judge, and every judge is a magistrate, on the day
on which he is deciding the suit. This will therefore be an appropriate
place to speak of judges and their functions. The supreme tribunal will be
that on which the litigants agree; and let there be two other tribunals,
one for public and the other for private causes. The high court of appeal
shall be composed as follows:--All the officers of state shall meet on the
last day but one of the year in some temple, and choose for a judge the
best man out of every magistracy: and those who are elected, after they
have undergone a scrutiny, shall be judges of appeal. They shall give
their decisions openly, in the presence of the magistrates who have
elected them; and the public may attend. If anybody charges one of them
with having intentionally decided wrong, he shall lay his accusation
before the guardians of the law, and if the judge be found guilty he shall
pay damages to the extent of half the injury, unless the guardians of the
law deem that he deserves a severer punishment, in which case the judges
shall assess the penalty.

As the whole people are injured by offences against the state, they should
share in the trial of them. Such causes should originate with the people
and be decided by them: the enquiry shall take place before any three of
the highest magistrates upon whom the defendant and plaintiff can agree.
Also in private suits all should judge as far as possible, and therefore
there should be a court of law in every ward; for he who has no share in
the administration of justice, believes that he has no share in the state.
The judges in these courts shall be elected by lot and give their decision
at once. The final judgment in all cases shall rest with the court of
appeal. And so, having done with the appointment of courts and the
election of officers, we will now make our laws.

'Your way of proceeding, Stranger, is admirable.'

Then so far our old man's game of play has gone off well.

'Say, rather, our serious and noble pursuit.'

Perhaps; but let me ask you whether you have ever observed the manner in
which painters put in and rub out colour: yet their endless labour will
last but a short time, unless they leave behind them some successor who
will restore the picture and remove its defects. 'Certainly.' And have we
not a similar object at the present moment? We are old ourselves, and
therefore we must leave our work of legislation to be improved and
perfected by the next generation; not only making laws for our guardians,
but making them lawgivers. 'We must at least do our best.' Let us address
them as follows. Beloved saviours of the laws, we give you an outline of
legislation which you must fill up, according to a rule which we will
prescribe for you. Megillus and Cleinias and I are agreed, and we hope
that you will agree with us in thinking, that the whole energies of a man
should be devoted to the attainment of manly virtue, whether this is to be
gained by study, or habit, or desire, or opinion. And rather than accept
institutions which tend to degrade and enslave him, he should fly his
country and endure any hardship. These are our principles, and we would
ask you to judge of our laws, and praise or blame them, accordingly as
they are or are not capable of improving our citizens.

And first of laws concerning religion. We have already said that the
number 5040 has many convenient divisions: and we took a twelfth part of
this (420), which is itself divisible by twelve, for the number of the
tribe. Every divisor is a gift of God, and corresponds to the months of
the year and to the revolution of the universe. All cities have a number,
but none is more fortunate than our own, which can be divided by all
numbers up to 12, with the exception of 11, and even by 11, if two
families are deducted. And now let us divide the state, assigning to each
division some God or demigod, who shall have altars raised to them, and
sacrifices offered twice a month; and assemblies shall be held in their
honour, twelve for the tribes, and twelve for the city, corresponding to
their divisions. The object of them will be first to promote religion,
secondly to encourage friendship and intercourse between families; for
families must be acquainted before they marry into one another, or great
mistakes will occur. At these festivals there shall be innocent dances of
young men and maidens, who may have the opportunity of seeing one another
in modest undress. To the details of all this the masters of choruses and
the guardians will attend, embodying in laws the results of their
experience; and, after ten years, making the laws permanent, with the
consent of the legislator, if he be alive, or, if he be not alive, of the
guardians of the law, who shall perfect them and settle them once for all.
At least, if any further changes are required, the magistrates must take
the whole people into counsel, and obtain the sanction of all the oracles.

Whenever any one who is between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five
wants to marry, let him do so; but first let him hear the strain which we
will address to him:--

My son, you ought to marry, but not in order to gain wealth or to avoid
poverty; neither should you, as men are wont to do, choose a wife who is
like yourself in property and character. You ought to consult the
interests of the state rather than your own pleasure; for by equal
marriages a society becomes unequal. And yet to enact a law that the rich
and mighty shall not marry the rich and mighty, that the quick shall be
united to the slow, and the slow to the quick, will arouse anger in some
persons and laughter in others; for they do not understand that opposite
elements ought to be mingled in the state, as wine should be mingled with
water. The object at which we aim must therefore be left to the influence
of public opinion. And do not forget our former precept, that every one
should seek to attain immortality and raise up a fair posterity to serve
God.--Let this be the prelude of the law about the duty of marriage. But
if a man will not listen, and at thirty-five years of age is still
unmarried, he shall pay an annual fine: if he be of the first class, 100
drachmas; if of the second, 70; if of the third, 60; and if of the fourth,
30. This fine shall be sacred to Here; and if he refuse to pay, a tenfold
penalty shall be exacted by the treasurer of Here, who shall be
responsible for the payment. Further, the unmarried man shall receive no
honour or obedience from the young, and he shall not retain the right of
punishing others. A man is neither to give nor receive a dowry beyond a
certain fixed sum; in our state, for his consolation, if he be poor, let
him know that he need neither receive nor give one, for every citizen is
provided with the necessaries of life. Again, if the woman is not rich,
her husband will not be her humble servant. He who disobeys this law shall
pay a fine according to his class, which shall be exacted by the
treasurers of Here and Zeus.

The betrothal of the parties shall be made by the next of kin, or if there
are none, by the guardians. The offerings and ceremonies of marriage shall
be determined by the interpreters of sacred rites. Let the wedding party
be moderate; five male and five female friends, and a like number of
kinsmen, will be enough. The expense should not exceed, for the first
class, a mina; and for the second, half a mina; and should be in like
proportion for the other classes. Extravagance is to be regarded as
vulgarity and ignorance of nuptial proprieties. Much wine is only to be
drunk at the festivals of Dionysus, and certainly not on the occasion of a
marriage. The bride and bridegroom, who are taking a great step in life,
ought to have all their wits about them; they should be especially careful
of the night on which God may give them increase, and which this will be
none can say. Their bodies and souls should be in the most temperate
condition; they should abstain from all that partakes of the nature of
disease or vice, which will otherwise become hereditary. There is an
original divinity in man which preserves all things, if used with proper
respect. He who marries should make one of the two houses on the lot the
nest and nursery of his young; he should leave his father and mother, and
then his affection for them will be only increased by absence. He will go
forth as to a colony, and will there rear up his offspring, handing on the
torch of life to another generation.

About property in general there is little difficulty, with the exception
of property in slaves, which is an institution of a very doubtful
character. The slavery of the Helots is approved by some and condemned by
others; and there is some doubt even about the slavery of the
Mariandynians at Heraclea and of the Thessalian Penestae. This makes us
ask, What shall we do about slaves? To which every one would agree in
replying,--Let us have the best and most attached whom we can get. All of
us have heard stories of slaves who have been better to their masters than
sons or brethren. Yet there is an opposite doctrine, that slaves are never
to be trusted; as Homer says, 'Slavery takes away half a man's
understanding.' And different persons treat them in different ways: there
are some who never trust them, and beat them like dogs, until they make
them many times more slavish than they were before; and others pursue the
opposite plan. Man is a troublesome animal, as has been often shown,
Megillus, notably in the revolts of the Messenians; and great mischiefs
have arisen in countries where there are large bodies of slaves of one
nationality. Two rules may be given for their management: first that they
should not, if possible, be of the same country or have a common language;
and secondly, that they should be treated by their master with more
justice even than equals, out of regard to himself quite as much as to
them. For he who is righteous in the treatment of his slaves, or of any
inferiors, will sow in them the seed of virtue. Masters should never jest
with their slaves: this, which is a common but foolish practice, increases
the difficulty and painfulness of managing them.

Next as to habitations. These ought to have been spoken of before; for no
man can marry a wife, and have slaves, who has not a house for them to
live in. Let us supply the omission. The temples should be placed round
the Agora, and the city built in a circle on the heights. Near the
temples, which are holy places and the habitations of the Gods, should be
buildings for the magistrates, and the courts of law, including those in
which capital offences are to be tried. As to walls, Megillus, I agree
with Sparta that they should sleep in the earth; 'cold steel is the best
wall,' as the poet finely says. Besides, how absurd to be sending out our
youth to fortify and guard the borders of our country, and then to build a
city wall, which is very unhealthy, and is apt to make people fancy that
they may run there and rest in idleness, not knowing that true repose
comes from labour, and that idleness is only a renewal of trouble. If,
however, there must be a wall, the private houses had better be so
arranged as to form one wall; this will have an agreeable aspect, and the
building will be safer and more defensible. These objects should be
attended to at the foundation of the city. The wardens of the city must
see that they are carried out; and they must also enforce cleanliness, and
preserve the public buildings from encroachments. Moreover, they must take
care to let the rain flow off easily, and must regulate other matters
concerning the general administration of the city. If any further
enactments prove to be necessary, the guardians of the law must supply
them.

And now, having provided buildings, and having married our citizens, we
will proceed to speak of their mode of life. In a well-constituted state,
individuals cannot be allowed to live as they please. Why do I say this?
Because I am going to enact that the bridegroom shall not absent himself
from the common meals. They were instituted originally on the occasion of
some war, and, though deemed singular when first founded, they have tended
greatly to the security of states. There was a difficulty in introducing
them, but there is no difficulty in them now. There is, however, another
institution about which I would speak, if I dared. I may preface my
proposal by remarking that disorder in a state is the source of all evil,
and order of all good. Now in Sparta and Crete there are common meals for
men, and this, as I was saying, is a divine and natural institution. But
the women are left to themselves; they live in dark places, and, being
weaker, and therefore wickeder, than men, they are at the bottom of a good
deal more than half the evil of states. This must be corrected, and the
institution of common meals extended to both sexes. But, in the present
unfortunate state of opinion, who would dare to establish them? And still
more, who can compel women to eat and drink in public? They will defy the
legislator to drag them out of their holes. And in any other state such a
proposal would be drowned in clamour, but in our own I think that I can
show the attempt to be just and reasonable. 'There is nothing which we
should like to hear better.' Listen, then; having plenty of time, we will
go back to the beginning of things, which is an old subject with us.
'Right.' Either the race of mankind never had a beginning and will never
have an end, or the time which has elapsed since man first came into being
is all but infinite. 'No doubt.' And in this infinity of time there have
been changes of every kind, both in the order of the seasons and in the
government of states and in the customs of eating and drinking. Vines and
olives were at length discovered, and the blessings of Demeter and
Persephone, of which one Triptolemus is said to have been the minister;
before his time the animals had been eating one another. And there are
nations in which mankind still sacrifice their fellow-men, and other
nations in which they lead a kind of Orphic existence, and will not
sacrifice animals, or so much as taste of a cow--they offer fruits or
cakes moistened with honey. Perhaps you will ask me what is the bearing of
these remarks? 'We would gladly hear.' I will endeavour to explain their
drift. I see that the virtue of human life depends on the due regulation
of three wants or desires. The first is the desire of meat, the second of
drink; these begin with birth, and make us disobedient to any voice other
than that of pleasure. The third and fiercest and greatest need is felt
latest; this is love, which is a madness setting men's whole nature on
fire. These three disorders of mankind we must endeavour to restrain by
three mighty influences--fear, and law, and reason, which, with the aid
of the Muses and the Gods of contests, may extinguish our lusts.

But to return. After marriage let us proceed to the generation of
children, and then to their nurture and education--thus gradually
approaching the subject of syssitia. There are, however, some other points
which are suggested by the three words--meat, drink, love. 'Proceed,' the
bride and bridegroom ought to set their mind on having a brave offspring.
Now a man only succeeds when he takes pains; wherefore the bridegroom
ought to take special care of the bride, and the bride of the bridegroom,
at the time when their children are about to be born. And let there be a
committee of matrons who shall meet every day at the temple of Eilithyia
at a time fixed by the magistrates, and inform against any man or woman
who does not observe the laws of married life. The time of begetting
children and the supervision of the parents shall last for ten years only;
if at the expiration of this period they have no children, they may part,
with the consent of their relatives and the official matrons, and with a
due regard to the interests of either; if a dispute arise, ten of the
guardians of the law shall be chosen as arbiters. The matrons shall also
have power to enter the houses of the young people, if necessary, and to
advise and threaten them. If their efforts fail, let them go to the
guardians of the law; and if they too fail, the offender, whether man or
woman, shall be forbidden to be present at all family ceremonies. If when
the time for begetting children has ceased, either husband or wife have
connexion with others who are of an age to beget children, they shall be
liable to the same penalties as those who are still having a family. But
when both parties have ceased to beget children there shall be no
penalties. If men and women live soberly, the enactments of law may be
left to slumber; punishment is necessary only when there is great disorder
of manners.

The first year of children's lives is to be registered in their ancestral
temples; the name of the archon of the year is to be inscribed on a whited
wall in every phratry, and the names of the living members of the phratry
close to them, to be erased at their decease. The proper time of marriage
for a woman shall be from sixteen years to twenty; for a man, from thirty
to thirty-five (compare Republic). The age of holding office for a woman
is to be forty, for a man thirty years. The time for military service for
a man is to be from twenty years to sixty; for a woman, from the time that
she has ceased to bear children until fifty.

BOOK VII. Now that we have married our citizens and brought their children
into the world, we have to find nurture and education for them. This is a
matter of precept rather than of law, and cannot be precisely regulated by
the legislator. For minute regulations are apt to be transgressed, and
frequent transgressions impair the habit of obedience to the laws. I speak
darkly, but I will also try to exhibit my wares in the light of day. Am I
not right in saying that a good education tends to the improvement of body
and mind? 'Certainly.' And the body is fairest which grows up straight and
well-formed from the time of birth. 'Very true.' And we observe that the
first shoot of every living thing is the greatest; many even contend that
man is not at twenty-five twice the height that he was at five. 'True.'
And growth without exercise of the limbs is the source of endless evils in
the body. 'Yes.' The body should have the most exercise when growing most.
'What, the bodies of young infants?' Nay, the bodies of unborn infants. I
should like to explain to you this singular kind of gymnastics. The
Athenians are fond of cock-fighting, and the people who keep cocks carry
them about in their hands or under their arms, and take long walks, to
improve, not their own health, but the health of the birds. Here is a
proof of the usefulness of motion, whether of rocking, swinging, riding,
or tossing upon the wave; for all these kinds of motion greatly increase
strength and the powers of digestion. Hence we infer that our women, when
they are with child, should walk about and fashion the embryo; and the
children, when born, should be carried by strong nurses,--there must be
more than one of them,--and should not be suffered to walk until they are
three years old. Shall we impose penalties for the neglect of these rules?
The greatest penalty, that is, ridicule, and the difficulty of making the
nurses do as we bid them, will be incurred by ourselves. 'Then why speak
of such matters?' In the hope that heads of families may learn that the
due regulation of them is the foundation of law and order in the state.

And now, leaving the body, let us proceed to the soul; but we must first
repeat that perpetual motion by night and by day is good for the young
creature. This is proved by the Corybantian cure of motion, and by the
practice of nurses who rock children in their arms, lapping them at the
same time in sweet strains. And the reason of this is obvious. The
affections, both of the Bacchantes and of the children, arise from fear,
and this fear is occasioned by something wrong which is going on within
them. Now a violent external commotion tends to calm the violent internal
one; it quiets the palpitation of the heart, giving to the children sleep,
and bringing back the Bacchantes to their right minds by the help of
dances and acceptable sacrifices. But if fear has such power, will not a
child who is always in a state of terror grow up timid and cowardly,
whereas if he learns from the first to resist fear he will develop a habit
of courage? 'Very true.' And we may say that the use of motion will
inspire the souls of children with cheerfulness and therefore with
courage. 'Of course.' Softness enervates and irritates the temper of the
young, and violence renders them mean and misanthropical. 'But how is the
state to educate them when they are as yet unable to understand the
meaning of words?' Why, surely they roar and cry, like the young of any
other animal, and the nurse knows the meaning of these intimations of the
child's likes or dislikes, and the occasions which call them forth. About
three years is passed by children in a state of imperfect articulation,
which is quite long enough time to make them either good- or ill-tempered.
And, therefore, during these first three years, the infant should be as
free as possible from fear and pain. 'Yes, and he should have as much
pleasure as possible.' There, I think, you are wrong; for the influence of
pleasure in the beginning of education is fatal. A man should neither
pursue pleasure nor wholly avoid pain. He should embrace the mean, and
cultivate that state of calm which mankind, taught by some inspiration,
attribute to God; and he who would be like God should neither be too fond
of pleasure himself, nor should he permit any other to be thus given;
above all, not the infant, whose character is just in the making. It may
sound ridiculous, but I affirm that a woman in her pregnancy should be
carefully tended, and kept from excessive pleasures and pains.

'I quite agree with you about the duty of avoiding extremes and following
the mean.'

Let us consider a further point. The matters which are now in question are
generally called customs rather than laws; and we have already made the
reflection that, though they are not, properly speaking, laws, yet neither
can they be neglected. For they fill up the interstices of law, and are
the props and ligatures on which the strength of the whole building
depends. Laws without customs never last; and we must not wonder if habit
and custom sometimes lengthen out our laws. 'Very true.' Up to their third
year, then, the life of children may be regulated by customs such as we
have described. From three to six their minds have to be amused; but they
must not be allowed to become self-willed and spoilt. If punishment is
necessary, the same rule will hold as in the case of slaves; they must
neither be punished in hot blood nor ruined by indulgence. The children of
that age will have their own modes of amusing themselves; they should be
brought for their play to the village temples, and placed under the care
of nurses, who will be responsible to twelve matrons annually chosen by
the women who have authority over marriage. These shall be appointed, one
out of each tribe, and their duty shall be to keep order at the meetings:
slaves who break the rules laid down by them, they shall punish by the
help of some of the public slaves; but citizens who dispute their
authority shall be brought before the magistrates. After six years of age
there shall be a separation of the sexes; the boys will go to learn riding
and the use of arms, and the girls may, if they please, also learn. Here I
note a practical error in early training. Mothers and nurses foolishly
believe that the left hand is by nature different from the right, whereas
the left leg and foot are acknowledged to be the same as the right. But
the truth is that nature made all things to balance, and the power of
using the left hand, which is of little importance in the case of the
plectrum of the lyre, may make a great difference in the art of the
warrior, who should be a skilled gymnast and able to fight and balance
himself in any position. If a man were a Briareus, he should use all his
hundred hands at once; at any rate, let everybody employ the two which
they have. To these matters the magistrates, male and female, should
attend; the women superintending the nursing and amusement of the
children, and the men superintending their education, that all of them,
boys and girls alike, may be sound, wind and limb, and not spoil the gifts
of nature by bad habits.

Education has two branches--gymnastic, which is concerned with the body;
and music, which improves the soul. And gymnastic has two parts, dancing
and wrestling. Of dancing one kind imitates musical recitation and aims at
stateliness and freedom; another kind is concerned with the training of
the body, and produces health, agility, and beauty. There is no military
use in the complex systems of wrestling which pass under the names of
Antaeus and Cercyon, or in the tricks of boxing, which are attributed to
Amycus and Epeius; but good wrestling and the habit of extricating the
neck, hands, and sides, should be diligently learnt and taught. In our
dances imitations of war should be practised, as in the dances of the
Curetes in Crete and of the Dioscuri at Sparta, or as in the dances in
complete armour which were taught us Athenians by the goddess Athene.
Youths who are not yet of an age to go to war should make religious
processions armed and on horseback; and they should also engage in
military games and contests. These exercises will be equally useful in
peace and war, and will benefit both states and families.

Next follows music, to which we will once more return; and here I shall
venture to repeat my old paradox, that amusements have great influence on
laws. He who has been taught to play at the same games and with the same
playthings will be content with the same laws. There is no greater evil in
a state than the spirit of innovation. In the case of the seasons and
winds, in the management of our bodies and in the habits of our minds,
change is a dangerous thing. And in everything but what is bad the same
rule holds. We all venerate and acquiesce in the laws to which we are
accustomed; and if they have continued during long periods of time, and
there is no remembrance of their ever having been otherwise, people are
absolutely afraid to change them. Now how can we create this quality of
immobility in the laws? I say, by not allowing innovations in the games
and plays of children. The children who are always having new plays, when
grown up will be always having new laws. Changes in mere fashions are not
serious evils, but changes in our estimate of men's characters are most
serious; and rhythms and music are representations of characters, and
therefore we must avoid novelties in dance and song. For securing
permanence no better method can be imagined than that of the Egyptians.
'What is their method?' They make a calendar for the year, arranging on
what days the festivals of the various Gods shall be celebrated, and for
each festival they consecrate an appropriate hymn and dance. In our state
a similar arrangement shall in the first instance be framed by certain
individuals, and afterwards solemnly ratified by all the citizens. He who
introduces other hymns or dances shall be excluded by the priests and
priestesses and the guardians of the law; and if he refuses to submit, he
may be prosecuted for impiety. But we must not be too ready to speak about
such great matters. Even a young man, when he hears something
unaccustomed, stands and looks this way and that, like a traveller at a
place where three ways meet; and at our age a man ought to be very sure of
his ground in so singular an argument. 'Very true.' Then, leaving the
subject for further examination at some future time, let us proceed with
our laws about education, for in this manner we may probably throw light
upon our present difficulty. 'Let us do as you say.' The ancients used the
term nomoi to signify harmonious strains, and perhaps they fancied that
there was a connexion between the songs and laws of a country. And we say
--Whosoever shall transgress the strains by law established is a
transgressor of the laws, and shall be punished by the guardians of the
law and by the priests and priestesses. 'Very good.' How can we legislate
about these consecrated strains without incurring ridicule? Moulds or
types must be first framed, and one of the types shall be--Abstinence from
evil words at sacrifices. When a son or brother blasphemes at a sacrifice
there is a sound of ill-omen heard in the family; and many a chorus stands
by the altar uttering inauspicious words, and he is crowned victor who
excites the hearers most with lamentations. Such lamentations should be
reserved for evil days, and should be uttered only by hired mourners; and
let the singers not wear circlets or ornaments of gold. To avoid every
evil word, then, shall be our first type. 'Agreed.' Our second law or type
shall be, that prayers ever accompany sacrifices; and our third, that,
inasmuch as all prayers are requests, they shall be only for good; this
the poets must be made to understand. 'Certainly.' Have we not already
decided that no gold or silver Plutus shall be allowed in our city? And
did not this show that we were dissatisfied with the poets? And may we not
fear that, if they are allowed to utter injudicious prayers, they will
bring the greatest misfortunes on the state? And we must therefore make a
law that the poet is not to contradict the laws or ideas of the state; nor
is he to show his poems to any private persons until they have first
received the imprimatur of the director of education. A fourth musical law
will be to the effect that hymns and praises shall be offered to Gods, and
to heroes and demigods. Still another law will permit eulogies of eminent
citizens, whether men or women, but only after their death. As to songs
and dances, we will enact as follows:--There shall be a selection made of
the best ancient musical compositions and dances; these shall be chosen by
judges, who ought not to be less than fifty years of age. They will accept
some, and reject or amend others, for which purpose they will call, if
necessary, the poets themselves into council. The severe and orderly music
is the style in which to educate children, who, if they are accustomed to
this, will deem the opposite kind to be illiberal, but if they are
accustomed to the other, will count this to be cold and unpleasing.
'True.' Further, a distinction should be made between the melodies of men
and women. Nature herself teaches that the grand or manly style should be
assigned to men, and to women the moderate and temperate. So much for the
subjects of education. But to whom are they to be taught, and when? I must
try, like the shipwright, who lays down the keel of a vessel, to build a
secure foundation for the vessel of the soul in her voyage through life.
Human affairs are hardly serious, and yet a sad necessity compels us to be
serious about them. Let us, therefore, do our best to bring the matter to
a conclusion. 'Very good.' I say then, that God is the object of a man's
most serious endeavours. But man is created to be the plaything of the
Gods; and therefore the aim of every one should be to pass through life,
not in grim earnest, but playing at the noblest of pastimes, in another
spirit from that which now prevails. For the common opinion is, that work
is for the sake of play, war of peace; whereas in war there is neither
amusement nor instruction worth speaking of. The life of peace is that
which men should chiefly desire to lengthen out and improve. They should
live sacrificing, singing, and dancing, with the view of propitiating Gods
and heroes. I have already told you the types of song and dance which they
should follow: and 'Some things,' as the poet well says, 'you will devise
for yourself--others, God will suggest to you.'

These words of his may be applied to our pupils. They will partly teach
themselves, and partly will be taught by God, the art of propitiating Him;
for they are His puppets, and have only a small portion in truth. 'You
have a poor opinion of man.' No wonder, when I compare him with God; but,
if you are offended, I will place him a little higher.

Next follow the building for gymnasia and schools; these will be in the
midst of the city, and outside will be riding-schools and archery-grounds.
In all of them there ought to be instructors of the young, drawn from
foreign parts by pay, and they will teach them music and war. Education
shall be compulsory; the children must attend school, whether their
parents like it or not; for they belong to the state more than to their
parents. And I say further, without hesitation, that the same education in
riding and gymnastic shall be given both to men and women. The ancient
tradition about the Amazons confirms my view, and at the present day there
are myriads of women, called Sauromatides, dwelling near the Pontus, who
practise the art of riding as well as archery and the use of arms. But if
I am right, nothing can be more foolish than our modern fashion of
training men and women differently, whereby the power the city is reduced
to a half. For reflect--if women are not to have the education of men,
some other must be found for them, and what other can we propose? Shall
they, like the women of Thrace, tend cattle and till the ground; or, like
our own, spin and weave, and take care of the house? or shall they follow
the Spartan custom, which is between the two?--there the maidens share in
gymnastic exercises and in music; and the grown women, no longer engaged
in spinning, weave the web of life, although they are not skilled in
archery, like the Amazons, nor can they imitate our warrior goddess and
carry shield or spear, even in the extremity of their country's need.
Compared with our women, the Sauromatides are like men. But your
legislators, Megillus, as I maintain, only half did their work; they took
care of the men, and left the women to take care of themselves.

'Shall we suffer the Stranger, Cleinias, to run down Sparta in this way?'

'Why, yes; for we cannot withdraw the liberty which we have already
conceded to him.'

What will be the manner of life of men in moderate circumstances, freed
from the toils of agriculture and business, and having common tables for
themselves and their families which are under the inspection of
magistrates, male and female? Are men who have these institutions only to
eat and fatten like beasts? If they do, how can they escape the fate of a
fatted beast, which is to be torn in pieces by some other beast more
valiant than himself? True, theirs is not the perfect way of life, for
they have not all things in common; but the second best way of life also
confers great blessings. Even those who live in the second state have a
work to do twice as great as the work of any Pythian or Olympic victor;
for their labour is for the body only, but ours both for body and soul.
And this higher work ought to be pursued night and day to the exclusion of
every other. The magistrates who keep the city should be wakeful, and the
master of the household should be up early and before all his servants;
and the mistress, too, should awaken her handmaidens, and not be awakened
by them. Much sleep is not required either for our souls or bodies. When a
man is asleep, he is no better than if he were dead; and he who loves life
and wisdom will take no more sleep than is necessary for health.
Magistrates who are wide awake at night are terrible to the bad; but they
are honoured by the good, and are useful to themselves and the state.

When the morning dawns, let the boy go to school. As the sheep need the
shepherd, so the boy needs a master; for he is at once the most cunning
and the most insubordinate of creatures. Let him be taken away from
mothers and nurses, and tamed with bit and bridle, being treated as a
freeman in that he learns and is taught, but as a slave in that he may be
chastised by all other freemen; and the freeman who neglects to chastise
him shall be disgraced. All these matters will be under the supervision of
the Director of Education.

Him we will address as follows: We have spoken to you, O illustrious
teacher of youth, of the song, the time, and the dance, and of martial
strains; but of the learning of letters and of prose writings, and of
music, and of the use of calculation for military and domestic purposes we
have not spoken, nor yet of the higher use of numbers in reckoning divine
things--such as the revolutions of the stars, or the arrangements of days,
months, and years, of which the true calculation is necessary in order
that seasons and festivals may proceed in regular course, and arouse and
enliven the city, rendering to the Gods their due, and making men know
them better. There are, we say, many things about which we have not as yet
instructed you--and first, as to reading and music: Shall the pupil be a
perfect scholar and musician, or not even enter on these studies? He
should certainly enter on both:--to letters he will apply himself from the
age of ten to thirteen, and at thirteen he will begin to handle the lyre,
and continue to learn music until he is sixteen; no shorter and no longer
time will be allowed, however fond he or his parents may be of the
pursuit. The study of letters he should carry to the extent of simple
reading and writing, but he need not care for calligraphy and tachygraphy,
if his natural gifts do not enable him to acquire them in the three years.
And here arises a question as to the learning of compositions when
unaccompanied with music, I mean, prose compositions. They are a dangerous
species of literature. Speak then, O guardians of the law, and tell us
what we shall do about them. 'You seem to be in a difficulty.' Yes; it is
difficult to go against the opinion of all the world. 'But have we not
often already done so?' Very true. And you imply that the road which we
are taking, though disagreeable to many, is approved by those whose
judgment is most worth having. 'Certainly.' Then I would first observe
that we have many poets, comic as well as tragic, with whose compositions,
as people say, youth are to be imbued and saturated. Some would have them
learn by heart entire poets; others prefer extracts. Now I believe, and
the general opinion is, that some of the things which they learn are good,
and some bad. 'Then how shall we reject some and select others?' A happy
thought occurs to me; this long discourse of ours is a sample of what we
want, and is moreover an inspired work and a kind of poem. I am naturally
pleased in reflecting upon all our words, which appear to me to be just
the thing for a young man to hear and learn. I would venture, then, to
offer to the Director of Education this treatise of laws as a pattern for
his guidance; and in case he should find any similar compositions, written
or oral, I would have him carefully preserve them, and commit them in the
first place to the teachers who are willing to learn them (he should turn
off the teacher who refuses), and let them communicate the lesson to the
young.

I have said enough to the teacher of letters; and now we will proceed to
the teacher of the lyre. He must be reminded of the advice which we gave
to the sexagenarian minstrels; like them he should be quick to perceive
the rhythms suited to the expression of virtue, and to reject the
opposite. With a view to the attainment of this object, the pupil and his
instructor are to use the lyre because its notes are pure; the voice and
string should coincide note for note: nor should there be complex
harmonies and contrasts of intervals, or variations of times or rhythms.
Three years' study is not long enough to give a knowledge of these
intricacies; and our pupils will have many things of more importance to
learn. The tunes and hymns which are to be consecrated for each festival
have been already determined by us.

Having given these instructions to the Director of Music, let us now
proceed to dancing and gymnastic, which must also be taught to boys and
girls by masters and mistresses. Our minister of education will have a
great deal to do; and being an old man, how will he get through so much
work? There is no difficulty;--the law will provide him with assistants,
male and female; and he will consider how important his office is, and how
great the responsibility of choosing them. For if education prospers, the
vessel of state sails merrily along; or if education fails, the
consequences are not even to be mentioned. Of dancing and gymnastics
something has been said already. We include under the latter military
exercises, the various uses of arms, all that relates to horsemanship, and
military evolutions and tactics. There should be public teachers of both
arts, paid by the state, and women as well as men should be trained in
them. The maidens should learn the armed dance, and the grown-up women be
practised in drill and the use of arms, if only in case of extremity, when
the men are gone out to battle, and they are left to guard their families.
Birds and beasts defend their young, but women instead of fighting run to
the altars, thus degrading man below the level of the animals. 'Such a
lack of education, Stranger, is both unseemly and dangerous.'

Wrestling is to be pursued as a military exercise, but the meaning of
this, and the nature of the art, can only be explained when action is
combined with words. Next follows dancing, which is of two kinds;
imitative, first, of the serious and beautiful; and, secondly, of the
ludicrous and grotesque. The first kind may be further divided into the
dance of war and the dance of peace. The former is called the Pyrrhic; in
this the movements of attack and defence are imitated in a direct and
manly style, which indicates strength and sufficiency of body and mind.
The latter of the two, the dance of peace, is suitable to orderly and law-
abiding men. These must be distinguished from the Bacchic dances which
imitate drunken revelry, and also from the dances by which purifications
are effected and mysteries celebrated. Such dances cannot be characterized
either as warlike or peaceful, and are unsuited to a civilized state. Now
the dances of peace are of two classes:--the first of them is the more
violent, being an expression of joy and triumph after toil and danger; the
other is more tranquil, symbolizing the continuance and preservation of
good. In speaking or singing we naturally move our bodies, and as we have
more or less courage or self-control we become less or more violent and
excited. Thus from the imitation of words in gestures the art of dancing
arises. Now one man imitates in an orderly, another in a disorderly
manner: and so the peaceful kinds of dance have been appropriately called
Emmeleiai, or dances of order, as the warlike have been called Pyrrhic. In
the latter a man imitates all sorts of blows and the hurling of weapons
and the avoiding of them; in the former he learns to bear himself
gracefully and like a gentleman. The types of these dances are to be fixed
by the legislator, and when the guardians of the law have assigned them to
the several festivals, and consecrated them in due order, no further
change shall be allowed.

Thus much of the dances which are appropriate to fair forms and noble
souls. Comedy, which is the opposite of them, remains to be considered.
For the serious implies the ludicrous, and opposites cannot be understood
without opposites. But a man of repute will desire to avoid doing what is
ludicrous. He should leave such performances to slaves,--they are not fit
for freemen; and there should be some element of novelty in them.
Concerning tragedy, let our law be as follows: When the inspired poet
comes to us with a request to be admitted into our state, we will reply in
courteous words--We also are tragedians and your rivals; and the drama
which we enact is the best and noblest, being the imitation of the truest
and noblest life, with a view to which our state is ordered. And we cannot
allow you to pitch your stage in the agora, and make your voices to be
heard above ours, or suffer you to address our women and children and the
common people on opposite principles to our own. Come then, ye children of
the Lydian Muse, and present yourselves first to the magistrates, and if
they decide that your hymns are as good or better than ours, you shall
have your chorus; but if not, not.

There remain three kinds of knowledge which should be learnt by freemen--
arithmetic, geometry of surfaces and of solids, and thirdly, astronomy.
Few need make an accurate study of such sciences; and of special students
we will speak at another time. But most persons must be content with the
study of them which is absolutely necessary, and may be said to be a
necessity of that nature against which God himself is unable to contend.
'What are these divine necessities of knowledge?' Necessities of a
knowledge without which neither gods, nor demigods, can govern mankind.
And far is he from being a divine man who cannot distinguish one, two, odd
and even; who cannot number day and night, and is ignorant of the
revolutions of the sun and stars; for to every higher knowledge a
knowledge of number is necessary--a fool may see this; how much, is a
matter requiring more careful consideration. 'Very true.' But the
legislator cannot enter into such details, and therefore we must defer the
more careful consideration of these matters to another occasion. 'You seem
to fear our habitual want of training in these subjects.' Still more do I
fear the danger of bad training, which is often worse than none at all.
'Very true.' I think that a gentleman and a freeman may be expected to
know as much as an Egyptian child. In Egypt, arithmetic is taught to
children in their sports by a distribution of apples or garlands among a
greater or less number of people; or a calculation is made of the various
combinations which are possible among a set of boxers or wrestlers; or
they distribute cups among the children, sometimes of gold, brass, and
silver intermingled, sometimes of one metal only. The knowledge of
arithmetic which is thus acquired is a great help, either to the general
or to the manager of a household; wherever measure is employed, men are
more wide-awake in their dealings, and they get rid of their ridiculous
ignorance. 'What do you mean?' I have observed this ignorance among my
countrymen--they are like pigs--and I am heartily ashamed both on my own
behalf and on that of all the Hellenes. 'In what respect?' Let me ask you
a question. You know that there are such things as length, breadth, and
depth? 'Yes.' And the Hellenes imagine that they are commensurable (1)
with themselves, and (2) with each other; whereas they are only
commensurable with themselves. But if this is true, then we are in an
unfortunate case, and may well say to our compatriots that not to possess
necessary knowledge is a disgrace, though to possess such knowledge is
nothing very grand. 'Certainly.' The discussion of arithmetical problems
is a much better amusement for old men than their favourite game of
draughts. 'True.' Mathematics, then, will be one of the subjects in which
youth should be trained. They may be regarded as an amusement, as well as
a useful and innocent branch of knowledge;--I think that we may include
them provisionally. 'Yes; that will be the way.' The next question is,
whether astronomy shall be made a part of education. About the stars there
is a strange notion prevalent. Men often suppose that it is impious to
enquire into the nature of God and the world, whereas the very reverse is
the truth. 'How do you mean?' What I am going to say may seem absurd and
at variance with the usual language of age, and yet if true and
advantageous to the state, and pleasing to God, ought not to be withheld.
'Let us hear.' My dear friend, how falsely do we and all the Hellenes
speak about the sun and moon! 'In what respect?' We are always saying that
they and certain of the other stars do not keep the same path, and we term
them planets. 'Yes; and I have seen the morning and evening stars go all
manner of ways, and the sun and moon doing what we know that they always
do. But I wish that you would explain your meaning further.' You will
easily understand what I have had no difficulty in understanding myself,
though we are both of us past the time of learning. 'True; but what is
this marvellous knowledge which youth are to acquire, and of which we are
ignorant?' Men say that the sun, moon, and stars are planets or wanderers;
but this is the reverse of the fact. Each of them moves in one orbit only,
which is circular, and not in many; nor is the swiftest of them the
slowest, as appears to human eyes. What an insult should we offer to
Olympian runners if we were to put the first last and the last first! And
if that is a ridiculous error in speaking of men, how much more in
speaking of the Gods? They cannot be pleased at our telling falsehoods
about them. 'They cannot.' Then people should at least learn so much about
them as will enable them to avoid impiety.

Enough of education. Hunting and similar pursuits now claim our attention.
These require for their regulation that mixture of law and admonition of
which we have often spoken; e.g., in what we were saying about the nurture
of young children. And therefore the whole duty of the citizen will not
consist in mere obedience to the laws; he must regard not only the
enactments but also the precepts of the legislator. I will illustrate my
meaning by an example. Of hunting there are many kinds--hunting of fish
and fowl, man and beast, enemies and friends; and the legislator can
neither omit to speak about these things, nor make penal ordinances about
them all. 'What is he to do then?' He will praise and blame hunting,
having in view the discipline and exercise of youth. And the young man
will listen obediently and will regard his praises and censures; neither
pleasure nor pain should hinder him. The legislator will express himself
in the form of a pious wish for the welfare of the young:--O my friends,
he will say, may you never be induced to hunt for fish in the waters,
either by day or night; or for men, whether by sea or land. Never let the
wish to steal enter into your minds; neither be ye fowlers, which is not
an occupation for gentlemen. As to land animals, the legislator will
discourage hunting by night, and also the use of nets and snares by day;
for these are indolent and unmanly methods. The only mode of hunting which
he can praise is with horses and dogs, running, shooting, striking at
close quarters. Enough of the prelude: the law shall be as follows:--

Let no one hinder the holy order of huntsmen; but let the nightly hunters
who lay snares and nets be everywhere prohibited. Let the fowler confine
himself to waste places and to the mountains. The fisherman is also
permitted to exercise his calling, except in harbours and sacred streams,
marshes and lakes; in all other places he may fish, provided he does not
make use of poisonous mixtures.

BOOK VIII. Next, with the help of the Delphian Oracle, we will appoint
festivals and sacrifices. There shall be 365 of them, one for every day in
the year; and one magistrate, at least, shall offer sacrifice daily
according to rites prescribed by a convocation of priests and
interpreters, who shall co-operate with the guardians of the law, and
supply what the legislator has omitted. Moreover there shall be twelve
festivals to the twelve Gods after whom the twelve tribes are named: these
shall be celebrated every month with appropriate musical and gymnastic
contests. There shall also be festivals for women, to be distinguished
from the men's festivals. Nor shall the Gods below be forgotten, but they
must be separated from the Gods above--Pluto shall have his own in the
twelfth month. He is not the enemy, but the friend of man, who releases
the soul from the body, which is at least as good a work as to unite them.
Further, those who have to regulate these matters should consider that our
state has leisure and abundance, and wishing to be happy, like an
individual, should lead a good life; for he who leads such a life neither
does nor suffers injury, of which the first is very easy, and the second
very difficult of attainment, and is only to be acquired by perfect
virtue. A good city has peace, but the evil city is full of wars within
and without. To guard against the danger of external enemies the citizens
should practise war at least one day in every month; they should go out en
masse, including their wives and children, or in divisions, as the
magistrates determine, and have mimic contests, imitating in a lively
manner real battles; they should also have prizes and encomiums of valour,
both for the victors in these contests, and for the victors in the battle
of life. The poet who celebrates the victors should be fifty years old at
least, and himself a man who has done great deeds. Of such an one the
poems may be sung, even though he is not the best of poets. To the
director of education and the guardians of the law shall be committed the
judgment, and no song, however sweet, which has not been licensed by them
shall be recited. These regulations about poetry, and about military
expeditions, apply equally to men and to women.

The legislator may be conceived to make the following address to himself:
--With what object am I training my citizens? Are they not strivers for
mastery in the greatest of combats? Certainly, will be the reply. And if
they were boxers or wrestlers, would they think of entering the lists
without many days' practice? Would they not as far as possible imitate all
the circumstances of the contest; and if they had no one to box with,
would they not practise on a lifeless image, heedless of the laughter of
the spectators? And shall our soldiers go out to fight for life and
kindred and property unprepared, because sham fights are thought to be
ridiculous? Will not the legislator require that his citizens shall
practise war daily, performing lesser exercises without arms, while the
combatants on a greater scale will carry arms, and take up positions, and
lie in ambuscade? And let their combats be not without danger, that
opportunity may be given for distinction, and the brave man and the coward
may receive their meed of honour or disgrace. If occasionally a man is
killed, there is no great harm done--there are others as good as he is who
will replace him; and the state can better afford to lose a few of her
citizens than to lose the only means of testing them.

'We agree, Stranger, that such warlike exercises are necessary.' But why
are they so rarely practised? Or rather, do we not all know the reasons?
One of them (1) is the inordinate love of wealth. This absorbs the soul of
a man, and leaves him no time for any other pursuit. Knowledge is valued
by him only as it tends to the attainment of wealth. All is lost in the
desire of heaping up gold and silver; anybody is ready to do anything,
right or wrong, for the sake of eating and drinking, and the indulgence of
his animal passions. 'Most true.' This is one of the causes which prevents
a man being a good soldier, or anything else which is good; it converts
the temperate and orderly into shopkeepers or servants, and the brave into
burglars or pirates. Many of these latter are men of ability, and are
greatly to be pitied, because their souls are hungering and thirsting all
their lives long. The bad forms of government (2) are another reason--
democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, which, as I was saying, are not states, but
states of discord, in which the rulers are afraid of their subjects, and
therefore do not like them to become rich, or noble, or valiant. Now our
state will escape both these causes of evil; the society is perfectly
free, and has plenty of leisure, and is not allowed by the laws to be
absorbed in the pursuit of wealth; hence we have an excellent field for a
perfect education, and for the introduction of martial pastimes. Let us
proceed to describe the character of these pastimes. All gymnastic
exercises in our state must have a military character; no other will be
allowed. Activity and quickness are most useful in war; and yet these
qualities do not attain their greatest efficiency unless the competitors
are armed. The runner should enter the lists in armour, and in the races
which our heralds proclaim, no prize is to be given except to armed
warriors. Let there be six courses--first, the stadium; secondly, the
diaulos or double course; thirdly, the horse course; fourthly, the long
course; fifthly, races (1) between heavy-armed soldiers who shall pass
over sixty stadia and finish at a temple of Ares, and (2) between still
more heavily-armed competitors who run over smoother ground; sixthly, a
race for archers, who shall run over hill and dale a distance of a hundred
stadia, and their goal shall be a temple of Apollo and Artemis. There
shall be three contests of each kind--one for boys, another for youths, a
third for men; the course for the boys we will fix at half, and that for
the youths at two-thirds of the entire length. Women shall join in the
races: young girls who are not grown up shall run naked; but after
thirteen they shall be suitably dressed; from thirteen to eighteen they
shall be obliged to share in these contests, and from eighteen to twenty
they may if they please and if they are unmarried. As to trials of
strength, single combats in armour, or battles between two and two, or of
any number up to ten, shall take the place of wrestling and the heavy
exercises. And there must be umpires, as there are now in wrestling, to
determine what is a fair hit and who is conqueror. Instead of the
pancratium, let there be contests in which the combatants carry bows and
wear light shields and hurl javelins and throw stones. The next provision
of the law will relate to horses, which, as we are in Crete, need be
rarely used by us, and chariots never; our horse-racing prizes will only
be given to single horses, whether colts, half-grown, or full-grown. Their
riders are to wear armour, and there shall be a competition between
mounted archers. Women, if they have a mind, may join in the exercises of
men.

But enough of gymnastics, and nearly enough of music. All musical contests
will take place at festivals, whether every third or every fifth year,
which are to be fixed by the guardians of the law, the judges of the
games, and the director of education, who for this purpose shall become
legislators and arrange times and conditions. The principles on which such
contests are to be ordered have been often repeated by the first
legislator; no more need be said of them, nor are the details of them
important. But there is another subject of the highest importance, which,
if possible, should be determined by the laws, not of man, but of God; or,
if a direct revelation is impossible, there is need of some bold man who,
alone against the world, will speak plainly of the corruption of human
nature, and go to war with the passions of mankind. 'We do not understand
you.' I will try to make my meaning plainer. In speaking of education, I
seemed to see young men and maidens in friendly intercourse with one
another; and there arose in my mind a natural fear about a state, in which
the young of either sex are well nurtured, and have little to do, and
occupy themselves chiefly with festivals and dances. How can they be saved
from those passions which reason forbids them to indulge, and which are
the ruin of so many? The prohibition of wealth, and the influence of
education, and the all-seeing eye of the ruler, will alike help to promote
temperance; but they will not wholly extirpate the unnatural loves which
have been the destruction of states; and against this evil what remedy can
be devised? Lacedaemon and Crete give no assistance here; on the subject
of love, as I may whisper in your ear, they are against us. Suppose a
person were to urge that you ought to restore the natural use which
existed before the days of Laius; he would be quite right, but he would
not be supported by public opinion in either of your states. Or try the
matter by the test which we apply to all laws,--who will say that the
permission of such things tends to virtue? Will he who is seduced learn
the habit of courage; or will the seducer acquire temperance? And will any
legislator be found to make such actions legal?

But to judge of this matter truly, we must understand the nature of love
and friendship, which may take very different forms. For we speak of
friendship, first, when there is some similarity or equality of virtue;
secondly, when there is some want; and either of these, when in excess, is
termed love. The first kind is gentle and sociable; the second is fierce
and unmanageable; and there is also a third kind, which is akin to both,
and is under the dominion of opposite principles. The one is of the body,
and has no regard for the character of the beloved; but he who is under
the influence of the other disregards the body, and is a looker rather
than a lover, and desires only with his soul to be knit to the soul of his
friend; while the intermediate sort is both of the body and of the soul.
Here are three kinds of love: ought the legislator to prohibit all of them
equally, or to allow the virtuous love to remain? 'The latter, clearly.' I
expected to gain your approval; but I will reserve the task of convincing
our friend Cleinias for another occasion. 'Very good.' To make right laws
on this subject is in one point of view easy, and in another most
difficult; for we know that in some cases most men abstain willingly from
intercourse with the fair. The unwritten law which prohibits members of
the same family from such intercourse is strictly obeyed, and no thought
of anything else ever enters into the minds of men in general. A little
word puts out the fire of their lusts. 'What is it?' The declaration that
such things are hateful to the Gods, and most abominable and unholy. The
reason is that everywhere, in jest and earnest alike, this is the doctrine
which is repeated to all from their earliest youth. They see on the stage
that an Oedipus or a Thyestes or a Macareus, when undeceived, are ready to
kill themselves. There is an undoubted power in public opinion when no
breath is heard adverse to the law; and the legislator who would enslave
these enslaving passions must consecrate such a public opinion all through
the city. 'Good: but how can you create it?' A fair objection; but I
promised to try and find some means of restraining loves to their natural
objects. A law which would extirpate unnatural love as effectually as
incest is at present extirpated, would be the source of innumerable
blessings, because it would be in accordance with nature, and would get
rid of excess in eating and drinking and of adulteries and frenzies,
making men love their wives, and having other excellent effects. I can
imagine that some lusty youth overhears what we are saying, and roars out
in abusive terms that we are legislating for impossibilities. And so a
person might have said of the syssitia, or common meals; but this is
refuted by facts, although even now they are not extended to women.
'True.' There is no impossibility or super-humanity in my proposed law, as
I shall endeavour to prove. 'Do so.' Will not a man find abstinence more
easy when his body is sound than when he is in ill-condition? 'Yes.' Have
we not heard of Iccus of Tarentum and other wrestlers who abstained wholly
for a time? Yet they were infinitely worse educated than our citizens, and
far more lusty in their bodies. And shall they have abstained for the sake
of an athletic contest, and our citizens be incapable of a similar
endurance for the sake of a much nobler victory,--the victory over
pleasure, which is true happiness? Will not the fear of impiety enable
them to conquer that which many who were inferior to them have conquered?
'I dare say.' And therefore the law must plainly declare that our citizens
should not fall below the other animals, who live all together in flocks,
and yet remain pure and chaste until the time of procreation comes, when
they pair, and are ever after faithful to their compact. But if the
corruption of public opinion is too great to allow our first law to be
carried out, then our guardians of the law must turn legislators, and try
their hand at a second law. They must minimize the appetites, diverting
the vigour of youth into other channels, allowing the practice of love in
secret, but making detection shameful. Three higher principles may be
brought to bear on all these corrupt natures. 'What are they?' Religion,
honour, and the love of the higher qualities of the soul. Perhaps this is
a dream only, yet it is the best of dreams; and if not the whole, still,
by the grace of God, a part of what we desire may be realized. Either men
may learn to abstain wholly from any loves, natural or unnatural, except
of their wedded wives; or, at least, they may give up unnatural loves; or,
if detected, they shall be punished with loss of citizenship, as aliens
from the state in their morals. 'I entirely agree with you,' said
Megillus, 'but Cleinias must speak for himself.' 'I will give my opinion
by-and-by.'

We were speaking of the syssitia, which will be a natural institution in a
Cretan colony. Whether they shall be established after the model of Crete
or Lacedaemon, or shall be different from either, is an unimportant
question which may be determined without difficulty. We may, therefore,
proceed to speak of the mode of life among our citizens, which will be far
less complex than in other cities; a state which is inland and not
maritime requires only half the number of laws. There is no trouble about
trade and commerce, and a thousand other things. The legislator has only
to regulate the affairs of husbandmen and shepherds, which will be easily
arranged, now that the principal questions, such as marriage, education,
and government, have been settled.

Let us begin with husbandry: First, let there be a law of Zeus against
removing a neighbour's landmark, whether he be a citizen or stranger. For
this is 'to move the immoveable'; and Zeus, the God of kindred, witnesses
to the wrongs of citizens, and Zeus, the God of strangers, to the wrongs
of strangers. The offence of removing a boundary shall receive two
punishments--the first will be inflicted by the God himself; the second by
the judges. In the next place, the differences between neighbours about
encroachments must be guarded against. He who encroaches shall pay twofold
the amount of the injury; of all such matters the wardens of the country
shall be the judges, in lesser cases the officers, and in greater the
whole number of them belonging to any one division. Any injury done by
cattle, the decoying of bees, the careless firing of woods, the planting
unduly near a neighbour's ground, shall all be visited with proper
damages. Such details have been determined by previous legislators, and
need not now be mixed up with greater matters. Husbandmen have had of old
excellent rules about streams and waters; and we need not 'divert their
course.' Anybody may take water from a common stream, if he does not
thereby cut off a private spring; he may lead the water in any direction,
except through a house or temple, but he must do no harm beyond the
channel. If land is without water the occupier shall dig down to the clay,
and if at this depth he find no water, he shall have a right of getting
water from his neighbours for his household; and if their supply is
limited, he shall receive from them a measure of water fixed by the
wardens of the country. If there be heavy rains, the dweller on the higher
ground must not recklessly suffer the water to flow down upon a neighbour
beneath him, nor must he who lives upon lower ground or dwells in an
adjoining house refuse an outlet. If the two parties cannot agree, they
shall go before the wardens of the city or country, and if a man refuse to
abide by their decision, he shall pay double the damage which he has
caused.

In autumn God gives us two boons--one the joy of Dionysus not to be laid
up--the other to be laid up. About the fruits of autumn let the law be as
follows: He who gathers the storing fruits of autumn, whether grapes or
figs, before the time of the vintage, which is the rising of Arcturus,
shall pay fifty drachmas as a fine to Dionysus, if he gathers on his own
ground; if on his neighbour's ground, a mina, and two-thirds of a mina if
on that of any one else. The grapes or figs not used for storing a man may
gather when he pleases on his own ground, but on that of others he must
pay the penalty of removing what he has not laid down. If he be a slave
who has gathered, he shall receive a stroke for every grape or fig. A
metic must purchase the choice fruit; but a stranger may pluck for himself
and his attendant. This right of hospitality, however, does not extend to
storing grapes. A slave who eats of the storing grapes or figs shall be
beaten, and the freeman be dismissed with a warning. Pears, apples,
pomegranates, may be taken secretly, but he who is detected in the act of
taking them shall be lightly beaten off, if he be not more than thirty
years of age. The stranger and the elder may partake of them, but not
carry any away; the latter, if he does not obey the law, shall fail in the
competition of virtue, if anybody brings up his offence against him.

Water is also in need of protection, being the greatest element of
nutrition, and, unlike the other elements--soil, air, and sun--which
conspire in the growth of plants, easily polluted. And therefore he who
spoils another's water, whether in springs or reservoirs, either by
trenching, or theft, or by means of poisonous substances, shall pay the
damage and purify the stream. At the getting-in of the harvest everybody
shall have a right of way over his neighbour's ground, provided he is
careful to do no damage beyond the trespass, or if he himself will gain
three times as much as his neighbour loses. Of all this the magistrates
are to take cognizance, and they are to assess the damage where the injury
does not exceed three minae; cases of greater damage can be tried only in
the public courts. A charge against a magistrate is to be referred to the
public courts, and any one who is found guilty of deciding corruptly shall
pay twofold to the aggrieved person. Matters of detail relating to
punishments and modes of procedure, and summonses, and witnesses to
summonses, do not require the mature wisdom of the aged legislator; the
younger generation may determine them according to their experience; but
when once determined, they shall remain unaltered.

The following are to be the regulations respecting handicrafts:--No
citizen, or servant of a citizen, is to practise them. For the citizen has
already an art and mystery, which is the care of the state; and no man can
practise two arts, or practise one and superintend another. No smith
should be a carpenter, and no carpenter, having many slaves who are
smiths, should look after them himself; but let each man practise one art
which shall be his means of livelihood. The wardens of the city should see
to this, punishing the citizen who offends with temporary deprival of his
rights--the foreigner shall be imprisoned, fined, exiled. Any disputes
about contracts shall be determined by the wardens of the city up to fifty
drachmae--above that sum by the public courts. No customs are to be
exacted either on imports or exports. Nothing unnecessary is to be
imported from abroad, whether for the service of the Gods or for the use
of man--neither purple, nor other dyes, nor frankincense,--and nothing
needed in the country is to be exported. These things are to be decided on
by the twelve guardians of the law who are next in seniority to the five
elders. Arms and the materials of war are to be imported and exported only
with the consent of the generals, and then only by the state. There is to
be no retail trade either in these or any other articles. For the
distribution of the produce of the country, the Cretan laws afford a rule
which may be usefully followed. All shall be required to distribute corn,
grain, animals, and other valuable produce, into twelve portions. Each of
these shall be subdivided into three parts--one for freemen, another for
servants, and the third shall be sold for the supply of artisans,
strangers, and metics. These portions must be equal whether the produce be
much or little; and the master of a household may distribute the two
portions among his family and his slaves as he pleases--the remainder is
to be measured out to the animals.

Next as to the houses in the country--there shall be twelve villages, one
in the centre of each of the twelve portions; and in every village there
shall be temples and an agora--also shrines for heroes or for any old
Magnesian deities who linger about the place. In every division there
shall be temples of Hestia, Zeus, and Athene, as well as of the local
deity, surrounded by buildings on eminences, which will be the guard-
houses of the rural police. The dwellings of the artisans will be thus
arranged:--The artisans shall be formed into thirteen guilds, one of
which will be divided into twelve parts and settled in the city; of the
rest there shall be one in each division of the country. And the
magistrates will fix them on the spots where they will cause the least
inconvenience and be most serviceable in supplying the wants of the
husbandmen.

The care of the agora will fall to the wardens of the agora. Their first
duty will be the regulation of the temples which surround the market-
place; and their second to see that the markets are orderly and that fair
dealing is observed. They will also take care that the sales which the
citizens are required to make to strangers are duly executed. The law
shall be, that on the first day of each month the auctioneers to whom the
sale is entrusted shall offer grain; and at this sale a twelfth part of
the whole shall be exposed, and the foreigner shall supply his wants for a
month. On the tenth, there shall be a sale of liquids, and on the twenty-
third of animals, skins, woven or woollen stuffs, and other things which
husbandmen have to sell and foreigners want to buy. None of these
commodities, any more than barley or flour, or any other food, may be
retailed by a citizen to a citizen; but foreigners may sell them to one
another in the foreigners' market. There must also be butchers who will
sell parts of animals to foreigners and craftsmen, and their servants; and
foreigners may buy firewood wholesale of the commissioners of woods, and
may sell retail to foreigners. All other goods must be sold in the market,
at some place indicated by the magistrates, and shall be paid for on the
spot. He who gives credit, and is cheated, will have no redress. In buying
or selling, any excess or diminution of what the law allows shall be
registered. The same rule is to be observed about the property of metics.
Anybody who practises a handicraft may come and remain twenty years from
the day on which he is enrolled; at the expiration of this time he shall
take what he has and depart. The only condition which is to be imposed
upon him as the tax of his sojourn is good conduct; and he is not to pay
any tax for being allowed to buy or sell. But if he wants to extend the
time of his sojourn, and has done any service to the state, and he can
persuade the council and assembly to grant his request, he may remain. The
children of metics may also be metics; and the period of twenty years,
during which they are permitted to sojourn, is to count, in their case,
from their fifteenth year.

No mention occurs in the Laws of the doctrine of Ideas. The will of God,
the authority of the legislator, and the dignity of the soul, have taken
their place in the mind of Plato. If we ask what is that truth or
principle which, towards the end of his life, seems to have absorbed him
most, like the idea of good in the Republic, or of beauty in the
Symposium, or of the unity of virtue in the Protagoras, we should answer--
The priority of the soul to the body: his later system mainly hangs upon
this. In the Laws, as in the Sophist and Statesman, we pass out of the
region of metaphysical or transcendental ideas into that of psychology.

The opening of the fifth book, though abrupt and unconnected in style, is
one of the most elevated passages in Plato. The religious feeling which he
seeks to diffuse over the commonest actions of life, the blessedness of
living in the truth, the great mistake of a man living for himself, the
pity as well as anger which should be felt at evil, the kindness due to
the suppliant and the stranger, have the temper of Christian philosophy.
The remark that elder men, if they want to educate others, should begin by
educating themselves; the necessity of creating a spirit of obedience in
the citizens; the desirableness of limiting property; the importance of
parochial districts, each to be placed under the protection of some God or
demigod, have almost the tone of a modern writer. In many of his views of
politics, Plato seems to us, like some politicians of our own time, to be
half socialist, half conservative.

In the Laws, we remark a change in the place assigned by him to pleasure
and pain. There are two ways in which even the ideal systems of morals may
regard them: either like the Stoics, and other ascetics, we may say that
pleasure must be eradicated; or if this seems unreal to us, we may affirm
that virtue is the true pleasure; and then, as Aristotle says, 'to be
brought up to take pleasure in what we ought, exercises a great and
paramount influence on human life' (Arist. Eth. Nic.). Or as Plato says in
the Laws, 'A man will recognize the noblest life as having the greatest
pleasure and the least pain, if he have a true taste.' If we admit that
pleasures differ in kind, the opposition between these two modes of
speaking is rather verbal than real; and in the greater part of the
writings of Plato they alternate with each other. In the Republic, the
mere suggestion that pleasure may be the chief good, is received by
Socrates with a cry of abhorrence; but in the Philebus, innocent pleasures
vindicate their right to a place in the scale of goods. In the Protagoras,
speaking in the person of Socrates rather than in his own, Plato admits
the calculation of pleasure to be the true basis of ethics, while in the
Phaedo he indignantly denies that the exchange of one pleasure for another
is the exchange of virtue. So wide of the mark are they who would
attribute to Plato entire consistency in thoughts or words.

He acknowledges that the second state is inferior to the first--in this,
at any rate, he is consistent; and he still casts longing eyes upon the
ideal. Several features of the first are retained in the second: the
education of men and women is to be as far as possible the same; they are
to have common meals, though separate, the men by themselves, the women
with their children; and they are both to serve in the army; the citizens,
if not actually communists, are in spirit communistic; they are to be
lovers of equality; only a certain amount of wealth is permitted to them,
and their burdens and also their privileges are to be proportioned to
this. The constitution in the Laws is a timocracy of wealth, modified by
an aristocracy of merit. Yet the political philosopher will observe that
the first of these two principles is fixed and permanent, while the latter
is uncertain and dependent on the opinion of the multitude. Wealth, after
all, plays a great part in the Second Republic of Plato. Like other
politicians, he deems that a property qualification will contribute
stability to the state. The four classes are derived from the constitution
of Athens, just as the form of the city, which is clustered around a
citadel set on a hill, is suggested by the Acropolis at Athens. Plato,
writing under Pythagorean influences, seems really to have supposed that
the well-being of the city depended almost as much on the number 5040 as
on justice and moderation. But he is not prevented by Pythagoreanism from
observing the effects which climate and soil exercise on the characters of
nations.

He was doubtful in the Republic whether the ideal or communistic state
could be realized, but was at the same time prepared to maintain that
whether it existed or not made no difference to the philosopher, who will
in any case regulate his life by it (Republic). He has now lost faith in
the practicability of his scheme--he is speaking to 'men, and not to Gods
or sons of Gods' (Laws). Yet he still maintains it to be the true pattern
of the state, which we must approach as nearly as possible: as Aristotle
says, 'After having created a more general form of state, he gradually
brings it round to the other' (Pol.). He does not observe, either here or
in the Republic, that in such a commonwealth there would be little room
for the development of individual character. In several respects the
second state is an improvement on the first, especially in being based
more distinctly on the dignity of the soul. The standard of truth,
justice, temperance, is as high as in the Republic;--in one respect
higher, for temperance is now regarded, not as a virtue, but as the
condition of all virtue. It is finally acknowledged that the virtues are
all one and connected, and that if they are separated, courage is the
lowest of them. The treatment of moral questions is less speculative but
more human. The idea of good has disappeared; the excellences of
individuals--of him who is faithful in a civil broil, of the examiner who
is incorruptible, are the patterns to which the lives of the citizens are
to conform. Plato is never weary of speaking of the honour of the soul,
which can only be honoured truly by being improved. To make the soul as
good as possible, and to prepare her for communion with the Gods in
another world by communion with divine virtue in this, is the end of life.
If the Republic is far superior to the Laws in form and style, and perhaps
in reach of thought, the Laws leave on the mind of the modern reader much
more strongly the impression of a struggle against evil, and an enthusiasm
for human improvement. When Plato says that he must carry out that part of
his ideal which is practicable, he does not appear to have reflected that
part of an ideal cannot be detached from the whole.

The great defect of both his constitutions is the fixedness which he seeks
to impress upon them. He had seen the Athenian empire, almost within the
limits of his own life, wax and wane, but he never seems to have asked
himself what would happen if, a century from the time at which he was
writing, the Greek character should have as much changed as in the century
which had preceded. He fails to perceive that the greater part of the
political life of a nation is not that which is given them by their
legislators, but that which they give themselves. He has never reflected
that without progress there cannot be order, and that mere order can only
be preserved by an unnatural and despotic repression. The possibility of a
great nation or of an universal empire arising never occurred to him. He
sees the enfeebled and distracted state of the Hellenic world in his own
later life, and thinks that the remedy is to make the laws unchangeable.
The same want of insight is apparent in his judgments about art. He would
like to have the forms of sculpture and of music fixed as in Egypt. He
does not consider that this would be fatal to the true principles of art,
which, as Socrates had himself taught, was to give life (Xen. Mem.). We
wonder how, familiar as he was with the statues of Pheidias, he could have
endured the lifeless and half-monstrous works of Egyptian sculpture. The
'chants of Isis' (Laws), we might think, would have been barbarous in an
Athenian ear. But although he is aware that there are some things which
are not so well among 'the children of the Nile,' he is deeply struck with
the stability of Egyptian institutions. Both in politics and in art Plato
seems to have seen no way of bringing order out of disorder, except by
taking a step backwards. Antiquity, compared with the world in which he
lived, had a sacredness and authority for him: the men of a former age
were supposed by him to have had a sense of reverence which was wanting
among his contemporaries. He could imagine the early stages of
civilization; he never thought of what the future might bring forth. His
experience is confined to two or three centuries, to a few Greek states,
and to an uncertain report of Egypt and the East. There are many ways in
which the limitations of their knowledge affected the genius of the
Greeks. In criticism they were like children, having an acute vision of
things which were near to them, blind to possibilities which were in the
distance.

The colony is to receive from the mother-country her original
constitution, and some of the first guardians of the law. The guardians of
the law are to be ministers of justice, and the president of education is
to take precedence of them all. They are to keep the registers of
property, to make regulations for trade, and they are to be superannuated
at seventy years of age. Several questions of modern politics, such as the
limitation of property, the enforcement of education, the relations of
classes, are anticipated by Plato. He hopes that in his state will be
found neither poverty nor riches; every man having the necessaries of
life, he need not go fortune-hunting in marriage. Almost in the spirit of
the Gospel he would say, 'How hardly can a rich man dwell in a perfect
state.' For he cannot be a good man who is always gaining too much and
spending too little (Laws; compare Arist. Eth. Nic.). Plato, though he
admits wealth as a political element, would deny that material prosperity
can be the foundation of a really great community. A man's soul, as he
often says, is more to be esteemed than his body; and his body than
external goods. He repeats the complaint which has been made in all ages,
that the love of money is the corruption of states. He has a sympathy with
thieves and burglars, 'many of whom are men of ability and greatly to be
pitied, because their souls are hungering and thirsting all their lives
long;' but he has little sympathy with shopkeepers or retailers, although
he makes the reflection, which sometimes occurs to ourselves, that such
occupations, if they were carried on honestly by the best men and women,
would be delightful and honourable. For traders and artisans a moderate
gain was, in his opinion, best. He has never, like modern writers,
idealized the wealth of nations, any more than he has worked out the
problems of political economy, which among the ancients had not yet grown
into a science. The isolation of Greek states, their constant wars, the
want of a free industrial population, and of the modern methods and
instruments of 'credit,' prevented any great extension of commerce among
them; and so hindered them from forming a theory of the laws which
regulate the accumulation and distribution of wealth.

The constitution of the army is aristocratic and also democratic; official
appointment is combined with popular election. The two principles are
carried out as follows: The guardians of the law nominate generals out of
whom three are chosen by those who are or have been of the age for
military service; and the generals elected have the nomination of certain
of the inferior officers. But if either in the case of generals or of the
inferior officers any one is ready to swear that he knows of a better man
than those nominated, he may put the claims of his candidate to the vote
of the whole army, or of the division of the service which he will, if
elected, command. There is a general assembly, but its functions, except
at elections, are hardly noticed. In the election of the Boule, Plato
again attempts to mix aristocracy and democracy. This is effected, first
as in the Servian constitution, by balancing wealth and numbers; for it
cannot be supposed that those who possessed a higher qualification were
equal in number with those who had a lower, and yet they have an equal
number of representatives. In the second place, all classes are compelled
to vote in the election of senators from the first and second class; but
the fourth class is not compelled to elect from the third, nor the third
and fourth from the fourth. Thirdly, out of the 180 persons who are thus
chosen from each of the four classes, 720 in all, 360 are to be taken by
lot; these form the council for the year.

These political adjustments of Plato's will be criticised by the practical
statesman as being for the most part fanciful and ineffectual. He will
observe, first of all, that the only real check on democracy is the
division into classes. The second of the three proposals, though
ingenious, and receiving some light from the apathy to politics which is
often shown by the higher classes in a democracy, would have little power
in times of excitement and peril, when the precaution was most needed. At
such political crises, all the lower classes would vote equally with the
higher. The subtraction of half the persons chosen at the first election
by the chances of the lot would not raise the character of the senators,
and is open to the objection of uncertainty, which necessarily attends
this and similar schemes of double representative government. Nor can the
voters be expected to retain the continuous political interest required
for carrying out such a proposal as Plato's. Who could select 180 persons
of each class, fitted to be senators? And whoever were chosen by the voter
in the first instance, his wishes might be neutralized by the action of
the lot. Yet the scheme of Plato is not really so extravagant as the
actual constitution of Athens, in which all the senators appear to have
been elected by lot (apo kuamou bouleutai), at least, after the revolution
made by Cleisthenes; for the constitution of the senate which was
established by Solon probably had some aristocratic features, though their
precise nature is unknown to us. The ancients knew that election by lot
was the most democratic of all modes of appointment, seeming to say in the
objectionable sense, that 'one man is as good as another.' Plato, who is
desirous of mingling different elements, makes a partial use of the lot,
which he applies to candidates already elected by vote. He attempts also
to devise a system of checks and balances such as he supposes to have been
intended by the ancient legislators. We are disposed to say to him, as he
himself says in a remarkable passage, that 'no man ever legislates, but
accidents of all sorts, which legislate for us in all sorts of ways. The
violence of war and the hard necessity of poverty are constantly
overturning governments and changing laws.' And yet, as he adds, the true
legislator is still required: he must co-operate with circumstances. Many
things which are ascribed to human foresight are the result of chance.
Ancient, and in a less degree modern political constitutions, are never
consistent with themselves, because they are never framed on a single
design, but are added to from time to time as new elements arise and gain
the preponderance in the state. We often attribute to the wisdom of our
ancestors great political effects which have sprung unforeseen from the
accident of the situation. Power, not wisdom, is most commonly the source
of political revolutions. And the result, as in the Roman Republic, of the
co-existence of opposite elements in the same state is, not a balance of
power or an equable progress of liberal principles, but a conflict of
forces, of which one or other may happen to be in the ascendant. In Greek
history, as well as in Plato's conception of it, this 'progression by
antagonism' involves reaction: the aristocracy expands into democracy and
returns again to tyranny.

The constitution of the Laws may be said to consist, besides the
magistrates, mainly of three elements,--an administrative Council, the
judiciary, and the Nocturnal Council, which is an intellectual
aristocracy, composed of priests and the ten eldest guardians of the law
and some younger co-opted members. To this latter chiefly are assigned the
functions of legislation, but to be exercised with a sparing hand. The
powers of the ordinary council are administrative rather than legislative.
The whole number of 360, as in the Athenian constitution, is distributed
among the months of the year according to the number of the tribes. Not
more than one-twelfth is to be in office at once, so that the government
would be made up of twelve administrations succeeding one another in the
course of the year. They are to exercise a general superintendence, and,
like the Athenian counsellors, are to preside in monthly divisions over
all assemblies. Of the ecclesia over which they presided little is said,
and that little relates to comparatively trifling duties. Nothing is less
present to the mind of Plato than a House of Commons, carrying on year by
year the work of legislation. For he supposes the laws to be already
provided. As little would he approve of a body like the Roman Senate. The
people and the aristocracy alike are to be represented, not by assemblies,
but by officers elected for one or two years, except the guardians of the
law, who are elected for twenty years.

The evils of this system are obvious. If in any state, as Plato says in
the Statesman, it is easier to find fifty good draught-players than fifty
good rulers, the greater part of the 360 who compose the council must be
unfitted to rule. The unfitness would be increased by the short period
during which they held office. There would be no traditions of government
among them, as in a Greek or Italian oligarchy, and no individual would be
responsible for any of their acts. Everything seems to have been
sacrificed to a false notion of equality, according to which all have a
turn of ruling and being ruled. In the constitution of the Magnesian state
Plato has not emancipated himself from the limitations of ancient
politics. His government may be described as a democracy of magistrates
elected by the people. He never troubles himself about the political
consistency of his scheme. He does indeed say that the greater part of the
good of this world arises, not from equality, but from proportion, which
he calls the judgment of Zeus (compare Aristotle's Distributive Justice),
but he hardly makes any attempt to carry out the principle in practice.
There is no attempt to proportion representation to merit; nor is there
any body in his commonwealth which represents the life either of a class
or of the whole state. The manner of appointing magistrates is taken
chiefly from the old democratic constitution of Athens, of which it
retains some of the worst features, such as the use of the lot, while by
doing away with the political character of the popular assembly the
mainspring of the machine is taken out. The guardians of the law, thirty-
seven in number, of whom the ten eldest reappear as a part of the
Nocturnal Council at the end of the twelfth book, are to be elected by the
whole military class, but they are to hold office for twenty years, and
would therefore have an oligarchical rather than a democratic character.
Nothing is said of the manner in which the functions of the Nocturnal
Council are to be harmonized with those of the guardians of the law, or as
to how the ordinary council is related to it.

Similar principles are applied to inferior offices. To some the
appointment is made by vote, to others by lot. In the elections to the
priesthood, Plato endeavours to mix or balance in a friendly manner 'demus
and not demus.' The commonwealth of the Laws, like the Republic, cannot
dispense with a spiritual head, which is the same in both--the oracle of
Delphi. From this the laws about all divine things are to be derived. The
final selection of the Interpreters, the choice of an heir for a vacant
lot, the punishment for removing a deposit, are also to be determined by
it. Plato is not disposed to encourage amateur attempts to revive religion
in states. For, as he says in the Laws, 'To institute religious rites is
the work of a great intelligence.'

Though the council is framed on the model of the Athenian Boule, the law
courts of Plato do not equally conform to the pattern of the Athenian
dicasteries. Plato thinks that the judges should speak and ask questions:
--this is not possible if they are numerous; he would, therefore, have a
few judges only, but good ones. He is nevertheless aware that both in
public and private suits there must be a popular element. He insists that
the whole people must share in the administration of justice--in public
causes they are to take the first step, and the final decision is to
remain with them. In private suits they are also to retain a share; 'for
the citizen who has no part in the administration of justice is apt to
think that he has no share in the state. For this reason there is to be a
court of law in every tribe (i.e. for about every 2,000 citizens), and the
judges are to be chosen by lot.' Of the courts of law he gives what he
calls a superficial sketch. Nor, indeed is it easy to reconcile his
various accounts of them. It is however clear that although some
officials, like the guardians of the law, the wardens of the agora, city,
and country have power to inflict minor penalties, the administration of
justice is in the main popular. The ingenious expedient of dividing the
questions of law and fact between a judge and jury, which would have
enabled Plato to combine the popular element with the judicial, did not
occur to him or to any other ancient political philosopher. Though
desirous of limiting the number of judges, and thereby confining the
office to persons specially fitted for it, he does not seem to have
understood that a body of law must be formed by decisions as well as by
legal enactments.

He would have men in the first place seek justice from their friends and
neighbours, because, as he truly remarks, they know best the questions at
issue; these are called in another passage arbiters rather than judges.
But if they cannot settle the matter, it is to be referred to the courts
of the tribes, and a higher penalty is to be paid by the party who is
unsuccessful in the suit. There is a further appeal allowed to the select
judges, with a further increase of penalty. The select judges are to be
appointed by the magistrates, who are to choose one from every magistracy.
They are to be elected annually, and therefore probably for a year only,
and are liable to be called to account before the guardians of the law. In
cases of which death is the penalty, the trial takes place before a
special court, which is composed of the guardians of the law and of the
judges of appeal.

In treating of the subject in Book ix, he proposes to leave for the most
part the methods of procedure to a younger generation of legislators; the
procedure in capital causes he determines himself. He insists that the
vote of the judges shall be given openly, and before they vote they are to
hear speeches from the plaintiff and defendant. They are then to take
evidence in support of what has been said, and to examine witnesses. The
eldest judge is to ask his questions first, and then the second, and then
the third. The interrogatories are to continue for three days, and the
evidence is to be written down. Apparently he does not expect the judges
to be professional lawyers, any more than he expects the members of the
council to be trained statesmen.

In forming marriage connexions, Plato supposes that the public interest
will prevail over private inclination. There was nothing in this very
shocking to the notions of Greeks, among whom the feeling of love towards
the other sex was almost deprived of sentiment or romance. Married life is
to be regulated solely with a view to the good of the state. The newly-
married couple are not allowed to absent themselves from their respective
syssitia, even during their honeymoon; they are to give their whole mind
to the procreation of children; their duties to one another at a later
period of life are not a matter about which the state is equally
solicitous. Divorces are readily allowed for incompatibility of temper. As
in the Republic, physical considerations seem almost to exclude moral and
social ones. To modern feelings there is a degree of coarseness in Plato's
treatment of the subject. Yet he also makes some shrewd remarks on
marriage, as for example, that a man who does not marry for money will not
be the humble servant of his wife. And he shows a true conception of the
nature of the family, when he requires that the newly-married couple
'should leave their father and mother,' and have a separate home. He also
provides against extravagance in marriage festivals, which in some states
of society, for instance in the case of the Hindoos, has been a social
evil of the first magnitude.

In treating of property, Plato takes occasion to speak of property in
slaves. They are to be treated with perfect justice; but, for their own
sake, to be kept at a distance. The motive is not so much humanity to the
slave, of which there are hardly any traces (although Plato allows that
many in the hour of peril have found a slave more attached than members of
their own family), but the self-respect which the freeman and citizen owes
to himself (compare Republic). If they commit crimes, they are doubly
punished; if they inform against illegal practices of their masters, they
are to receive a protection, which would probably be ineffectual, from the
guardians of the law; in rare cases they are to be set free. Plato still
breathes the spirit of the old Hellenic world, in which slavery was a
necessity, because leisure must be provided for the citizen.

The education propounded in the Laws differs in several points from that
of the Republic. Plato seems to have reflected as deeply and earnestly on
the importance of infancy as Rousseau, or Jean Paul (compare the saying of
the latter--'Not the moment of death, but the moment of birth, is probably
the more important'). He would fix the amusements of children in the hope
of fixing their characters in after-life. In the spirit of the statesman
who said, 'Let me make the ballads of a country, and I care not who make
their laws,' Plato would say, 'Let the amusements of children be
unchanged, and they will not want to change the laws. The 'Goddess
Harmonia' plays a great part in Plato's ideas of education. The natural
restless force of life in children, 'who do nothing but roar until they
are three years old,' is gradually to be reduced to law and order. As in
the Republic, he fixes certain forms in which songs are to be composed:
(1) they are to be strains of cheerfulness and good omen; (2) they are to
be hymns or prayers addressed to the Gods; (3) they are to sing only of
the lawful and good. The poets are again expelled or rather ironically
invited to depart; and those who remain are required to submit their poems
to the censorship of the magistrates. Youth are no longer compelled to
commit to memory many thousand lyric and tragic Greek verses; yet,
perhaps, a worse fate is in store for them. Plato has no belief in
'liberty of prophesying'; and having guarded against the dangers of lyric
poetry, he remembers that there is an equal danger in other writings. He
cannot leave his old enemies, the Sophists, in possession of the field;
and therefore he proposes that youth shall learn by heart, instead of the
compositions of poets or prose writers, his own inspired work on laws.
These, and music and mathematics, are the chief parts of his education.

Mathematics are to be cultivated, not as in the Republic with a view to
the science of the idea of good,--though the higher use of them is not
altogether excluded,--but rather with a religious and political aim. They
are a sacred study which teaches men how to distribute the portions of a
state, and which is to be pursued in order that they may learn not to
blaspheme about astronomy. Against three mathematical errors Plato is in
profound earnest. First, the error of supposing that the three dimensions
of length, breadth, and height, are really commensurable with one another.
The difficulty which he feels is analogous to the difficulty which he
formerly felt about the connexion of ideas, and is equally characteristic
of ancient philosophy: he fixes his mind on the point of difference, and
cannot at the same time take in the similarity. Secondly, he is puzzled
about the nature of fractions: in the Republic, he is disposed to deny the
possibility of their existence. Thirdly, his optimism leads him to insist
(unlike the Spanish king who thought that he could have improved on the
mechanism of the heavens) on the perfect or circular movement of the
heavenly bodies. He appears to mean, that instead of regarding the stars
as overtaking or being overtaken by one another, or as planets wandering
in many paths, a more comprehensive survey of the heavens would enable us
to infer that they all alike moved in a circle around a centre (compare
Timaeus; Republic). He probably suspected, though unacquainted with the
true cause, that the appearance of the heavens did not agree with the
reality: at any rate, his notions of what was right or fitting easily
overpowered the results of actual observation. To the early astronomers,
who lived at the revival of science, as to Plato, there was nothing absurd
in a priori astronomy, and they would probably have made fewer real
discoveries of they had followed any other track. (Compare Introduction to
the Republic.)

The science of dialectic is nowhere mentioned by name in the Laws, nor is
anything said of the education of after-life. The child is to begin to
learn at ten years of age: he is to be taught reading and writing for
three years, from ten to thirteen, and no longer; and for three years
more, from thirteen to sixteen, he is to be instructed in music. The great
fault which Plato finds in the contemporary education is the almost total
ignorance of arithmetic and astronomy, in which the Greeks would do well
to take a lesson from the Egyptians (compare Republic). Dancing and
wrestling are to have a military character, and women as well as men are
to be taught the use of arms. The military spirit which Plato has vainly
endeavoured to expel in the first two books returns again in the seventh
and eighth. He has evidently a sympathy with the soldier, as well as with
the poet, and he is no mean master of the art, or at least of the theory,
of war (compare Laws; Republic), though inclining rather to the Spartan
than to the Athenian practice of it (Laws). Of a supreme or master science
which was to be the 'coping-stone' of the rest, few traces appear in the
Laws. He seems to have lost faith in it, or perhaps to have realized that
the time for such a science had not yet come, and that he was unable to
fill up the outline which he had sketched. There is no requirement that
the guardians of the law shall be philosophers, although they are to know
the unity of virtue, and the connexion of the sciences. Nor are we told
that the leisure of the citizens, when they are grown up, is to be devoted
to any intellectual employment. In this respect we note a falling off from
the Republic, but also there is 'the returning to it' of which Aristotle
speaks in the Politics. The public and family duties of the citizens are
to be their main business, and these would, no doubt, take up a great deal
more time than in the modern world we are willing to allow to either of
them. Plato no longer entertains the idea of any regular training to be
pursued under the superintendence of the state from eighteen to thirty, or
from thirty to thirty-five; he has taken the first step downwards on
'Constitution Hill' (Republic). But he maintains as earnestly as ever that
'to men living under this second polity there remains the greatest of all
works, the education of the soul,' and that no bye-work should be allowed
to interfere with it. Night and day are not long enough for the
consummation of it.

Few among us are either able or willing to carry education into later
life; five or six years spent at school, three or four at a university, or
in the preparation for a profession, an occasional attendance at a lecture
to which we are invited by friends when we have an hour to spare from
house-keeping or money-making--these comprise, as a matter of fact, the
education even of the educated; and then the lamp is extinguished 'more
truly than Heracleitus' sun, never to be lighted again' (Republic). The
description which Plato gives in the Republic of the state of adult
education among his contemporaries may be applied almost word for word to
our own age. He does not however acquiesce in this widely-spread want of a
higher education; he would rather seek to make every man something of a
philosopher before he enters on the duties of active life. But in the Laws
he no longer prescribes any regular course of study which is to be pursued
in mature years. Nor does he remark that the education of after-life is of
another kind, and must consist with the majority of the world rather in
the improvement of character than in the acquirement of knowledge. It
comes from the study of ourselves and other men: from moderation and
experience: from reflection on circumstances: from the pursuit of high
aims: from a right use of the opportunities of life. It is the
preservation of what we have been, and the addition of something more. The
power of abstract study or continuous thought is very rare, but such a
training as this can be given by every one to himself.

The singular passage in Book vii., in which Plato describes life as a
pastime, like many other passages in the Laws is imperfectly expressed.
Two thoughts seem to be struggling in his mind: first, the reflection, to
which he returns at the end of the passage, that men are playthings or
puppets, and that God only is the serious aim of human endeavours; this
suggests to him the afterthought that, although playthings, they are the
playthings of the Gods, and that this is the best of them. The cynical,
ironical fancy of the moment insensibly passes into a religious sentiment.
In another passage he says that life is a game of which God, who is the
player, shifts the pieces so as to procure the victory of good on the
whole. Or once more: Tragedies are acted on the stage; but the best and
noblest of them is the imitation of the noblest life, which we affirm to
be the life of our whole state. Again, life is a chorus, as well as a sort
of mystery, in which we have the Gods for playmates. Men imagine that war
is their serious pursuit, and they make war that they may return to their
amusements. But neither wars nor amusements are the true satisfaction of
men, which is to be found only in the society of the Gods, in sacrificing
to them and propitiating them. Like a Christian ascetic, Plato seems to
suppose that life should be passed wholly in the enjoyment of divine
things. And after meditating in amazement on the sadness and unreality of
the world, he adds, in a sort of parenthesis, 'Be cheerful, Sirs'
(Shakespeare, Tempest.)

In one of the noblest passages of Plato, he speaks of the relation of the
sexes. Natural relations between members of the same family have been
established of old; a 'little word' has put a stop to incestuous
connexions. But unnatural unions of another kind continued to prevail at
Crete and Lacedaemon, and were even justified by the example of the Gods.
They, too, might be banished, if the feeling that they were unholy and
abominable could sink into the minds of men. The legislator is to cry
aloud, and spare not, 'Let not men fall below the level of the beasts.'
Plato does not shrink, like some modern philosophers, from 'carrying on
war against the mightiest lusts of mankind;' neither does he expect to
extirpate them, but only to confine them to their natural use and purpose,
by the enactments of law, and by the influence of public opinion. He will
not feed them by an over-luxurious diet, nor allow the healthier instincts
of the soul to be corrupted by music and poetry. The prohibition of
excessive wealth is, as he says, a very considerable gain in the way of
temperance, nor does he allow of those enthusiastic friendships between
older and younger persons which in his earlier writings appear to be
alluded to with a certain degree of amusement and without reproof (compare
Introduction to the Symposium). Sappho and Anacreon are celebrated by him
in the Charmides and the Phaedrus; but they would have been expelled from
the Magnesian state.

Yet he does not suppose that the rule of absolute purity can be enforced
on all mankind. Something must be conceded to the weakness of human
nature. He therefore adopts a 'second legal standard of honourable and
dishonourable, having a second standard of right.' He would abolish
altogether 'the connexion of men with men...As to women, if any man has to
do with any but those who come into his house duly married by sacred
rites, and he offends publicly in the face of all mankind, we shall be
right in enacting that he be deprived of civic honours and privileges.'
But feeling also that it is impossible wholly to control the mightiest
passions of mankind,' Plato, like other legislators, makes a compromise.
The offender must not be found out; decency, if not morality, must be
respected. In this he appears to agree with the practice of all civilized
ages and countries. Much may be truly said by the moralist on the
comparative harm of open and concealed vice. Nor do we deny that some
moral evils are better turned out to the light, because, like diseases,
when exposed, they are more easily cured. And secrecy introduces mystery
which enormously exaggerates their power; a mere animal want is thus
elevated into a sentimental ideal. It may very well be that a word spoken
in season about things which are commonly concealed may have an excellent
effect. But having regard to the education of youth, to the innocence of
children, to the sensibilities of women, to the decencies of society,
Plato and the world in general are not wrong in insisting that some of the
worst vices, if they must exist, should be kept out of sight; this, though
only a second-best rule, is a support to the weakness of human nature.
There are some things which may be whispered in the closet, but should not
be shouted on the housetop. It may be said of this, as of many other
things, that it is a great part of education to know to whom they are to
be spoken of, and when, and where.

BOOK IX. Punishments of offences and modes of procedure come next in
order. We have a sense of disgrace in making regulations for all the
details of crime in a virtuous and well-ordered state. But seeing that we
are legislating for men and not for Gods, there is no uncharitableness in
apprehending that some one of our citizens may have a heart, like the seed
which has touched the ox's horn, so hard as to be impenetrable to the law.
Let our first enactment be directed against the robbing of temples. No
well-educated citizen will be guilty of such a crime, but one of their
servants, or some stranger, may, and with a view to him, and at the same
time with a remoter eye to the general infirmity of human nature, I will
lay down the law, beginning with a prelude. To the intending robber we
will say--O sir, the complaint which troubles you is not human; but some
curse has fallen upon you, inherited from the crimes of your ancestors, of
which you must purge yourself: go and sacrifice to the Gods, associate
with the good, avoid the wicked; and if you are cured of the fatal
impulse, well; but if not, acknowledge death to be better than life, and
depart.

These are the accents, soft and low, in which we address the would-be
criminal. And if he will not listen, then cry aloud as with the sound of a
trumpet: Whosoever robs a temple, if he be a slave or foreigner shall be
branded in the face and hands, and scourged, and cast naked beyond the
border. And perhaps this may improve him: for the law aims either at the
reformation of the criminal, or the repression of crime. No punishment is
designed to inflict useless injury. But if the offender be a citizen, he
must be incurable, and for him death is the only fitting penalty. His
iniquity, however, shall not be visited on his children, nor shall his
property be confiscated.

As to the exaction of penalties, any person who is fined for an offence
shall not be liable to pay the fine, unless he have property in excess of
his lot. For the lots must never go uncultivated for lack of means; the
guardians of the law are to provide against this. If a fine is inflicted
upon a man which he cannot pay, and for which his friends are unwilling to
give security, he shall be imprisoned and otherwise dishonoured. But no
criminal shall go unpunished:--whether death, or imprisonment, or stripes,
or fines, or the stocks, or banishment to a remote temple, be the penalty.
Capital offences shall come under the cognizance of the guardians of the
law, and a college of the best of the last year's magistrates. The order
of suits and similar details we shall leave to the lawgivers of the
future, and only determine the mode of voting. The judges are to sit in
order of seniority, and the proceedings shall begin with the speeches of
the plaintiff and the defendant; and then the judges, beginning with the
eldest, shall ask questions and collect evidence during three days, which,
at the end of each day, shall be deposited in writing under their seals on
the altar of Hestia; and when they have evidence enough, after a solemn
declaration that they will decide justly, they shall vote and end the
case. The votes are to be given openly in the presence of the citizens.

Next to religion, the preservation of the constitution is the first object
of the law. The greatest enemy of the state is he who attempts to set up a
tyrant, or breeds plots and conspiracies; not far below him in guilt is a
magistrate who either knowingly, or in ignorance, fails to bring the
offender to justice. Any one who is good for anything will give
information against traitors. The mode of proceeding at such trials will
be the same as at trials for sacrilege; the penalty, death. But neither in
this case nor in any other is the son to bear the iniquity of the father,
unless father, grandfather, great-grandfather, have all of them been
capitally convicted, and then the family of the criminal are to be sent
off to the country of their ancestor, retaining their property, with the
exception of the lot and its fixtures. And ten are to be selected from the
younger sons of the other citizens--one of whom is to be chosen by the
oracle of Delphi to be heir of the lot.

Our third law will be a general one, concerning the procedure and the
judges in cases of treason. As regards the remaining or departure of the
family of the offender, the same law shall apply equally to the traitor,
the sacrilegious, and the conspirator.

A thief, whether he steals much or little, must refund twice the amount,
if he can do so without impairing his lot; if he cannot, he must go to
prison until he either pays the plaintiff, or in case of a public theft,
the city, or they agree to forgive him. 'But should all kinds of theft
incur the same penalty?' You remind me of what I know--that legislation is
never perfect. The men for whom laws are now made may be compared to the
slave who is being doctored, according to our old image, by the
unscientific doctor. For the empirical practitioner, if he chance to meet
the educated physician talking to his patient, and entering into the
philosophy of his disease, would burst out laughing and say, as doctors
delight in doing, 'Foolish fellow, instead of curing the patient you are
educating him!' 'And would he not be right?' Perhaps; and he might add,
that he who discourses in our fashion preaches to the citizens instead of
legislating for them. 'True.' There is, however, one advantage which we
possess--that being amateurs only, we may either take the most ideal, or
the most necessary and utilitarian view. 'But why offer such an
alternative? As if all our legislation must be done to-day, and nothing
put off until the morrow. We may surely rough-hew our materials first, and
shape and place them afterwards.' That will be the natural way of
proceeding. There is a further point. Of all writings either in prose or
verse the writings of the legislator are the most important. For it is he
who has to determine the nature of good and evil, and how they should be
studied with a view to our instruction. And is it not as disgraceful for
Solon and Lycurgus to lay down false precepts about the institutions of
life as for Homer and Tyrtaeus? The laws of states ought to be the models
of writing, and what is at variance with them should be deemed ridiculous.
And we may further imagine them to express the affection and good sense of
a father or mother, and not to be the fiats of a tyrant. 'Very true.'

Let us enquire more particularly about sacrilege, theft and other crimes,
for which we have already legislated in part. And this leads us to ask,
first of all, whether we are agreed or disagreed about the nature of the
honourable and just. 'To what are you referring?' I will endeavour to
explain. All are agreed that justice is honourable, whether in men or
things, and no one who maintains that a very ugly men who is just, is in
his mind fair, would be thought extravagant. 'Very true.' But if honour is
to be attributed to justice, are just sufferings honourable, or only just
actions? 'What do you mean?' Our laws supply a case in point; for we
enacted that the robber of temples and the traitor should die; and this
was just, but the reverse of honourable. In this way does the language of
the many rend asunder the just and honourable. 'That is true.' But is our
own language consistent? I have already said that the evil are
involuntarily evil; and the evil are the unjust. Now the voluntary cannot
be the involuntary; and if you two come to me and say, 'Then shall we
legislate for our city?' Of course, I shall reply.--'Then will you
distinguish what crimes are voluntary and what involuntary, and shall we
impose lighter penalties on the latter, and heavier on the former? Or
shall we refuse to determine what is the meaning of voluntary and
involuntary, and maintain that our words have come down from heaven, and
that they should be at once embodied in a law?' All states legislate under
the idea that there are two classes of actions, the voluntary and the
involuntary, but there is great confusion about them in the minds of men;
and the law can never act unless they are distinguished. Either we must
abstain from affirming that unjust actions are involuntary, or explain the
meaning of this statement. Believing, then, that acts of injustice cannot
be divided into voluntary and involuntary, I must endeavour to find some
other mode of classifying them. Hurts are voluntary and involuntary, but
all hurts are not injuries: on the other hand, a benefit when wrongly
conferred may be an injury. An act which gives or takes away anything is
not simply just; but the legislator who has to decide whether the case is
one of hurt or injury, must consider the animus of the agent; and when
there is hurt, he must as far as possible, provide a remedy and
reparation: but if there is injustice, he must, when compensation has been
made, further endeavour to reconcile the two parties. 'Excellent.' Where
injustice, like disease, is remediable, there the remedy must be applied
in word or deed, with the assistance of pleasures and pains, of bounties
and penalties, or any other influence which may inspire man with the love
of justice, or hatred of injustice; and this is the noblest work of law.
But when the legislator perceives the evil to be incurable, he will
consider that the death of the offender will be a good to himself, and in
two ways a good to society: first, as he becomes an example to others;
secondly, because the city will be quit of a rogue; and in such a case,
but in no other, the legislator will punish with death. 'There is some
truth in what you say. I wish, however, that you would distinguish more
clearly the difference of injury and hurt, and the complications of
voluntary and involuntary.' You will admit that anger is of a violent and
destructive nature? 'Certainly.' And further, that pleasure is different
from anger, and has an opposite power, working by persuasion and deceit?
'Yes.' Ignorance is the third source of crimes; this is of two kinds--
simple ignorance and ignorance doubled by conceit of knowledge; the
latter, when accompanied with power, is a source of terrible errors, but
is excusable when only weak and childish. 'True.' We often say that one
man masters, and another is mastered by pleasure and anger. 'Just so.' But
no one says that one man masters, and another is mastered by ignorance.
'You are right.' All these motives actuate men and sometimes drive them in
different ways. 'That is so.' Now, then, I am in a position to define the
nature of just and unjust. By injustice I mean the dominion of anger and
fear, pleasure and pain, envy and desire, in the soul, whether doing harm
or not: by justice I mean the rule of the opinion of the best, whether in
states or individuals, extending to the whole of life; although actions
done in error are often thought to be involuntary injustice. No
controversy need be raised about names at present; we are only desirous of
fixing in our memories the heads of error. And the pain which is called
fear and anger is our first head of error; the second is the class of
pleasures and desires; and the third, of hopes which aim at true opinion
about the best;--this latter falls into three divisions (i.e. (1) when
accompanied by simple ignorance, (2) when accompanied by conceit of wisdom
combined with power, or (3) with weakness), so that there are in all five.
And the laws relating to them may be summed up under two heads, laws which
deal with acts of open violence and with acts of deceit; to which may be
added acts both violent and deceitful, and these last should be visited
with the utmost rigour of the law. 'Very properly.'

Let us now return to the enactment of laws. We have treated of sacrilege,
and of conspiracy, and of treason. Any of these crimes may be committed by
a person not in his right mind, or in the second childhood of old age. If
this is proved to be the fact before the judges, the person in question
shall only have to pay for the injury, and not be punished further, unless
he have on his hands the stain of blood. In this case he shall be exiled
for a year, and if he return before the expiration of the year, he shall
be retained in the public prison two years.

Homicides may be divided into voluntary and involuntary: and first of
involuntary homicide. He who unintentionally kills another man at the
games or in military exercises duly authorized by the magistrates, whether
death follow immediately or after an interval, shall be acquitted, subject
only to the purification required by the Delphian Oracle. Any physician
whose patient dies against his will shall in like manner be acquitted. Any
one who unintentionally kills the slave of another, believing that he is
his own, with or without weapons, shall bear the master of the slave
harmless, or pay a penalty amounting to twice the value of the slave, and
to this let him add a purification greater than in the case of homicide at
the games. If a man kill his own slave, a purification only is required of
him. If he kill a freeman unintentionally, let him also make purification;
and let him remember the ancient tradition which says that the murdered
man is indignant when he sees the murderer walk about in his own
accustomed haunts, and that he terrifies him with the remembrance of his
crime. And therefore the homicide should keep away from his native land
for a year, or, if he have slain a stranger, let him avoid the land of the
stranger for a like period. If he complies with this condition, the
nearest kinsman of the deceased shall take pity upon him and be reconciled
to him; but if he refuses to remain in exile, or visits the temples
unpurified, then let the kinsman proceed against him, and demand a double
penalty. The kinsman who neglects this duty shall himself incur the curse,
and any one who likes may proceed against him, and compel him to leave his
country for five years. If a stranger involuntarily kill a stranger, any
one may proceed against him in the same manner: and the homicide, if he be
a metic, shall be banished for a year; but if he be an entire stranger,
whether he have murdered metic, citizen, or stranger, he shall be banished
for ever; and if he return, he shall be punished with death, and his
property shall go to the next of kin of the murdered man. If he come back
by sea against his will, he shall remain on the seashore, wetting his feet
in the water while he waits for a vessel to sail; or if he be brought back
by land, the magistrates shall send him unharmed beyond the border.

Next follows murder done from anger, which is of two kinds--either arising
out of a sudden impulse, and attended with remorse; or committed with
premeditation, and unattended with remorse. The cause of both is anger,
and both are intermediate between voluntary and involuntary. The one which
is committed from sudden impulse, though not wholly involuntary, bears the
image of the involuntary, and is therefore the more excusable of the two,
and should receive a gentler punishment. The act of him who nurses his
wrath is more voluntary, and therefore more culpable. The degree of
culpability depends on the presence or absence of intention, to which the
degree of punishment should correspond. For the first kind of murder, that
which is done on a momentary impulse, let two years' exile be the penalty;
for the second, that which is accompanied with malice prepense, three.
When the time of any one's exile has expired, the guardians shall send
twelve judges to the borders of the land, who shall have authority to
decide whether he may return or not. He who after returning repeats the
offence, shall be exiled and return no more, and, if he return, shall be
put to death, like the stranger in a similar case. He who in a fit of
anger kills his own slave, shall purify himself; and he who kills another
man's slave, shall pay to his master double the value. Any one may proceed
against the offender if he appear in public places, not having been
purified; and may bring to trial both the next of kin to the dead man and
the homicide, and compel the one to exact, and the other to pay, a double
penalty. If a slave kill his master, or a freeman who is not his master,
in anger, the kinsmen of the murdered person may do with the murderer
whatever they please, but they must not spare his life. If a father or
mother kill their son or daughter in anger, let the slayer remain in exile
for three years; and on the return of the exile let the parents separate,
and no longer continue to cohabit, or have the same sacred rites with
those whom he or she has deprived of a brother or sister. The same penalty
is decreed against the husband who murders his wife, and also against the
wife who murders her husband. Let them be absent three years, and on their
return never again share in the same sacred rites with their children, or
sit at the same table with them. Nor is a brother or sister who have
lifted up their hands against a brother or sister, ever to come under the
same roof or share in the same rites with those whom they have robbed of a
child. If a son feels such hatred against his father or mother as to take
the life of either of them, then, if the parent before death forgive him,
he shall only suffer the penalty due to involuntary homicide; but if he be
unforgiven, there are many laws against which he has offended; he is
guilty of outrage, impiety, sacrilege all in one, and deserves to be put
to death many times over. For if the law will not allow a man to kill the
authors of his being even in self-defence, what other penalty than death
can be inflicted upon him who in a fit of passion wilfully slays his
father or mother? If a brother kill a brother in self-defence during a
civil broil, or a citizen a citizen, or a slave a slave, or a stranger a
stranger, let them be free from blame, as he is who slays an enemy in
battle. But if a slave kill a freeman, let him be as a parricide. In all
cases, however, the forgiveness of the injured party shall acquit the
agents; and then they shall only be purified, and remain in exile for a
year.

Enough of actions that are involuntary, or done in anger; let us proceed
to voluntary and premeditated actions. The great source of voluntary crime
is the desire of money, which is begotten by evil education; and this
arises out of the false praise of riches, common both among Hellenes and
barbarians; they think that to be the first of goods which is really the
third. For the body is not for the sake of wealth, but wealth for the
body, as the body is for the soul. If this were better understood, the
crime of murder, of which avarice is the chief cause, would soon cease
among men. Next to avarice, ambition is a source of crime, troublesome to
the ambitious man himself, as well as to the chief men of the state. And
next to ambition, base fear is a motive, which has led many an one to
commit murder in order that he may get rid of the witnesses of his crimes.
Let this be said as a prelude to all enactments about crimes of violence;
and the tradition must not be forgotten, which tells that the murderer is
punished in the world below, and that when he returns to this world he
meets the fate which he has dealt out to others. If a man is deterred by
the prelude and the fear of future punishment, he will have no need of the
law; but in case he disobey, let the law be declared against him as
follows:--He who of malice prepense kills one of his kindred, shall in the
first place be outlawed; neither temple, harbour, nor agora shall be
polluted by his presence. And if a kinsman of the deceased refuse to
proceed against his slayer, he shall take the curse of pollution upon
himself, and also be liable to be prosecuted by any one who will avenge
the dead. The prosecutor, however, must observe the customary ceremonial
before he proceeds against the offender. The details of these observances
will be best determined by a conclave of prophets and interpreters and
guardians of the law, and the judges of the cause itself shall be the same
as in cases of sacrilege. He who is convicted shall be punished with
death, and not be buried within the country of the murdered person. He who
flies from the law shall undergo perpetual banishment; if he return, he
may be put to death with impunity by any relative of the murdered man or
by any other citizen, or bound and delivered to the magistrates. He who
accuses a man of murder shall demand satisfactory bail of the accused, and
if this is not forthcoming, the magistrate shall keep him in prison
against the day of trial. If a man commit murder by the hand of another,
he shall be tried in the same way as in the cases previously supposed, but
if the offender be a citizen, his body after execution shall be buried
within the land.

If a slave kill a freeman, either with his own hand or by contrivance, let
him be led either to the grave or to a place whence he can see the grave
of the murdered man, and there receive as many stripes at the hand of the
public executioner as the person who took him pleases; and if he survive
he shall be put to death. If a slave be put out of the way to prevent his
informing of some crime, his death shall be punished like that of a
citizen. If there are any of those horrible murders of kindred which
sometimes occur even in well-regulated societies, and of which the
legislator, however unwilling, cannot avoid taking cognizance, he will
repeat the old myth of the divine vengeance against the perpetrators of
such atrocities. The myth will say that the murderer must suffer what he
has done: if he have slain his father, he must be slain by his children;
if his mother, he must become a woman and perish at the hands of his
offspring in another age of the world. Such a preamble may terrify him;
but if, notwithstanding, in some evil hour he murders father or mother or
brethren or children, the mode of proceeding shall be as follows:--Him who
is convicted, the officers of the judges shall lead to a spot without the
city where three ways meet, and there slay him and expose his body naked;
and each of the magistrates shall cast a stone upon his head and justify
the city, and he shall be thrown unburied beyond the border. But what
shall we say of him who takes the life which is dearest to him, that is to
say, his own; and this not from any disgrace or calamity, but from
cowardice and indolence? The manner of his burial and the purification of
his crime is a matter for God and the interpreters to decide and for his
kinsmen to execute. Let him, at any rate, be buried alone in some
uncultivated and nameless spot, and be without name or monument. If a
beast kill a man, not in a public contest, let it be prosecuted for
murder, and after condemnation slain and cast without the border. Also
inanimate things which have caused death, except in the case of lightning
and other visitations from heaven, shall be carried without the border. If
the body of a dead man be found, and the murderer remain unknown, the
trial shall take place all the same, and the unknown murderer shall be
warned not to set foot in the temples or come within the borders of the
land; if discovered, he shall die, and his body shall be cast out. A man
is justified in taking the life of a burglar, of a footpad, of a violator
of women or youth; and he may take the life of another with impunity in
defence of father, mother, brother, wife, or other relations.

The nurture and education which are necessary to the existence of men have
been considered, and the punishment of acts of violence which destroy
life. There remain maiming, wounding, and the like, which admit of a
similar division into voluntary and involuntary. About this class of
actions the preamble shall be: Whereas men would be like wild beasts
unless they obeyed the laws, the first duty of citizens is the care of the
public interests, which unite and preserve states, as private interests
distract them. A man may know what is for the public good, but if he have
absolute power, human nature will impel him to seek pleasure instead of
virtue, and so darkness will come over his soul and over the state. If he
had mind, he would have no need of law; for mind is the perfection of law.
But such a freeman, 'whom the truth makes free,' is hardly to be found;
and therefore law and order are necessary, which are the second-best, and
they regulate things as they exist in part only, but cannot take in the
whole. For actions have innumerable characteristics, which must be partly
determined by the law and partly left to the judge. The judge must
determine the fact; and to him also the punishment must sometimes be left.
What shall the law prescribe, and what shall be left to the judge? A city
is unfortunate in which the tribunals are either secret and speechless,
or, what is worse, noisy and public, when the people, as if they were in a
theatre, clap and hoot the various speakers. Such courts a legislator
would rather not have; but if he is compelled to have them, he will speak
distinctly, and leave as little as possible to their discretion. But where
the courts are good, and presided over by well-trained judges, the
penalties to be inflicted may be in a great measure left to them; and as
there are to be good courts among our colonists, we need not determine
beforehand the exact proportion of the penalty and the crime. Returning,
then, to our legislator, let us indite a law about wounding, which shall
run as follows:--He who wounds with intent to kill, and fails in his
object, shall be tried as if he had succeeded. But since God has favoured
both him and his victim, instead of being put to death, he shall be
allowed to go into exile and take his property with him, the damage due to
the sufferer having been previously estimated by the court, which shall be
the same as would have tried the case if death had ensued. If a child
should intentionally wound a parent, or a servant his master, or brother
or sister wound brother or sister with malice prepense, the penalty shall
be death. If a husband or wife wound one another with intent to kill, the
penalty which is inflicted upon them shall be perpetual exile; and if they
have young children, the guardians shall take care of them and administer
their property as if they were orphans. If they have no children, their
kinsmen male and female shall meet, and after a consultation with the
priests and guardians of the law, shall appoint an heir of the house; for
the house and family belong to the state, being a 5040th portion of the
whole. And the state is bound to preserve her families happy and holy;
therefore, when the heir of a house has committed a capital offence, or is
in exile for life, the house is to be purified, and then the kinsmen of
the house and the guardians of the law are to find out a family which has
a good name and in which there are many sons, and introduce one of them to
be the heir and priest of the house. He shall assume the fathers and
ancestors of the family, while the first son dies in dishonour and his
name is blotted out.

Some actions are intermediate between the voluntary and involuntary. Those
done from anger are of this class. If a man wound another in anger, let
him pay double the damage, if the injury is curable; or fourfold, if
curable, and at the same time dishonourable; and fourfold, if incurable;
the amount is to be assessed by the judges. If the wounded person is
rendered incapable of military service, the injurer, besides the other
penalties, shall serve in his stead, or be liable to a suit for refusing
to serve. If brother wounds brother, then their parents and kindred, of
both sexes, shall meet and judge the crime. The damages shall be assessed
by the parents; and if the amount fixed by them is disputed, an appeal
shall be made to the male kindred; or in the last resort to the guardians
of the law. Parents who wound their children are to be tried by judges of
at least sixty years of age, who have children of their own; and they are
to determine whether death, or some lesser punishment, is to be inflicted
upon them--no relatives are to take part in the trial. If a slave in anger
smite a freeman, he is to be delivered up by his master to the injured
person. If the master suspect collusion between the slave and the injured
person, he may bring the matter to trial: and if he fail he shall pay
three times the injury; or if he obtain a conviction, the contriver of the
conspiracy shall be liable to an action for kidnapping. He who wounds
another unintentionally shall only pay for the actual harm done.

In all outrages and acts of violence, the elder is to be more regarded
than the younger. An injury done by a younger man to an elder is
abominable and hateful; but the younger man who is struck by an elder is
to bear with him patiently, considering that he who is twenty years older
is loco parentis, and remembering the reverence which is due to the Gods
who preside over birth. Let him keep his hands, too, from the stranger;
instead of taking upon himself to chastise him when he is insolent, he
shall bring him before the wardens of the city, who shall examine into the
case, and if they find him guilty, shall scourge him with as many blows as
he has given; or if he be innocent, they shall warn and threaten his
accuser. When an equal strikes an equal, whether an old man an old man, or
a young man a young man, let them use only their fists and have no
weapons. He who being above forty years of age commences a fight, or
retaliates, shall be counted mean and base.

To this preamble, let the law be added: If a man smite another who is his
elder by twenty years or more, let the bystander, in case he be older than
the combatants, part them; or if he be younger than the person struck, or
of the same age with him, let him defend him as he would a father or
brother; and let the striker be brought to trial, and if convicted
imprisoned for a year or more at the discretion of the judges. If a
stranger smite one who is his elder by twenty years or more, he shall be
imprisoned for two years, and a metic, in like case, shall suffer three
years' imprisonment. He who is standing by and gives no assistance, shall
be punished according to his class in one of four penalties--a mina,
fifty, thirty, twenty drachmas. The generals and other superior officers
of the army shall form the court which tries this class of offences.

Laws are made to instruct the good, and in the hope that there may be no
need of them; also to control the bad, whose hardness of heart will not be
hindered from crime. The uttermost penalty will fall upon those who lay
violent hands upon a parent, having no fear of the Gods above, or of the
punishments which will pursue them in the world below. They are too wise
in their own conceits to believe in such things: wherefore the tortures
which await them in another life must be anticipated in this. Let the law
be as follows:--

If a man, being in his right mind, dare to smite his father and mother, or
his grandfather and grandmother, let the passer-by come to the rescue; and
if he be a metic or stranger who comes to the rescue, he shall have the
first place at the games; or if he do not come to the rescue, he shall be
a perpetual exile. Let the citizen in the like case be praised or blamed,
and the slave receive freedom or a hundred stripes. The wardens of the
agora, the city, or the country, as the case may be, shall see to the
execution of the law. And he who is an inhabitant of the same place and is
present shall come to the rescue, or he shall fall under a curse.

If a man be convicted of assaulting his parents, let him be banished for
ever from the city into the country, and let him abstain from all sacred
rites; and if he do not abstain, let him be punished by the wardens of the
country; and if he return to the city, let him be put to death. If any
freeman consort with him, let him be purified before he returns to the
city. If a slave strike a freeman, whether citizen or stranger, let the
bystander be obliged to seize and deliver him into the hands of the
injured person, who may inflict upon him as many blows as he pleases, and
shall then return him to his master. The law will be as follows:--The
slave who strikes a freeman shall be bound by his master, and not set at
liberty without the consent of the person whom he has injured. All these
laws apply to women as well as to men.

BOOK X. The greatest wrongs arise out of youthful insolence, and the
greatest of all are committed against public temples; they are in the
second degree great when private rites and sepulchres are insulted; in the
third degree, when committed against parents; in the fourth degree, when
they are done against the authority or property of the rulers; in the
fifth degree, when the rights of individuals are violated. Most of these
offences have been already considered; but there remains the question of
admonition and punishment of offences against the Gods. Let the admonition
be in the following terms:--No man who ever intentionally did or said
anything impious, had a true belief in the existence of the Gods; but
either he thought that there were no Gods, or that they did not care about
men, or that they were easily appeased by sacrifices and prayers. 'What
shall we say or do to such persons?' My good sir, let us first hear the
jests which they in their superiority will make upon us. 'What will they
say?' Probably something of this kind:--'Strangers you are right in
thinking that some of us do not believe in the existence of the Gods;
while others assert that they do not care for us, and others that they are
propitiated by prayers and offerings. But we want you to argue with us
before you threaten; you should prove to us by reasonable evidence that
there are Gods, and that they are too good to be bribed. Poets, priests,
prophets, rhetoricians, even the best of them, speak to us of atoning for
evil, and not of avoiding it. From legislators who profess to be gentle we
ask for instruction, which may, at least, have the persuasive power of
truth, if no other.' What have you to say? 'Well, there is no difficulty
in proving the being of the Gods. The sun, and earth, and stars, moving in
their courses, the recurring seasons, furnish proofs of their existence;
and there is the general opinion of mankind.' I fear that the unbelievers
--not that I care for their opinion--will despise us. You are not aware
that their impiety proceeds, not from sensuality, but from ignorance
taking the garb of wisdom. 'What do you mean?' At Athens there are tales
current both in prose and verse of a kind which are not tolerated in a
well-regulated state like yours. The oldest of them relate the origin of
the world, and the birth and life of the Gods. These narratives have a bad
influence on family relations; but as they are old we will let them pass,
and consider another kind of tales, invented by the wisdom of a younger
generation, who, if any one argues for the existence of the Gods and
claims that the stars have a divine being, insist that these are mere
earth and stones, which can have no care of human things, and that all
theology is a cooking up of words. Now what course ought we to take? Shall
we suppose some impious man to charge us with assuming the existence of
the Gods, and make a defence? Or shall we leave the preamble and go on to
the laws? 'There is no hurry, and we have often said that the shorter and
worse method should not be preferred to the longer and better. The proof
that there are Gods who are good, and the friends of justice, is the best
preamble of all our laws.' Come, let us talk with the impious, who have
been brought up from their infancy in the belief of religion, and have
heard their own fathers and mothers praying for them and talking with the
Gods as if they were absolutely convinced of their existence; who have
seen mankind prostrate in prayer at the rising and setting of the sun and
moon and at every turn of fortune, and have dared to despise and
disbelieve all this. Can we keep our temper with them, when they compel us
to argue on such a theme? We must; or like them we shall go mad, though
with more reason. Let us select one of them and address him as follows:

O my son, you are young; time and experience will make you change many of
your opinions. Do not be hasty in forming a conclusion about the divine
nature; and let me mention to you a fact which I know. You and your
friends are not the first or the only persons who have had these notions
about the Gods. There are always a considerable number who are infected by
them: I have known many myself, and can assure you that no one who was an
unbeliever in his youth ever persisted till he was old in denying the
existence of the Gods. The two other opinions, first, that the Gods exist
and have no care of men, secondly, that they care for men, but may be
propitiated by sacrifices and prayers, may indeed last through life in a
few instances, but even this is not common. I would beg of you to be
patient, and learn the truth of the legislator and others; in the mean
time abstain from impiety. 'So far, our discourse has gone well.'

I will now speak of a strange doctrine, which is regarded by many as the
crown of philosophy. They affirm that all things come into being either by
art or nature or chance, and that the greater things are done by nature
and chance, and the lesser things by art, which receiving from nature the
greater creations, moulds and fashions all those lesser works which are
termed works of art. Their meaning is that fire, water, earth, and air all
exist by nature and chance, and not by art; and that out of these,
according to certain chance affinities of opposites, the sun, the moon,
the stars, and the earth have been framed, not by any action of mind, but
by nature and chance only. Thus, in their opinion, the heaven and earth
were created, as well as the animals and plants. Art came later, and is of
mortal birth; by her power were invented certain images and very partial
imitations of the truth, of which kind are the creations of musicians and
painters: but they say that there are other arts which combine with
nature, and have a deeper truth, such as medicine, husbandry, gymnastic.
Also the greater part of politics they imagine to co-operate with nature,
but in a less degree, having more of art, while legislation is declared by
them to be wholly a work of art. 'How do you mean?' In the first place,
they say that the Gods exist neither by nature nor by art, but by the laws
of states, which are different in different countries; and that virtue is
one thing by nature and another by convention; and that justice is
altogether conventional, made by law, and having authority for the moment
only. This is repeated to young men by sages and poets, and leads to
impiety, and the pretended life according to nature and in disobedience to
law; for nobody believes the Gods to be such as the law affirms. 'How
true! and oh! how injurious to states and to families!' But then, what
should the lawgiver do? Should he stand up in the state and threaten
mankind with the severest penalties if they persist in their unbelief,
while he makes no attempt to win them by persuasion? 'Nay, Stranger, the
legislator ought never to weary of trying to persuade the world that there
are Gods; and he should declare that law and art exist by nature.' Yes,
Cleinias; but these are difficult and tedious questions. 'And shall our
patience, which was not exhausted in the enquiry about music or drink,
fail now that we are discoursing about the Gods? There may be a difficulty
in framing laws, but when written down they remain, and time and diligence
will make them clear; if they are useful there would be neither reason nor
religion in rejecting them on account of their length.' Most true. And the
general spread of unbelief shows that the legislator should do something
in vindication of the laws, when they are being undermined by bad men. 'He
should.' You agree with me, Cleinias, that the heresy consists in
supposing earth, air, fire, and water to be the first of all things. These
the heretics call nature, conceiving them to be prior to the soul. 'I
agree.' You would further agree that natural philosophy is the source of
this impiety--the study appears to be pursued in a wrong way. 'In what way
do you mean?' The error consists in transposing first and second causes.
They do not see that the soul is before the body, and before all other
things, and the author and ruler of them all. And if the soul is prior to
the body, then the things of the soul are prior to the things of the body.
In other words, opinion, attention, mind, art, law, are prior to sensible
qualities; and the first and greater works of creation are the results of
art and mind, whereas the works of nature, as they are improperly termed,
are secondary and subsequent. 'Why do you say "improperly"?' Because when
they speak of nature they seem to mean the first creative power. But if
the soul is first, and not fire and air, then the soul above all things
may be said to exist by nature. And this can only be on the supposition
that the soul is prior to the body. Shall we try to prove that it is so?
'By all means.' I fear that the greenness of our argument will ludicrously
contrast with the ripeness of our ages. But as we must go into the water,
and the stream is strong, I will first attempt to cross by myself, and if
I arrive at the bank, you shall follow. Remembering that you are
unaccustomed to such discussions, I will ask and answer the questions
myself, while you listen in safety. But first I must pray the Gods to
assist at the demonstration of their own existence--if ever we are to call
upon them, now is the time. Let me hold fast to the rope, and enter into
the depths: Shall I put the question to myself in this form?--Are all
things at rest, and is nothing in motion? or are some things in motion,
and some things at rest? 'The latter.' And do they move and rest, some in
one place, some in more? 'Yes.' There may be (1) motion in the same place,
as in revolution on an axis, which is imparted swiftly to the larger and
slowly to the lesser circle; and there may be motion in different places,
having sometimes (2) one centre of motion and sometimes (3) more. (4) When
bodies in motion come against other bodies which are at rest, they are
divided by them, and (5) when they are caught between other bodies coming
from opposite directions they unite with them; and (6) they grow by union
and (7) waste by dissolution while their constitution remains the same,
but are (8) destroyed when their constitution fails. There is a growth
from one dimension to two, and from a second to a third, which then
becomes perceptible to sense; this process is called generation, and the
opposite, destruction. We have now enumerated all possible motions with
the exception of two. 'What are they?' Just the two with which our enquiry
is concerned; for our enquiry relates to the soul. There is one kind of
motion which is only able to move other things; there is another which can
move itself as well, working in composition and decomposition, by increase
and diminution, by generation and destruction. 'Granted.' (9) That which
moves and is moved by another is the ninth kind of motion; (10) that which
is self-moved and moves others is the tenth. And this tenth kind of motion
is the mightiest, and is really the first, and is followed by that which
was improperly called the ninth. 'How do you mean?' Must not that which is
moved by others finally depend upon that which is moved by itself? Nothing
can be affected by any transition prior to self-motion. Then the first and
eldest principle of motion, whether in things at rest or not at rest, will
be the principle of self-motion; and that which is moved by others and can
move others will be the second. 'True.' Let me ask another question:

What is the name which is given to self-motion when manifested in any
material substance? 'Life.' And soul too is life? 'Very good.' And are
there not three kinds of knowledge--a knowledge (1) of the essence, (2) of
the definition, (3) of the name? And sometimes the name leads us to ask
the definition, sometimes the definition to ask the name. For example,
number can be divided into equal parts, and when thus divided is termed
even, and the definition of even and the word 'even' refer to the same
thing. 'Very true.' And what is the definition of the thing which is named
'soul'? Must we not reply, 'The self-moved'? And have we not proved that
the self-moved is the source of motion in other things? 'Yes.' And the
motion which is not self-moved will be inferior to this? 'True.' And if
so, we shall be right in saying that the soul is prior and superior to the
body, and the body by nature subject and inferior to the soul? 'Quite
right.' And we agreed that if the soul was prior to the body, the things
of the soul were prior to the things of the body? 'Certainly.' And
therefore desires, and manners, and thoughts, and true opinions, and
recollections, are prior to the length and breadth and force of bodies.
'To be sure.' In the next place, we acknowledge that the soul is the cause
of good and evil, just and unjust, if we suppose her to be the cause of
all things? 'Certainly.' And the soul which orders all things must also
order the heavens? 'Of course.' One soul or more? More; for less than two
are inconceivable, one good, the other evil. 'Most true.' The soul directs
all things by her movements, which we call will, consideration, attention,
deliberation, opinion true and false, joy, sorrow, courage, fear, hatred,
love, and similar affections. These are the primary movements, and they
receive the secondary movements of bodies, and guide all things to
increase and diminution, separation and union, and to all the qualities
which accompany them--cold, hot, heavy, light, hard, soft, white, black,
sweet, bitter; these and other such qualities the soul, herself a goddess,
uses, when truly receiving the divine mind she leads all things rightly to
their happiness; but under the impulse of folly she works out an opposite
result. For the controller of heaven and earth and the circle of the world
is either the wise and good soul, or the foolish and vicious soul, working
in them. 'What do you mean?' If we say that the whole course and motion of
heaven and earth is in accordance with the workings and reasonings of
mind, clearly the best soul must have the care of the heaven, and guide it
along that better way. 'True.' But if the heavens move wildly and
disorderly, then they must be under the guidance of the evil soul. 'True
again.' What is the nature of the movement of the soul? We must not
suppose that we can see and know the soul with our bodily eyes, any more
than we can fix them on the midday sun; it will be safer to look at an
image only. 'How do you mean?' Let us find among the ten kinds of motion
an image of the motion of the mind. You remember, as we said, that all
things are divided into two classes; and some of them were moved and some
at rest. 'Yes.' And of those which were moved, some were moved in the same
place, others in more places than one. 'Just so.' The motion which was in
one place was circular, like the motion of a spherical body; and such a
motion in the same place, and in the same relations, is an excellent image
of the motion of mind. 'Very true.' The motion of the other sort, which
has no fixed place or manner or relation or order or proportion, is akin
to folly and nonsense. 'Very true.' After what has been said, it is clear
that, since the soul carries round all things, some soul which is either
very good or the opposite carries round the circumference of heaven. But
that soul can be no other than the best. Again, the soul carries round the
sun, moon, and stars, and if the sun has a soul, then either the soul of
the sun is within and moves the sun as the human soul moves the body; or,
secondly, the sun is contained in some external air or fire, which the
soul provides and through which she operates; or, thirdly, the course of
the sun is guided by the soul acting in a wonderful manner without a body.
'Yes, in one of those ways the soul must guide all things.' And this soul
of the sun, which is better than the sun, whether driving him in a chariot
or employing any other agency, is by every man called a God? 'Yes, by
every man who has any sense.' And of the seasons, stars, moon, and year,
in like manner, it may be affirmed that the soul or souls from which they
derive their excellence are divine; and without insisting on the manner of
their working, no one can deny that all things are full of Gods. 'No one.'
And now let us offer an alternative to him who denies that there are Gods.
Either he must show that the soul is not the origin of all things, or he
must live for the future in the belief that there are Gods.

Next, as to the man who believes in the Gods, but refuses to acknowledge
that they take care of human things--let him too have a word of
admonition. 'Best of men,' we will say to him, 'some affinity to the Gods
leads you to honour them and to believe in them. But you have heard the
happiness of wicked men sung by poets and admired by the world, and this
has drawn you away from your natural piety. Or you have seen the wicked
growing old in prosperity, and leaving great offices to their children; or
you have watched the tyrant succeeding in his career of crime; and
considering all these things you have been led to believe in an irrational
way that the Gods take no care of human affairs. That your error may not
increase, I will endeavour to purify your soul.' Do you, Megillus and
Cleinias, make answer for the youth, and when we come to a difficulty, I
will carry you over the water as I did before. 'Very good.' He will easily
be convinced that the Gods care for the small as well as the great; for he
heard what was said of their goodness and of their having all things under
their care. 'He certainly heard.' Then now let us enquire what is meant by
the virtue of the Gods. To possess mind belongs to virtue, and the
contrary to vice. 'That is what we say.' And is not courage a part of
virtue, and cowardice of vice? 'Certainly.' And to the Gods we ascribe
virtues; but idleness and indolence are not virtues. 'Of course not.' And
is God to be conceived of as a careless, indolent fellow, such as the poet
would compare to a stingless drone? 'Impossible.' Can we be right in
praising any one who cares for great matters and leaves the small to take
care of themselves? Whether God or man, he who does so, must either think
the neglect of such matters to be of no consequence, or he is indolent and
careless. For surely neither of them can be charged with neglect if they
fail to attend to something which is beyond their power? 'Certainly not.'

And now we will examine the two classes of offenders who admit that there
are Gods, but say,--the one that they may be appeased, the other that they
take no care of small matters: do they not acknowledge that the Gods are
omnipotent and omniscient, and also good and perfect? 'Certainly.' Then
they cannot be indolent, for indolence is the offspring of idleness, and
idleness of cowardice, and there is no cowardice in God. 'True.' If the
Gods neglect small matters, they must either know or not know that such
things are not to be regarded. But of course they know that they should be
regarded, and knowing, they cannot be supposed to neglect their duty,
overcome by the seductions of pleasure or pain. 'Impossible.' And do not
all human things share in soul, and is not man the most religious of
animals and the possession of the Gods? And the Gods, who are the best of
owners, will surely take care of their property, small or great. Consider
further, that the greater the power of perception, the less the power of
action. For it is harder to see and hear the small than the great, but
easier to control them. Suppose a physician who had to cure a patient--
would he ever succeed if he attended to the great and neglected the
little? 'Impossible.' Is not life made up of littles?--the pilot, general,
householder, statesman, all attend to small matters; and the builder will
tell you that large stones do not lie well without small ones. And God is
not inferior to mortal craftsmen, who in proportion to their skill are
careful in the details of their work; we must not imagine the best and
wisest to be a lazy good-for-nothing, who wearies of his work and hurries
over small and easy matters. 'Never, never!' He who charges the Gods with
neglect has been forced to admit his error; but I should like further to
persuade him that the author of all has made every part for the sake of
the whole, and that the smallest part has an appointed state of action or
passion, and that the least action or passion of any part has a presiding
minister. You, we say to him, are a minute fraction of this universe,
created with a view to the whole; the world is not made for you, but you
for the world; for the good artist considers the whole first, and
afterwards the parts. And you are annoyed at not seeing how you and the
universe are all working together for the best, so far as the laws of the
common creation admit. The soul undergoes many changes from her contact
with bodies; and all that the player does is to put the pieces into their
right places. 'What do you mean?' I mean that God acts in the way which is
simplest and easiest. Had each thing been formed without any regard to the
rest, the transposition of the Cosmos would have been endless; but now
there is not much trouble in the government of the world. For when the
king saw the actions of the living souls and bodies, and the virtue and
vice which were in them, and the indestructibility of the soul and body
(although they were not eternal), he contrived so to arrange them that
virtue might conquer and vice be overcome as far as possible; giving them
a seat and room adapted to them, but leaving the direction of their
separate actions to men's own wills, which make our characters to be what
they are. 'That is very probable.' All things which have a soul possess in
themselves the principle of change, and in changing move according to fate
and law; natures which have undergone lesser changes move on the surface;
but those which have changed utterly for the worse, sink into Hades and
the infernal world. And in all great changes for good and evil which are
produced either by the will of the soul or the influence of others, there
is a change of place. The good soul, which has intercourse with the divine
nature, passes into a holier and better place; and the evil soul, as she
grows worse, changes her place for the worse. This,--as we declare to the
youth who fancies that he is neglected of the Gods,--is the law of divine
justice--the worse to the worse, the better to the better, like to like,
in life and in death. And from this law no man will ever boast that he has
escaped. Even if you say--'I am small, and will creep into the earth,' or
'I am high, and will mount to heaven'--you are not so small or so high
that you shall not pay the fitting penalty, either here or in the world
below. This is also the explanation of the seeming prosperity of the
wicked, in whose actions as in a mirror you imagined that you saw the
neglect of the Gods, not considering that they make all things contribute
to the whole. And how then could you form any idea of true happiness?--If
Cleinias and Megillus and I have succeeded in persuading you that you know
not what you say about the Gods, God will help you; but if there is still
any deficiency of proof, hear our answer to the third opponent.

Enough has been said to prove that the Gods exist and care for us; that
they can be propitiated, or that they receive gifts, is not to be allowed
or admitted for an instant. 'Let us proceed with the argument.' Tell me,
by the Gods, I say, how the Gods are to be propitiated by us? Are they not
rulers, who may be compared to charioteers, pilots, perhaps generals, or
physicians providing against the assaults of disease, husbandmen observing
the perils of the seasons, shepherds watching their flocks? To whom shall
we compare them? We acknowledged that the world is full both of good and
evil, but having more of evil than of good. There is an immortal conflict
going on, in which Gods and demigods are our allies, and we their
property; for injustice and folly and wickedness make war in our souls
upon justice and temperance and wisdom. There is little virtue to be found
on earth; and evil natures fawn upon the Gods, like wild beasts upon their
keepers, and believe that they can win them over by flattery and prayers.
And this sin, which is termed dishonesty, is to the soul what disease is
to the body, what pestilence is to the seasons, what injustice is to
states. 'Quite so.' And they who maintain that the Gods can be appeased
must say that they forgive the sins of men, if they are allowed to share
in their spoils; as you might suppose wolves to mollify the dogs by
throwing them a portion of the prey. 'That is the argument.' But let us
apply our images to the Gods--are they the pilots who are won by gifts to
wreck their own ships--or the charioteers who are bribed to lose the race
--or the generals, or doctors, or husbandmen, who are perverted from their
duty--or the dogs who are silenced by wolves? 'God forbid.' Are they not
rather our best guardians; and shall we suppose them to fall short even of
a moderate degree of human or even canine virtue, which will not betray
justice for reward? 'Impossible.' He, then, who maintains such a doctrine,
is the most blasphemous of mankind.

And now our three points are proven; and we are agreed (1) that there are
Gods, (2) that they care for men, (3) that they cannot be bribed to do
injustice. I have spoken warmly, from a fear lest this impiety of theirs
should lead to a perversion of life. And our warmth will not have been in
vain, if we have succeeded in persuading these men to abominate
themselves, and to change their ways. 'So let us hope.' Then now that the
preamble is completed, we will make a proclamation commanding the impious
to renounce their evil ways; and in case they refuse, the law shall be
added:--If a man is guilty of impiety in word or deed, let the bystander
inform the magistrates, and let the magistrates bring the offender before
the court; and if any of the magistrates refuses to act, he likewise shall
be tried for impiety. Any one who is found guilty of such an offence shall
be fined at the discretion of the court, and shall also be punished by a
term of imprisonment. There shall be three prisons--one for common
offences against life and property; another, near by the spot where the
Nocturnal Council will assemble, which is to be called the 'House of
Reformation'; the third, to be situated in some desolate region in the
centre of the country, shall be called by a name indicating retribution.
There are three causes of impiety, and from each of them spring impieties
of two kinds, six in all. First, there is the impiety of those who deny
the existence of the Gods; these may be honest men, haters of evil, who
are only dangerous because they talk loosely about the Gods and make
others like themselves; but there is also a more vicious class, who are
full of craft and licentiousness. To this latter belong diviners,
jugglers, despots, demagogues, generals, hierophants of private mysteries,
and sophists. The first class shall be only imprisoned and admonished. The
second class should be put to death, if they could be, many times over.
The two other sorts of impiety, first of those who deny the care of the
Gods, and secondly, of those who affirm that they may be propitiated, have
similar subdivisions, varying in degree of guilt. Those who have learnt to
blaspheme from mere ignorance shall be imprisoned in the House of
Reformation for five years at least, and not allowed to see any one but
members of the Nocturnal Council, who shall converse with them touching
their souls health. If any of the prisoners come to their right mind, at
the end of five years let them be restored to sane company; but he who
again offends shall die. As to that class of monstrous natures who not
only believe that the Gods are negligent, or may be propitiated, but
pretend to practise on the souls of quick and dead, and promise to charm
the Gods, and to effect the ruin of houses and states--he, I say, who is
guilty of these things, shall be bound in the central prison, and shall
have no intercourse with any freeman, receiving only his daily rations of
food from the public slaves; and when he dies, let him be cast beyond the
border; and if any freeman assist to bury him, he shall be liable to a
suit for impiety. But the sins of the father shall not be visited upon his
children, who, like other orphans, shall be educated by the state.
Further, let there be a general law which will have a tendency to repress
impiety. No man shall have religious services in his house, but he shall
go with his friends to pray and sacrifice in the temples. The reason of
this is, that religious institutions can only be framed by a great
intelligence. But women and weak men are always consecrating the event of
the moment; they are under the influence of dreams and apparitions, and
they build altars and temples in every village and in any place where they
have had a vision. The law is designed to prevent this, and also to deter
men from attempting to propitiate the Gods by secret sacrifices, which
only multiply their sins. Therefore let the law run:--No one shall have
private religious rites; and if a man or woman who has not been previously
noted for any impiety offend in this way, let them be admonished to remove
their rites to a public temple; but if the offender be one of the
obstinate sort, he shall be brought to trial before the guardians, and if
he be found guilty, let him die.

BOOK XI. As to dealings between man and man, the principle of them is
simple--Thou shalt not take what is not thine; and shalt do to others as
thou wouldst that they should do to thee. First, of treasure trove:--May I
never desire to find, or lift, if I find, or be induced by the counsel of
diviners to lift, a treasure which one who was not my ancestor has laid
down; for I shall not gain so much in money as I shall lose in virtue. The
saying, 'Move not the immovable,' may be repeated in a new sense; and
there is a common belief which asserts that such deeds prevent a man from
having a family. To him who is careless of such consequences, and,
despising the word of the wise, takes up a treasure which is not his--what
will be done by the hand of the Gods, God only knows,--but I would have
the first person who sees the offender, inform the wardens of the city or
the country; and they shall send to Delphi for a decision, and whatever
the oracle orders, they shall carry out. If the informer be a freeman, he
shall be honoured, and if a slave, set free; but he who does not inform,
if he be a freeman, shall be dishonoured, and if a slave, shall be put to
death. If a man leave anywhere anything great or small, intentionally or
unintentionally, let him who may find the property deem the deposit sacred
to the Goddess of ways. And he who appropriates the same, if he be a
slave, shall be beaten with many stripes; if a freeman, he shall pay
tenfold, and be held to have done a dishonourable action. If a person says
that another has something of his, and the other allows that he has the
property in dispute, but maintains it to be his own, let the ownership be
proved out of the registers of property. If the property is registered as
belonging to some one who is absent, possession shall be given to him who
offers sufficient security on behalf of the absentee; or if the property
is not registered, let it remain with the three eldest magistrates, and if
it should be an animal, the defeated party must pay the cost of its keep.
A man may arrest his own slave, and he may also imprison for safe-keeping
the runaway slave of a friend. Any one interfering with him must produce
three sureties; otherwise, he will be liable to an action for violence,
and if he be cast, must pay a double amount of damages to him from whom he
has taken the slave. A freedman who does not pay due respect to his
patron, may also be seized. Due respect consists in going three times a
month to the house of his patron, and offering to perform any lawful
service for him; he must also marry as his master pleases; and if his
property be greater than his master's, he must hand over to him the
excess. A freedman may not remain in the state, except with the consent of
the magistrates and of his master, for more than twenty years; and
whenever his census exceeds that of the third class, he must in any case
leave the country within thirty days, taking his property with him. If he
break this regulation, the penalty shall be death, and his property shall
be confiscated. Suits about these matters are to be decided in the courts
of the tribes, unless the parties have settled the matter before a court
of neighbours or before arbiters. If anybody claim a beast, or anything
else, let the possessor refer to the seller or giver of the property
within thirty days, if the latter reside in the city, or, if the goods
have been received from a stranger, within five months, of which the
middle month shall include the summer solstice. All purchases and
exchanges are to be made in the agora, and paid for on the spot; the law
will not allow credit to be given. No law shall protect the money
subscribed for clubs. He who sells anything of greater value than fifty
drachmas shall abide in the city for ten days, and let his whereabouts be
known to the buyer, in case of any reclamation. When a slave is sold who
is subject to epilepsy, stone, or any other invisible disorder, the buyer,
if he be a physician or trainer, or if he be warned, shall have no
redress; but in other cases within six months, or within twelve months in
epileptic disorders, he may bring the matter before a jury of physicians
to be agreed upon by both parties; and the seller who loses the suit, if
he be an expert, shall pay twice the price; or if he be a private person,
the bargain shall be rescinded, and he shall simply refund. If a person
knowingly sells a homicide to another, who is informed of his character,
there is no redress. But if the judges--who are to be the five youngest
guardians of the law--decide that the purchaser was not aware, then the
seller is to pay threefold, and to purify the house of the buyer.

He who exchanges money for money, or beast for beast, must warrant either
of them to be sound and good. As in the case of other laws, let us have a
preamble, relating to all this class of crime. Adulteration is a kind of
falsehood about which the many commonly say that at proper times the
practice may often be right, but they do not define at what times. But the
legislator will tell them, that no man should invoke the Gods when he is
practising deceit or fraud, in word or deed. For he is the enemy of
heaven, first, who swears falsely, not thinking of the Gods by whom he
swears, and secondly, he who lies to his superiors. (Now the superiors are
the betters of inferiors,--the elder of the younger, parents of children,
men of women, and rulers of subjects.) The trader who cheats in the agora
is a liar and is perjured--he respects neither the name of God nor the
regulations of the magistrates. If after hearing this he will still be
dishonest, let him listen to the law:--The seller shall not have two
prices on the same day, neither must he puff his goods, nor offer to swear
about them. If he break the law, any citizen not less than thirty years of
age may smite him. If he sell adulterated goods, the slave or metic who
informs against him shall have the goods; the citizen who brings such a
charge, if he prove it, shall offer up the goods in question to the Gods
of the agora; or if he fail to prove it, shall be dishonoured. He who is
detected in selling adulterated goods shall be deprived of them, and shall
receive a stripe for every drachma of their value. The wardens of the
agora and the guardians of the law shall take experienced persons into
counsel, and draw up regulations for the agora. These shall be inscribed
on a column in front of the court of the wardens of the agora.--As to the
wardens of the city, enough has been said already. But if any omissions in
the law are afterwards discovered, the wardens and the guardians shall
supply them, and have them inscribed after the original regulations on a
column before the court of the wardens of the city.

Next in order follows the subject of retail trades, which in their natural
use are the reverse of mischievous; for every man is a benefactor who
reduces what is unequal to symmetry and proportion. Money is the
instrument by which this is accomplished, and the shop-keeper, the
merchant, and hotel-keeper do but supply the wants and equalize the
possessions of mankind. Why, then, does any dishonour attach to a
beneficent occupation? Let us consider the nature of the accusation first,
and then see whether it can be removed. 'What is your drift?' Dear
Cleinias, there are few men who are so gifted by nature, and improved by
education, as to be able to control the desire of making money; or who are
sober in their wishes and prefer moderation to accumulation. The great
majority think that they can never have enough, and the consequence is
that retail trade has become a reproach. Whereas, however ludicrous the
idea may seem, if noble men and noble women could be induced to open a
shop, and to trade upon incorruptible principles, then the aspect of
things would change, and retail traders would be regarded as nursing
fathers and mothers. In our own day the trader goes and settles in distant
places, and receives the weary traveller hospitably at first, but in the
end treats him as an enemy and a captive, whom he only liberates for an
enormous ransom. This is what has brought retail trade into disrepute, and
against this the legislator ought to provide. Men have said of old, that
to fight against two opponents is hard; and the two opponents of whom I am
thinking are wealth and poverty--the one corrupting men by luxury; the
other, through misery, depriving them of the sense of shame. What remedies
can a city find for this disease? First, to have as few retail traders as
possible; secondly, to give retail trade over to a class whose corruption
will not injure the state; and thirdly, to restrain the insolence and
meanness of the retailers.

Let us make the following laws:--(1) In the city of the Magnetes none of
the 5040 citizens shall be a retailer or merchant, or do any service to
any private persons who do not equally serve him, except to his father and
mother and their fathers and mothers, and generally to his elders who are
freemen, and whom he serves as a freeman. He who follows an illiberal
pursuit may be cited for dishonouring his family, and kept in bonds for a
year; and if he offend again, he shall be bound for two years; and for
every offence his punishment shall be doubled: (2) Every retailer shall be
a metic or a foreigner: (3) The guardians of the law shall have a special
care of this part of the community, whose calling exposes them to peculiar
temptations. They shall consult with persons of experience, and find out
what prices will yield the traders a moderate profit, and fix them.

When a man does not fulfil his contract, he being under no legal or other
impediment, the case shall be brought before the court of the tribes, if
not previously settled by arbitration. The class of artisans is
consecrated to Hephaestus and Athene; the makers of weapons to Ares and
Athene: all of whom, remembering that the Gods are their ancestors, should
be ashamed to deceive in the practice of their craft. If any man is lazy
in the fulfilment of his work, and fancies, foolish fellow, that his
patron God will not deal hardly with him, he will be punished by the God;
and let the law follow:--He who fails in his undertaking shall pay the
value, and do the work gratis in a specified time. The contractor, like
the seller, is enjoined by law to charge the simple value of his work; in
a free city, art should be a true thing, and the artist must not practise
on the ignorance of others. On the other hand, he who has ordered any work
and does not pay the workman according to agreement, dishonours Zeus and
Athene, and breaks the bonds of society. And if he does not pay at the
time agreed, let him pay double; and although interest is forbidden in
other cases, let the workman receive after the expiration of a year
interest at the rate of an obol a month for every drachma (equal to 200
per cent. per ann.). And we may observe by the way, in speaking of
craftsmen, that if our military craft do their work well, the state will
praise those who honour them, and blame those who do not honour them. Not
that the first place of honour is to be assigned to the warrior; a higher
still is reserved for those who obey the laws.

Most of the dealings between man and man are now settled, with the
exception of such as relate to orphans and guardianships. These lead us to
speak of the intentions of the dying, about which we must make
regulations. I say 'must'; for mankind cannot be allowed to dispose of
their property as they please, in ways at variance with one another and
with law and custom. But a dying person is a strange being, and is not
easily managed; he wants to be master of all he has, and is apt to use
angry words. He will say,--'May I not do what I will with my own, and give
much to my friends, and little to my enemies?' 'There is reason in that.'
O Cleinias, in my judgment the older lawgivers were too soft-hearted, and
wanting in insight into human affairs. They were too ready to listen to
the outcry of a dying man, and hence they were induced to give him an
absolute power of bequest. But I would say to him:--O creature of a day,
you know neither what is yours nor yourself: for you and your property are
not your own, but belong to your whole family, past and to come, and
property and family alike belong to the State. And therefore I must take
out of your hands the charge of what you leave behind you, with a view to
the interests of all. And I hope that you will not quarrel with us, now
that you are going the way of all mankind; we will do our best for you and
yours when you are no longer here. Let this be our address to the living
and dying, and let the law be as follows:--The father who has sons shall
appoint one of them to be the heir of the lot; and if he has given any
other son to be adopted by another, the adoption shall also be recorded;
and if he has still a son who has no lot, and has a chance of going to a
colony, he may give him what he has more than the lot; or if he has more
than one son unprovided for, he may divide the money between them. A son
who has a house of his own, and a daughter who is betrothed, are not to
share in the bequest of money; and the son or daughter who, having
inherited one lot, acquires another, is to bequeath the new inheritance to
the next of kin. If a man have only daughters, he may adopt the husband of
any one of them; or if he have lost a son, let him make mention of the
circumstance in his will and adopt another. If he have no children, he may
give away a tenth of his acquired property to whomsoever he likes; but he
must adopt an heir to inherit the lot, and may leave the remainder to him.
Also he may appoint guardians for his children; or if he die without
appointing them or without making a will, the nearest kinsmen,--two on the
father's and two on the mother's side,--and one friend of the departed,
shall be appointed guardians. The fifteen eldest guardians of the law are
to have special charge of all orphans, the whole number of fifteen being
divided into bodies of three, who will succeed one another according to
seniority every year for five years. If a man dying intestate leave
daughters, he must pardon the law which marries them for looking, first to
kinship, and secondly to the preservation of the lot. The legislator
cannot regard the character of the heir, which to the father is the first
consideration. The law will therefore run as follows:--If the intestate
leave daughters, husbands are to be found for them among their kindred
according to the following table of affinity: first, their father's
brothers; secondly, the sons of their father's brothers; thirdly, of their
father's sisters; fourthly, their great-uncles; fifthly, the sons of a
great-uncle; sixthly, the sons of a great-aunt. The kindred in such cases
shall always be reckoned in this way; the relationship shall proceed
upwards through brothers and sisters and brothers' and sisters' children,
and first the male line must be taken and then the female. If there is a
dispute in regard to fitness of age for marriage, this the judge shall
decide, after having made an inspection of the youth naked, and of the
maiden naked down to the waist. If the maiden has no relations within the
degree of third cousin, she may choose whom she likes, with the consent of
her guardians; or she may even select some one who has gone to a colony,
and he, if he be a kinsman, will take the lot by law; if not, he must have
her guardians' consent, as well as hers. When a man dies without children
and without a will, let a young man and a young woman go forth from the
family and take up their abode in the desolate house. The woman shall be
selected from the kindred in the following order of succession:--first, a
sister of the deceased; second, a brother's daughter; third, a sister's
daughter; fourth, a father's sister; fifth, a daughter of a father's
brother; sixth, a daughter of a father's sister. For the man the same
order shall be observed as in the preceding case. The legislator foresees
that laws of this kind will sometimes press heavily, and that his
intention cannot always be fulfilled; as for example, when there are
mental and bodily defects in the persons who are enjoined to marry. But he
must be excused for not being always able to reconcile the general
principles of public interest with the particular circumstances of
individuals; and he is willing to allow, in like manner, that the
individual cannot always do what the lawgiver wishes. And then arbiters
must be chosen, who will determine equitably the cases which may arise
under the law: e.g. a rich cousin may sometimes desire a grander match, or
the requirements of the law can only be fulfilled by marrying a madwoman.
To meet such cases let the following law be enacted:--If any one comes
forward and says that the lawgiver, had he been alive, would not have
required the carrying out of the law in a particular case, let him go to
the fifteen eldest guardians of the law who have the care of orphans; but
if he thinks that too much power is thus given to them, he may bring the
case before the court of select judges.

Thus will orphans have a second birth. In order to make their sad
condition as light as possible, the guardians of the law shall be their
parents, and shall be admonished to take care of them. And what admonition
can be more appropriate than the assurance which we formerly gave, that
the souls of the dead watch over mortal affairs? About this there are many
ancient traditions, which may be taken on trust from the legislator. Let
men fear, in the first place, the Gods above; secondly, the souls of the
departed, who naturally care for their own descendants; thirdly, the aged
living, who are quick to hear of any neglect of family duties, especially
in the case of orphans. For they are the holiest and most sacred of all
deposits, and the peculiar care of guardians and magistrates; and those
who try to bring them up well will contribute to their own good and to
that of their families. He who listens to the preamble of the law will
never know the severity of the legislator; but he who disobeys, and
injures the orphan, will pay twice the penalty he would have paid if the
parents had been alive. More laws might have been made about orphans, did
we not suppose that the guardians have children and property of their own
which are protected by the laws; and the duty of the guardian in our state
is the same as that of a father, though his honour or disgrace is greater.
A legal admonition and threat may, however, be of service: the guardian of
the orphan and the guardian of the law who is over him, shall love the
orphan as their own children, and take more care of his or her property
than of their own. If the guardian of the child neglect his duty, the
guardian of the law shall fine him; and the guardian may also have the
magistrate tried for neglect in the court of select judges, and he shall
pay, if convicted, a double penalty. Further, the guardian of the orphan
who is careless or dishonest may be fined on the information of any of the
citizens in a fourfold penalty, half to go to the orphan and half to the
prosecutor of the suit. When the orphan is of age, if he thinks that he
has been ill-used, his guardian may be brought to trial by him within five
years, and the penalty shall be fixed by the court. Or if the magistrate
has neglected the orphan, he shall pay damages to him; but if he have
defrauded him, he shall make compensation and also be deposed from his
office of guardian of the law.

If irremediable differences arise between fathers and sons, the father may
want to renounce his son, or the son may indict his father for imbecility:
such violent separations only take place when the family are 'a bad lot';
if only one of the two parties is bad, the differences do not grow to so
great a height. But here arises a difficulty. Although in any other state
a son who is disinherited does not cease to be a citizen, in ours he does;
for the number of citizens cannot exceed 5040. And therefore he who is to
suffer such a penalty ought to be abjured, not only by his father, but by
the whole family. The law, then, should run as follows:--If any man's evil
fortune or temper incline him to disinherit his son, let him not do so
lightly or on the instant; but let him have a council of his own relations
and of the maternal relations of his son, and set forth to them the
propriety of disinheriting him, and allow his son to answer. And if more
than half of the kindred male and female, being of full age, condemn the
son, let him be disinherited. If any other citizen desires to adopt him,
he may, for young men's characters often change in the course of life. But
if, after ten years, he remains unadopted, let him be sent to a colony. If
disease, or old age, or evil disposition cause a man to go out of his
mind, and he is ruining his house and property, and his son doubts about
indicting him for insanity, let him lay the case before the eldest
guardians of the law, and consult with them. And if they advise him to
proceed, and the father is decided to be imbecile, he shall have no more
control over his property, but shall live henceforward like a child in the
house.

If a man and his wife are of incompatible tempers, ten guardians of the
law and ten of the matrons who regulate marriage shall take their case in
hand, and reconcile them, if possible. If, however, their swelling souls
cannot be pacified, the wife may try and find a new husband, and the
husband a new wife; probably they are not very gentle creatures, and
should therefore be joined to milder natures. The younger of those who are
separated should also select their partners with a view to the procreation
of children; while the older should seek a companion for their declining
years. If a woman dies, leaving children male or female, the law will
advise, but not compel, the widower to abstain from a second marriage; if
she leave no children, he shall be compelled to marry. Also a widow, if
she is not old enough to live honestly without marriage, shall marry
again; and in case she have no children, she should marry for the sake of
them. There is sometimes an uncertainty which parent the offspring is to
follow: in unions of a female slave with a male slave, or with a freedman
or free man, or of a free woman with a male slave, the offspring is to
belong to the master; but if the master or mistress be themselves the
parent of the child, the slave and the child are to be sent away to
another land.

Concerning duty to parents, let the preamble be as follows:--We honour the
Gods in their lifeless images, and believe that we thus propitiate them.
But he who has an aged father or mother has a living image, which if he
cherish it will do him far more good than any statue. 'What do you mean by
cherishing them?' I will tell you. Oedipus and Amyntor and Theseus cursed
their children, and their curses took effect. This proves that the Gods
hear the curses of parents who are wronged; and shall we doubt that they
hear and fulfil their blessings too?' 'Surely not.' And, as we were
saying, no image is more honoured by the Gods than an aged father and
mother, to whom when honour is done, the God who hears their prayers is
rejoiced, and their influence is greater than that of the lifeless statue;
for they pray that good or evil may come to us in proportion as they are
honoured or dishonoured, but the statue is silent. 'Excellent.' Good men
are glad when their parents live to extreme old age, or if they depart
early, lament their loss; but to bad man their parents are always
terrible. Wherefore let every one honour his parents, and if this preamble
fails of influencing him, let him hear the law:--If any one does not take
sufficient care of his parents, let the aggrieved person inform the three
eldest guardians of the law and three of the women who are concerned with
marriages. Women up to forty years of age, and men up to thirty, who thus
offend, shall be beaten and imprisoned. After that age they are to be
brought before a court composed of the eldest citizens, who may inflict
any punishment upon them which they please. If the injured party cannot
inform, let any freeman who hears of the case inform; a slave who does so
shall be set free,--if he be the slave of the one of the parties, by the
magistrate,--if owned by another, at the cost of the state; and let the
magistrates, take care that he is not wronged by any one out of revenge.

The injuries which one person does to another by the use of poisons are of
two kinds;--one affects the body by the employment of drugs and potions;
the other works on the mind by the practice of sorcery and magic. Fatal
cases of either sort have been already mentioned; and now we must have a
law respecting cases which are not fatal. There is no use in arguing with
a man whose mind is disturbed by waxen images placed at his own door, or
on the sepulchre of his father or mother, or at a spot where three ways
meet. But to the wizards themselves we must address a solemn preamble,
begging them not to treat the world as if they were children, or compel
the legislator to expose them, and to show men that the poisoner who is
not a physician and the wizard who is not a prophet or diviner are equally
ignorant of what they are doing. Let the law be as follows:--He who by the
use of poison does any injury not fatal to a man or his servants, or any
injury whether fatal or not to another's cattle or bees, is to be punished
with death if he be a physician, and if he be not a physician he is to
suffer the punishment awarded by the court: and he who injures another by
sorcery, if he be a diviner or prophet, shall be put to death; and, if he
be not a diviner, the court shall determine what he ought to pay or
suffer.

Any one who injures another by theft or violence shall pay damages at
least equal to the injury; and besides the compensation, a suitable
punishment shall be inflicted. The foolish youth who is the victim of
others is to have a lighter punishment; he whose folly is occasioned by
his own jealousy or desire or anger is to suffer more heavily. Punishment
is to be inflicted, not for the sake of vengeance, for what is done cannot
be undone, but for the sake of prevention and reformation. And there
should be a proportion between the punishment and the crime, in which the
judge, having a discretion left him, must, by estimating the crime, second
the legislator, who, like a painter, furnishes outlines for him to fill
up.

A madman is not to go about at large in the city, but is to be taken care
of by his relatives. Neglect on their part is to be punished in the first
class by a fine of a hundred drachmas, and proportionally in the others.
Now madness is of various kinds; in addition to that which arises from
disease there is the madness which originates in a passionate temperament,
and makes men when engaged in a quarrel use foul and abusive language
against each other. This is intolerable in a well-ordered state; and
therefore our law shall be as follows:--No one is to speak evil of
another, but when men differ in opinion they are to instruct one another
without speaking evil. Nor should any one seek to rouse the passions which
education has calmed; for he who feeds and nurses his wrath is apt to make
ribald jests at his opponent, with a loss of character or dignity to
himself. And for this reason no one may use any abusive word in a temple,
or at sacrifices, or games, or in any public assembly, and he who offends
shall be censured by the proper magistrate; and the magistrate, if he fail
to censure him, shall not claim the prize of virtue. In any other place
the angry man who indulges in revilings, whether he be the beginner or
not, may be chastised by an elder. The reviler is always trying to make
his opponent ridiculous; and the use of ridicule in anger we cannot allow.
We forbid the comic poet to ridicule our citizens, under a penalty of
expulsion from the country or a fine of three minae. Jest in which there
is no offence may be allowed; but the question of offence shall be
determined by the director of education, who is to be the licenser of
theatrical performances.

The righteous man who is in adversity will not be allowed to starve in a
well-ordered city; he will never be a beggar. Nor is a man to be pitied,
merely because he is hungry, unless he be temperate. Therefore let the law
be as follows:--Let there be no beggars in our state; and he who begs
shall be expelled by the magistrates both from town and country.

If a slave, male or female, does any harm to the property of another, who
is not himself a party to the harm, the master shall compensate the injury
or give up the offending slave. But if the master argue that the charge
has arisen by collusion, with the view of obtaining the slave, he may put
the plaintiff on his trial for malpractices, and recover from him twice
the value of the slave; or if he is cast he must make good the damage and
deliver up the slave. The injury done by a horse or other animal shall be
compensated in like manner.

A witness who will not come of himself may be summoned, and if he fail in
appearing, he shall be liable for any harm which may ensue: if he swears
that he does not know, he may leave the court. A judge who is called upon
as a witness must not vote. A free woman, if she is over forty, may bear
witness and plead, and, if she have no husband, she may also bring an
action. A slave, male or female, and a child may witness and plead only in
case of murder, but they must give sureties that they will appear at the
trial, if they should be charged with false witness. Such charges must be
made pending the trial, and the accusations shall be sealed by both
parties and kept by the magistrates until the trial for perjury comes off.
If a man is twice convicted of perjury, he is not to be required, if three
times, he is not to be allowed to bear witness, or, if he persists in
bearing witness, is to be punished with death. When more than half the
evidence is proved to be false there must be a new trial.

The best and noblest things in human life are liable to be defiled and
perverted. Is not justice the civilizer of mankind? And yet upon the noble
profession of the advocate has come an evil name. For he is said to make
the worse appear the better cause, and only requires money in return for
his services. Such an art will be forbidden by the legislator, and if
existing among us will be requested to depart to another city. To the
disobedient let the voice of the law be heard saying:--He who tries to
pervert justice in the minds of the judges, or to increase litigation,
shall be brought before the supreme court. If he does so from
contentiousness, let him be silenced for a time, and, if he offend again,
put to death. If he have acted from a love of gain, let him be sent out of
the country if he be a foreigner, or if he be a citizen let him be put to
death.

BOOK XII. If a false message be taken to or brought from other states,
whether friendly or hostile, by ambassadors or heralds, they shall be
indicted for having dishonoured their sacred office, and, if convicted,
shall suffer a penalty.--Stealing is mean; robbery is shameless. Let no
man deceive himself by the supposed example of the Gods, for no God or son
of a God ever really practised either force or fraud. On this point the
legislator is better informed than all the poets put together. He who
listens to him shall be for ever happy, but he who will not listen shall
have the following law directed against him:--He who steals much, or he
who steals little of the public property is deserving of the same penalty;
for they are both impelled by the same evil motive. When the law punishes
one man more lightly than another, this is done under the idea, not that
he is less guilty, but that he is more curable. Now a thief who is a
foreigner or slave may be curable; but the thief who is a citizen, and has
had the advantages of education, should be put to death, for he is
incurable.

Much consideration and many regulations are necessary about military
expeditions; the great principal of all is that no one, male or female, in
war or peace, in great matters or small, shall be without a commander.
Whether men stand or walk, or drill, or pursue, or retreat, or wash, or
eat, they should all act together and in obedience to orders. We should
practise from our youth upwards the habits of command and obedience. All
dances, relaxations, endurances of meats and drinks, of cold and heat, and
of hard couches, should have a view to war, and care should be taken not
to destroy the natural covering and use of the head and feet by wearing
shoes and caps; for the head is the lord of the body, and the feet are the
best of servants. The soldier should have thoughts like these; and let him
hear the law:--He who is enrolled shall serve, and if he absent himself
without leave he shall be indicted for failure of service before his own
branch of the army when the expedition returns, and if he be found guilty
he shall suffer the penalty which the courts award, and never be allowed
to contend for any prize of valour, or to accuse another of misbehaviour
in military matters. Desertion shall also be tried and punished in the
same manner. After the courts for trying failure of service and desertion
have been held, the generals shall hold another court, in which the
several arms of the service will award prizes for the expedition which has
just concluded. The prize is to be a crown of olive, which the victor
shall offer up at the temple of his favourite war God...In any suit which
a man brings, let the indictment be scrupulously true, for justice is an
honourable maiden, to whom falsehood is naturally hateful. For example,
when men are prosecuted for having lost their arms, great care should be
taken by the witnesses to distinguish between cases in which they have
been lost from necessity and from cowardice. If the hero Patroclus had not
been killed but had been brought back alive from the field, he might have
been reproached with having lost the divine armour. And a man may lose his
arms in a storm at sea, or from a fall, and under many other
circumstances. There is a distinction of language to be observed in the
use of the two terms, 'thrower away of a shield' (ripsaspis), and 'loser
of arms' (apoboleus oplon), one being the voluntary, the other the
involuntary relinquishment of them. Let the law then be as follows:--If
any one is overtaken by the enemy, having arms in his hands, and he leaves
them behind him voluntarily, choosing base life instead of honourable
death, let justice be done. The old legend of Caeneus, who was changed by
Poseidon from a woman into a man, may teach by contraries the appropriate
punishment. Let the thrower away of his shield be changed from a man into
a woman--that is to say, let him be all his life out of danger, and never
again be admitted by any commander into the ranks of his army; and let him
pay a heavy fine according to his class. And any commander who permits him
to serve shall also be punished by a fine.

All magistrates, whatever be their tenure of office, must give an account
of their magistracy. But where shall we find the magistrate who is worthy
to supervise them or look into their short-comings and crooked ways? The
examiner must be more than man who is sufficient for these things. For the
truth is that there are many causes of the dissolution of states; which,
like ships or animals, have their cords, and girders, and sinews easily
relaxed, and nothing tends more to their welfare and preservation than the
supervision of them by examiners who are better than the magistrates;
failing in this they fall to pieces, and each becomes many instead of one.
Wherefore let the people meet after the summer solstice, in the precincts
of Apollo and the Sun, and appoint three men of not less than fifty years
of age. They shall proceed as follows:--Each citizen shall select some
one, not himself, whom he thinks the best. The persons selected shall be
reduced to one half, who have the greatest number of votes, if they are an
even number; but if an odd number, he who has the smallest number of votes
shall be previously withdrawn. The voting shall continue in the same
manner until three only remain; and if the number of votes cast for them
be equal, a distinction between the first, second, and third shall be made
by lot. The three shall be crowned with an olive wreath, and proclamation
made, that the city of the Magnetes, once more preserved by the Gods,
presents her three best men to Apollo and the Sun, to whom she dedicates
them as long as their lives answer to the judgment formed of them. They
shall choose in the first year of their office twelve examiners, to
continue until they are seventy-five years of age; afterwards three shall
be added annually. While they hold office, they shall dwell within the
precinct of the God. They are to divide all the magistracies into twelve
classes, and may apply any methods of enquiry, and inflict any punishments
which they please; in some cases singly, in other cases together,
announcing the acquittal or punishment of the magistrate on a tablet which
they will place in the agora. A magistrate who has been condemned by the
examiners may appeal to the select judges, and, if he gain his suit, may
in turn prosecute the examiners; but if the appellant is cast, his
punishment shall be doubled, unless he was previously condemned to death.

And what honours shall be paid to these examiners, whom the whole state
counts worthy of the rewards of virtue? They shall have the first place at
all sacrifices and other ceremonies, and in all assemblies and public
places; they shall go on sacred embassies, and have the exclusive
privilege of wearing a crown of laurel. They are priests of Apollo and the
Sun, and he of their number who is judged first shall be high priest, and
give his name to the year. The manner of their burial, too, shall be
different from that of the other citizens. The colour of their funeral
array shall be white, and, instead of the voice of lamentation, around the
bier shall stand a chorus of fifteen boys and fifteen maidens, chanting
hymns in honour of the deceased in alternate strains during an entire day;
and at dawn a band of a hundred youths shall carry the bier to the grave,
marching in the garb of warriors, and the boys in front of the bier shall
sing their national hymn, while the maidens and women past child-bearing
follow after. Priests and priestesses may also follow, unless the Pythian
oracle forbids. The sepulchre shall be a vault built underground, which
will last for ever, having couches of stone placed side by side; on one of
these they shall lay the departed saint, and then cover the tomb with a
mound, and plant trees on every side except one, where an opening shall be
left for other interments. Every year there shall be games--musical,
gymnastic, or equestrian, in honour of those who have passed every ordeal.
But if any of them, after having been acquitted on any occasion, begin to
show the wickedness of human nature, he who pleases may bring them to
trial before a court composed of the guardians of the law, and of the
select judges, and of any of the examiners who are alive. If he be
convicted he shall be deprived of his honours, and if the accuser do not
obtain a fifth part of the votes, he shall pay a fine according to his
class.

What is called the judgment of Rhadamanthus is suited to 'ages of faith,'
but not to our days. He knew that his contemporaries believed in the Gods,
for many of them were the sons of Gods; and he thought that the easiest
and surest method of ending litigation was to commit the decision to
Heaven. In our own day, men either deny the existence of Gods or their
care of men, or maintain that they may be bribed by attentions and gifts;
and the procedure of Rhadamanthus would therefore be out of date. When the
religious ideas of mankind change, their laws should also change. Thus
oaths should no longer be taken from plaintiff and defendant; simple
statements of affirmation and denial should be substituted. For there is
something dreadful in the thought, that nearly half the citizens of a
state are perjured men. There is no objection to an oath, where a man has
no interest in forswearing himself; as, for example, when a judge is about
to give his decision, or in voting at an election, or in the judgment of
games and contests. But where there would be a premium on perjury, oaths
and imprecations should be prohibited as irrelevant, like appeals to
feeling. Let the principles of justice be learned and taught without words
of evil omen. The oaths of a stranger against a stranger may be allowed,
because strangers are not permitted to become permanent residents in our
state.

Trials in private causes are to be decided in the same manner as lesser
offences against the state. The non-attendance at a chorus or sacrifice,
or the omission to pay a war-tax, may be regarded as in the first instance
remediable, and the defaulter may give security; but if he forfeits the
security, the goods pledged shall be sold and the money given to the
state. And for obstinate disobedience, the magistrate shall have the power
of inflicting greater penalties.

A city which is without trade or commerce must consider what it will do
about the going abroad of its own people and the admission of strangers.
For out of intercourse with strangers there arises great confusion of
manners, which in most states is not of any consequence, because the
confusion exists already; but in a well-ordered state it may be a great
evil. Yet the absolute prohibition of foreign travel, or the exclusion of
strangers, is impossible, and would appear barbarous to the rest of
mankind. Public opinion should never be lightly regarded, for the many are
not so far wrong in their judgments as in their lives. Even the worst of
men have often a divine instinct, which enables them to judge of the
differences between the good and bad. States are rightly advised when they
desire to have the praise of men; and the greatest and truest praise is
that of virtue. And our Cretan colony should, and probably will, have a
character for virtue, such as few cities have. Let this, then, be our law
about foreign travel and the reception of strangers:--No one shall be
allowed to leave the country who is under forty years of age--of course
military service abroad is not included in this regulation--and no one at
all except in a public capacity. To the Olympic, and Pythian, and Nemean,
and Isthmian games, shall be sent the fairest and best and bravest, who
shall support the dignity of the city in time of peace. These, when they
come home, shall teach the youth the inferiority of all other governments.
Besides those who go on sacred missions, other persons shall be sent out
by permission of the guardians to study the institutions of foreign
countries. For a people which has no experience, and no knowledge of the
characters of men or the reason of things, but lives by habit only, can
never be perfectly civilized. Moreover, in all states, bad as well as
good, there are holy and inspired men; these the citizen of a well-ordered
city should be ever seeking out; he should go forth to find them over sea
and over land, that he may more firmly establish institutions in his own
state which are good already and amend the bad. 'What will be the best way
of accomplishing such an object?' In the first place, let the visitor of
foreign countries be between fifty and sixty years of age, and let him be
a citizen of repute, especially in military matters. On his return he
shall appear before the Nocturnal Council: this is a body which sits from
dawn to sunrise, and includes amongst its members the priests who have
gained the prize of virtue, and the ten oldest guardians of the law, and
the director and past directors of education; each of whom has power to
bring with him a younger friend of his own selection, who is between
thirty and forty. The assembly thus constituted shall consider the laws of
their own and other states, and gather information relating to them.
Anything of the sort which is approved by the elder members of the council
shall be studied with all diligence by the younger; who are to be
specially watched by the rest of the citizens, and shall receive honour,
if they are deserving of honour, or dishonour, if they prove inferior.
This is the assembly to which the visitor of foreign countries shall come
and tell anything which he has heard from others in the course of his
travels, or which he has himself observed. If he be made neither better
nor worse, let him at least be praised for his zeal; and let him receive
still more praise, and special honour after death, if he be improved. But
if he be deteriorated by his travels, let him be prohibited from speaking
to any one; and if he submit, he may live as a private individual: but if
he be convicted of attempting to make innovations in education and the
laws, let him die.

Next, as to the reception of strangers. Of these there are four classes:--
First, merchants, who, like birds of passage, find their way over the sea
at a certain time of the year, that they may exhibit their wares. These
should be received in markets and public buildings without the city, by
proper officers, who shall see that justice is done them, and shall also
watch against any political designs which they may entertain; no more
intercourse is to be held with them than is absolutely necessary.
Secondly, there are the visitors at the festivals, who shall be
entertained by hospitable persons at the temples for a reasonable time;
the priests and ministers of the temples shall have a care of them. In
small suits brought by them or against them, the priests shall be the
judges; but in the more important, the wardens of the agora. Thirdly,
there are ambassadors of foreign states; these are to be honourably
received by the generals and commanders, and placed under the care of the
Prytanes and of the persons with whom they are lodged. Fourthly, there is
the philosophical stranger, who, like our own spectators, from time to
time goes to see what is rich and rare in foreign countries. Like them he
must be fifty years of age: and let him go unbidden to the doors of the
wise and rich, that he may learn from them, and they from him.

These are the rules of missions into foreign countries, and of the
reception of strangers. Let Zeus, the God of hospitality, be honoured; and
let not the stranger be excluded, as in Egypt, from meals and sacrifices,
or, (as at Sparta,) driven away by savage proclamations.

Let guarantees be clearly given in writing and before witnesses. The
number of witnesses shall be three when the sum lent is under a thousand
drachmas, or five when above. The agent and principal at a fraudulent sale
shall be equally liable. He who would search another man's house for
anything must swear that he expects to find it there; and he shall enter
naked, or having on a single garment and no girdle. The owner shall place
at the disposal of the searcher all his goods, sealed as well as unsealed;
if he refuse, he shall be liable in double the value of the property, if
it shall prove to be in his possession. If the owner be absent, the
searcher may counter-seal the property which is under seal, and place
watchers. If the owner remain absent more than five days, the searcher
shall take the magistrates, and open the sealed property, and seal it up
again in their presence. The recovery of goods disputed, except in the
case of lands and houses, (about which there can be no dispute in our
state), is to be barred by time. The public and unimpeached use of
anything for a year in the city, or for five years in the country, or the
private possession and domestic use for three years in the city, or for
ten years in the country, is to give a right of ownership. But if the
possessor have the property in a foreign country, there shall be no bar as
to time. The proceedings of any trial are to be void, in which either the
parties or the witnesses, whether bond or free, have been prevented by
violence from attending:--if a slave be prevented, the suit shall be
invalid; or if a freeman, he who is guilty of the violence shall be
imprisoned for a year, and shall also be liable to an action for
kidnapping. If one competitor forcibly prevents another from attending at
the games, the other may be inscribed as victor in the temples, and the
first, whether victor or not, shall be liable to an action for damages.
The receiver of stolen goods shall undergo the same punishment as the
thief. The receiver of an exile shall be punished with death. A man ought
to have the same friends and enemies as his country; and he who makes war
or peace for himself shall be put to death. And if a party in the state
make war or peace, their leaders shall be indicted by the generals, and,
if convicted, they shall be put to death. The ministers and officers of a
country ought not to receive gifts, even as the reward of good deeds. He
who disobeys shall die.

With a view to taxation a man should have his property and income valued:
and the government may, at their discretion, levy the tax upon the annual
return, or take a portion of the whole.

The good man will offer moderate gifts to the Gods; his land or hearth
cannot be offered, because they are already consecrated to all Gods. Gold
and silver, which arouse envy, and ivory, which is taken from the dead
body of an animal, are unsuitable offerings; iron and brass are materials
of war. Wood and stone of a single piece may be offered; also woven work
which has not occupied one woman more than a month in making. White is a
colour which is acceptable to the Gods; figures of birds and similar
offerings are the best of gifts, but they must be such as the painter can
execute in a day.

Next concerning lawsuits. Judges, or rather arbiters, may be agreed upon
by the plaintiff and defendant; and if no decision is obtained from them,
their fellow-tribesmen shall judge. At this stage there shall be an
increase of the penalty: the defendant, if he be cast, shall pay a fifth
more than the damages claimed. If he further persist, and appeal a second
time, the case shall be heard before the select judges; and he shall pay,
if defeated, the penalty and half as much again. And the pursuer, if on
the first appeal he is defeated, shall pay one fifth of the damages
claimed by him; and if on the second, one half. Other matters relating to
trials, such as the assignment of judges to courts, the times of sitting,
the number of judges, the modes of pleading and procedure, as we have
already said, may be determined by younger legislators.

These are to be the rules of private courts. As regards public courts,
many states have excellent modes of procedure which may serve for models;
these, when duly tested by experience, should be ratified and made
permanent by us.

Let the judge be accomplished in the laws. He should possess writings
about them, and make a study of them; for laws are the highest instrument
of mental improvement, and derive their name from mind (nous, nomos). They
afford a measure of all censure and praise, whether in verse or prose, in
conversation or in books, and are an antidote to the vain disputes of men
and their equally vain acquiescence in each other's opinions. The just
judge, who imbibes their spirit, makes the city and himself to stand
upright. He establishes justice for the good, and cures the tempers of the
bad, if they can be cured; but denounces death, which is the only remedy,
to the incurable, the threads of whose life cannot be reversed.

When the suits of the year are completed, execution is to follow. The
court is to award to the plaintiff the property of the defendant, if he is
cast, reserving to him only his lot of land. If the plaintiff is not
satisfied within a month, the court shall put into his hands the property
of the defendant. If the defendant fails in payment to the amount of a
drachma, he shall lose the use and protection of the court; or if he rebel
against the authority of the court, he shall be brought before the
guardians of the law, and if found guilty he shall be put to death.

Man having been born, educated, having begotten and brought up children,
and gone to law, fulfils the debt of nature. The rites which are to be
celebrated after death in honour of the Gods above and below shall be
determined by the Interpreters. The dead shall be buried in uncultivated
places, where they will be out of the way and do least injury to the
living. For no one either in life or after death has any right to deprive
other men of the sustenance which mother earth provides for them. No
sepulchral mound is to be piled higher than five men can raise it in five
days, and the grave-stone shall not be larger than is sufficient to
contain an inscription of four heroic verses. The dead are only to be
exposed for three days, which is long enough to test the reality of death.
The legislator will instruct the people that the body is a mere shadow or
image, and that the soul, which is our true being, is gone to give an
account of herself before the Gods below. When they hear this, the good
are full of hope, and the evil are terrified. It is also said that not
much can be done for any one after death. And therefore while in life all
man should be helped by their kindred to pass their days justly and
holily, that they may depart in peace. When a man loses a son or a
brother, he should consider that the beloved one has gone away to fulfil
his destiny in another place, and should not waste money over his lifeless
remains. Let the law then order a moderate funeral of five minae for the
first class, of three for the second, of two for the third, of one for the
fourth. One of the guardians of the law, to be selected by the relatives,
shall assist them in arranging the affairs of the deceased. There would be
a want of delicacy in prescribing that there should or should not be
mourning for the dead. But, at any rate, such mourning is to be confined
to the house; there must be no processions in the streets, and the dead
body shall be taken out of the city before daybreak. Regulations about
other forms of burial and about the non-burial of parricides and other
sacrilegious persons have already been laid down. The work of legislation
is therefore nearly completed; its end will be finally accomplished when
we have provided for the continuance of the state.

Do you remember the names of the Fates? Lachesis, the giver of the lots,
is the first of them; Clotho, the spinster, the second; Atropos, the
unchanging one, is the third and last, who makes the threads of the web
irreversible. And we too want to make our laws irreversible, for the
unchangeable quality in them will be the salvation of the state, and the
source of health and order in the bodies and souls of our citizens. 'But
can such a quality be implanted?' I think that it may; and at any rate we
must try; for, after all our labour, to have been piling up a fabric which
has no foundation would be too ridiculous. 'What foundation would you
lay?' We have already instituted an assembly which was composed of the ten
oldest guardians of the law, and secondly, of those who had received
prizes of virtue, and thirdly, of the travellers who had gone abroad to
enquire into the laws of other countries. Moreover, each of the members
was to choose a young man, of not less than thirty years of age, to be
approved by the rest; and they were to meet at dawn, when all the world is
at leisure. This assembly will be an anchor to the vessel of state, and
provide the means of permanence; for the constitutions of states, like all
other things, have their proper saviours, which are to them what the head
and soul are to the living being. 'How do you mean?' Mind in the soul, and
sight and hearing in the head, or rather, the perfect union of mind and
sense, may be justly called every man's salvation. 'Certainly.' Yes; but
of what nature is this union? In the case of a ship, for example, the
senses of the sailors are added to the intelligence of the pilot, and the
two together save the ship and the men in the ship. Again, the physician
and the general have their objects; and the object of the one is health,
of the other victory. States, too, have their objects, and the ruler must
understand, first, their nature, and secondly, the means of attaining
them, whether in laws or men. The state which is wanting in this knowledge
cannot be expected to be wise when the time for action arrives. Now what
class or institution is there in our state which has such a saving power?
'I suspect that you are referring to the Nocturnal Council.' Yes, to that
council which is to have all virtue, and which should aim directly at the
mark. 'Very true.' The inconsistency of legislation in most states is not
surprising, when the variety of their objects is considered. One of them
makes their rule of justice the government of a class; another aims at
wealth; another at freedom, or at freedom and power; and some who call
themselves philosophers maintain that you should seek for all of them at
once. But our object is unmistakeably virtue, and virtue is of four kinds.
'Yes; and we said that mind is the chief and ruler of the three other
kinds of virtue and of all else.' True, Cleinias; and now, having already
declared the object which is present to the mind of the pilot, the
general, the physician, we will interrogate the mind of the statesman.
Tell me, I say, as the physician and general have told us their object,
what is the object of the statesman. Can you tell me? 'We cannot.' Did we
not say that there are four virtues--courage, wisdom, and two others, all
of which are called by the common name of virtue, and are in a sense one?
'Certainly we did.' The difficulty is, not in understanding the
differences of the virtues, but in apprehending their unity. Why do we
call virtue, which is a single thing, by the two names of wisdom and
courage? The reason is that courage is concerned with fear, and is found
both in children and in brutes; for the soul may be courageous without
reason, but no soul was, or ever will be, wise without reason. 'That is
true.' I have explained to you the difference, and do you in return
explain to me the unity. But first let us consider whether any one who
knows the name of a thing without the definition has any real knowledge of
it. Is not such knowledge a disgrace to a man of sense, especially where
great and glorious truths are concerned? and can any subject be more
worthy of the attention of our legislators than the four virtues of which
we are speaking--courage, temperance, justice, wisdom? Ought not the
magistrates and officers of the state to instruct the citizens in the
nature of virtue and vice, instead of leaving them to be taught by some
chance poet or sophist? A city which is without instruction suffers the
usual fate of cities in our day. What then shall we do? How shall we
perfect the ideas of our guardians about virtue? how shall we give our
state a head and eyes? 'Yes, but how do you apply the figure?' The city
will be the body or trunk; the best of our young men will mount into the
head or acropolis and be our eyes; they will look about them, and inform
the elders, who are the mind and use the younger men as their instruments:
together they will save the state. Shall this be our constitution, or
shall all be educated alike, and the special training be given up? 'That
is impossible.' Let us then endeavour to attain to some more exact idea of
education. Did we not say that the true artist or guardian ought to have
an eye, not only to the many, but to the one, and to order all things with
a view to the one? Can there be any more philosophical speculation than
how to reduce many things which are unlike to one idea? 'Perhaps not.' Say
rather, 'Certainly not.' And the rulers of our divine state ought to have
an exact knowledge of the common principle in courage, temperance,
justice, wisdom, which is called by the name of virtue; and unless we know
whether virtue is one or many, we shall hardly know what virtue is. Shall
we contrive some means of engrafting this knowledge on our state, or give
the matter up? 'Anything rather than that.' Let us begin by making an
agreement. 'By all means, if we can.' Well, are we not agreed that our
guardians ought to know, not only how the good and the honourable are
many, but also how they are one? 'Yes, certainly.' The true guardian of
the laws ought to know their truth, and should also be able to interpret
and execute them? 'He should.' And is there any higher knowledge than the
knowledge of the existence and power of the Gods? The people may be
excused for following tradition; but the guardian must be able to give a
reason of the faith which is in him. And there are two great evidences of
religion--the priority of the soul and the order of the heavens. For no
man of sense, when he contemplates the universe, will be likely to
substitute necessity for reason and will. Those who maintain that the sun
and the stars are inanimate beings are utterly wrong in their opinions.
The men of a former generation had a suspicion, which has been confirmed
by later thinkers, that things inanimate could never without mind have
attained such scientific accuracy; and some (Anaxagoras) even in those
days ventured to assert that mind had ordered all things in heaven; but
they had no idea of the priority of mind, and they turned the world, or
more properly themselves, upside down, and filled the universe with
stones, and earth, and other inanimate bodies. This led to great impiety,
and the poets said many foolish things against the philosophers, whom they
compared to 'yelping she-dogs,' besides making other abusive remarks. No
man can now truly worship the Gods who does not believe that the soul is
eternal, and prior to the body, and the ruler of all bodies, and does not
perceive also that there is mind in the stars; or who has not heard the
connexion of these things with music, and has not harmonized them with
manners and laws, giving a reason of things which are matters of reason.
He who is unable to acquire this knowledge, as well as the ordinary
virtues of a citizen, can only be a servant, and not a ruler in the state.

Let us then add another law to the effect that the Nocturnal Council shall
be a guard set for the salvation of the state. 'Very good.' To establish
this will be our aim, and I hope that others besides myself will assist.
'Let us proceed along the road in which God seems to guide us.' We cannot,
Megillus and Cleinias, anticipate the details which will hereafter be
needed; they must be supplied by experience. 'What do you mean?' First of
all a register will have to be made of all those whose age, character, or
education would qualify them to be guardians. The subjects which they are
to learn, and the order in which they are to be learnt, are mysteries
which cannot be explained beforehand, but not mysteries in any other
sense. 'If that is the case, what is to be done?' We must stake our all on
a lucky throw, and I will share the risk by stating my views on education.
And I would have you, Cleinias, who are the founder of the Magnesian
state, and will obtain the greatest glory if you succeed, and will at
least be praised for your courage, if you fail, take especial heed of this
matter. If we can only establish the Nocturnal Council, we will hand over
the city to its keeping; none of the present company will hesitate about
that. Our dream will then become a reality; and our citizens, if they are
carefully chosen and well educated, will be saviours and guardians such as
the world hitherto has never seen.

The want of completeness in the Laws becomes more apparent in the later
books. There is less arrangement in them, and the transitions are more
abrupt from one subject to another. Yet they contain several noble
passages, such as the 'prelude to the discourse concerning the honour and
dishonour of parents,' or the picture of the dangers attending the
'friendly intercourse of young men and maidens with one another,' or the
soothing remonstrance which is addressed to the dying man respecting his
right to do what he will with his own, or the fine description of the
burial of the dead. The subject of religion in Book X is introduced as a
prelude to offences against the Gods, and this portion of the work appears
to be executed in Plato's best manner.

In the last four books, several questions occur for consideration: among
them are (I) the detection and punishment of offences; (II) the nature of
the voluntary and involuntary; (III) the arguments against atheism, and
against the opinion that the Gods have no care of human affairs; (IV) the
remarks upon retail trade; (V) the institution of the Nocturnal Council.

I. A weak point in the Laws of Plato is the amount of inquisition into
private life which is to be made by the rulers. The magistrate is always
watching and waylaying the citizens. He is constantly to receive
information against improprieties of life. Plato does not seem to be aware
that espionage can only have a negative effect. He has not yet discovered
the boundary line which parts the domain of law from that of morality or
social life. Men will not tell of one another; nor will he ever be the
most honoured citizen, who gives the most frequent information about
offenders to the magistrates.

As in some writers of fiction, so also in philosophers, we may observe the
effect of age. Plato becomes more conservative as he grows older, and he
would govern the world entirely by men like himself, who are above fifty
years of age; for in them he hopes to find a principle of stability. He
does not remark that, in destroying the freedom he is destroying also the
life of the State. In reducing all the citizens to rule and measure, he
would have been depriving the Magnesian colony of those great men 'whose
acquaintance is beyond all price;' and he would have found that in the
worst-governed Hellenic State, there was more of a carriere ouverte for
extraordinary genius and virtue than in his own.

Plato has an evident dislike of the Athenian dicasteries; he prefers a few
judges who take a leading part in the conduct of trials to a great number
who only listen in silence. He allows of two appeals--in each case however
with an increase of the penalty. Modern jurists would disapprove of the
redress of injustice being purchased only at an increasing risk; though
indirectly the burden of legal expenses, which seems to have been little
felt among the Athenians, has a similar effect. The love of litigation,
which is a remnant of barbarism quite as much as a corruption of
civilization, and was innate in the Athenian people, is diminished in the
new state by the imposition of severe penalties. If persevered in, it is
to be punished with death.

In the Laws murder and homicide besides being crimes, are also pollutions.
Regarded from this point of view, the estimate of such offences is apt to
depend on accidental circumstances, such as the shedding of blood, and not
on the real guilt of the offender or the injury done to society. They are
measured by the horror which they arouse in a barbarous age. For there is
a superstition in law as well as in religion, and the feelings of a
primitive age have a traditional hold on the mass of the people. On the
other hand, Plato is innocent of the barbarity which would visit the sins
of the fathers upon the children, and he is quite aware that punishment
has an eye to the future, and not to the past. Compared with that of most
European nations in the last century his penal code, though sometimes
capricious, is reasonable and humane.

A defect in Plato's criminal jurisprudence is his remission of the
punishment when the homicide has obtained the forgiveness of the murdered
person; as if crime were a personal affair between individuals, and not an
offence against the State. There is a ridiculous disproportion in his
punishments. Because a slave may fairly receive a blow for stealing one
fig or one bunch of grapes, or a tradesman for selling adulterated goods
to the value of one drachma, it is rather hard upon the slave that he
should receive as many blows as he has taken grapes or figs, or upon the
tradesman who has sold adulterated goods to the value of a thousand
drachmas that he should receive a thousand blows.

II. But before punishment can be inflicted at all, the legislator must
determine the nature of the voluntary and involuntary. The great question
of the freedom of the will, which in modern times has been worn threadbare
with purely abstract discussion, was approached both by Plato and
Aristotle--first, from the judicial; secondly, from the sophistical point
of view. They were puzzled by the degrees and kinds of crime; they
observed also that the law only punished hurts which are inflicted by a
voluntary agent on an involuntary patient.

In attempting to distinguish between hurt and injury, Plato says that mere
hurt is not injury; but that a benefit when done in a wrong spirit may
sometimes injure, e.g. when conferred without regard to right and wrong,
or to the good or evil consequences which may follow. He means to say that
the good or evil disposition of the agent is the principle which
characterizes actions; and this is not sufficiently described by the terms
voluntary and involuntary. You may hurt another involuntarily, and no one
would suppose that you had injured him; and you may hurt him voluntarily,
as in inflicting punishment--neither is this injury; but if you hurt him
from motives of avarice, ambition, or cowardly fear, this is injury.
Injustice is also described as the victory of desire or passion or self-
conceit over reason, as justice is the subordination of them to reason. In
some paradoxical sense Plato is disposed to affirm all injustice to be
involuntary; because no man would do injustice who knew that it never paid
and could calculate the consequences of what he was doing. Yet, on the
other hand, he admits that the distinction of voluntary and involuntary,
taken in another and more obvious sense, is the basis of legislation. His
conception of justice and injustice is complicated (1) by the want of a
distinction between justice and virtue, that is to say, between the
quality which primarily regards others, and the quality in which self and
others are equally regarded; (2) by the confusion of doing and suffering
justice; (3) by the unwillingness to renounce the old Socratic paradox,
that evil is involuntary.

III. The Laws rest on a religious foundation; in this respect they bear
the stamp of primitive legislation. They do not escape the almost
inevitable consequence of making irreligion penal. If laws are based upon
religion, the greatest offence against them must be irreligion. Hence the
necessity for what in modern language, and according to a distinction
which Plato would scarcely have understood, might be termed persecution.
But the spirit of persecution in Plato, unlike that of modern religious
bodies, arises out of the desire to enforce a true and simple form of
religion, and is directed against the superstitions which tend to degrade
mankind. Sir Thomas More, in his Utopia, is in favour of tolerating all
except the intolerant, though he would not promote to high offices those
who disbelieved in the immortality of the soul. Plato has not advanced
quite so far as this in the path of toleration. But in judging of his
enlightenment, we must remember that the evils of necromancy and
divination were far greater than those of intolerance in the ancient
world. Human nature is always having recourse to the first; but only when
organized into some form of priesthood falls into the other; although in
primitive as in later ages the institution of a priesthood may claim
probably to be an advance on some form of religion which preceded. The
Laws would have rested on a sounder foundation, if Plato had ever
distinctly realized to his mind the difference between crime and sin or
vice. Of this, as of many other controversies, a clear definition might
have been the end. But such a definition belongs to a later age of
philosophy.

The arguments which Plato uses for the being of a God, have an extremely
modern character: first, the consensus gentium; secondly, the argument
which has already been adduced in the Phaedrus, of the priority of the
self-moved. The answer to those who say that God 'cares not,' is, that He
governs by general laws; and that he who takes care of the great will
assuredly take care of the small. Plato did not feel, and has not
attempted to consider, the difficulty of reconciling the special with the
general providence of God. Yet he is on the road to a solution, when he
regards the world as a whole, of which all the parts work together towards
the final end.

We are surprised to find that the scepticism, which we attribute to young
men in our own day, existed then (compare Republic); that the Epicureanism
expressed in the line of Horace (borrowed from Lucretius)--

'Namque Deos didici securum agere aevum,'

was already prevalent in the age of Plato; and that the terrors of another
world were freely used in order to gain advantages over other men in this.
The same objection which struck the Psalmist--'when I saw the prosperity
of the wicked'--is supposed to lie at the root of the better sort of
unbelief. And the answer is substantially the same which the modern
theologian would offer:--that the ways of God in this world cannot be
justified unless there be a future state of rewards and punishments. Yet
this future state of rewards and punishments is in Plato's view not any
addition of happiness or suffering imposed from without, but the
permanence of good and evil in the soul: here he is in advance of many
modern theologians. The Greek, too, had his difficulty about the existence
of evil, which in one solitary passage, remarkable for being inconsistent
with his general system, Plato explains, after the Magian fashion, by a
good and evil spirit (compare Theaet., Statesman). This passage is also
remarkable for being at variance with the general optimism of the Tenth
Book--not 'all things are ordered by God for the best,' but some things by
a good, others by an evil spirit.

The Tenth Book of the Laws presents a picture of the state of belief among
the Greeks singularly like that of the world in which we live. Plato is
disposed to attribute the incredulity of his own age to several causes.
First, to the bad effect of mythological tales, of which he retains his
disapproval; but he has a weak side for antiquity, and is unwilling, as in
the Republic, wholly to proscribe them. Secondly, he remarks the self-
conceit of a newly-fledged generation of philosophers, who declare that
the sun, moon, and stars, are earth and stones only; and who also maintain
that the Gods are made by the laws of the state. Thirdly, he notes a
confusion in the minds of men arising out of their misinterpretation of
the appearances of the world around them: they do not always see the
righteous rewarded and the wicked punished. So in modern times there are
some whose infidelity has arisen from doubts about the inspiration of
ancient writings; others who have been made unbelievers by physical
science, or again by the seemingly political character of religion; while
there is a third class to whose minds the difficulty of 'justifying the
ways of God to man' has been the chief stumblingblock. Plato is very much
out of temper at the impiety of some of his contemporaries; yet he is
determined to reason with the victims, as he regards them, of these
illusions before he punishes them. His answer to the unbelievers is
twofold: first, that the soul is prior to the body; secondly, that the
ruler of the universe being perfect has made all things with a view to
their perfection. The difficulties arising out of ancient sacred writings
were far less serious in the age of Plato than in our own.

We too have our popular Epicureanism, which would allow the world to go on
as if there were no God. When the belief in Him, whether of ancient or
modern times, begins to fade away, men relegate Him, either in theory or
practice, into a distant heaven. They do not like expressly to deny God
when it is more convenient to forget Him; and so the theory of the
Epicurean becomes the practice of mankind in general. Nor can we be said
to be free from that which Plato justly considers to be the worst unbelief
--of those who put superstition in the place of true religion. For the
larger half of Christians continue to assert that the justice of God may
be turned aside by gifts, and, if not by the 'odour of fat, and the
sacrifice steaming to heaven,' still by another kind of sacrifice placed
upon the altar--by masses for the quick and dead, by dispensations, by
building churches, by rites and ceremonies--by the same means which the
heathen used, taking other names and shapes. And the indifference of
Epicureanism and unbelief is in two ways the parent of superstition,
partly because it permits, and also because it creates, a necessity for
its development in religious and enthusiastic temperaments. If men cannot
have a rational belief, they will have an irrational. And hence the most
superstitious countries are also at a certain point of civilization the
most unbelieving, and the revolution which takes one direction is quickly
followed by a reaction in the other. So we may read 'between the lines'
ancient history and philosophy into modern, and modern into ancient.
Whether we compare the theory of Greek philosophy with the Christian
religion, or the practice of the Gentile world with the practice of the
Christian world, they will be found to differ more in words and less in
reality than we might have supposed. The greater opposition which is
sometimes made between them seems to arise chiefly out of a comparison of
the ideal of the one with the practice of the other.

To the errors of superstition and unbelief Plato opposes the simple and
natural truth of religion; the best and highest, whether conceived in the
form of a person or a principle--as the divine mind or as the idea of good
--is believed by him to be the basis of human life. That all things are
working together for good to the good and evil to the evil in this or in
some other world to which human actions are transferred, is the sum of his
faith or theology. Unlike Socrates, he is absolutely free from
superstition. Religion and morality are one and indivisible to him. He
dislikes the 'heathen mythology,' which, as he significantly remarks, was
not tolerated in Crete, and perhaps (for the meaning of his words is not
quite clear) at Sparta. He gives no encouragement to individual
enthusiasm; 'the establishment of religion could only be the work of a
mighty intellect.' Like the Hebrews, he prohibits private rites; for the
avoidance of superstition, he would transfer all worship of the Gods to
the public temples. He would not have men and women consecrating the
accidents of their lives. He trusts to human punishments and not to divine
judgments; though he is not unwilling to repeat the old tradition that
certain kinds of dishonesty 'prevent a man from having a family.' He
considers that the 'ages of faith' have passed away and cannot now be
recalled. Yet he is far from wishing to extirpate the sentiment of
religion, which he sees to be common to all mankind--Barbarians as well as
Hellenes. He remarks that no one passes through life without, sooner or
later, experiencing its power. To which we may add the further remark that
the greater the irreligion, the more violent has often been the religious
reaction.

It is remarkable that Plato's account of mind at the end of the Laws goes
beyond Anaxagoras, and beyond himself in any of his previous writings.
Aristotle, in a well-known passage (Met.) which is an echo of the Phaedo,
remarks on the inconsistency of Anaxagoras in introducing the agency of
mind, and yet having recourse to other and inferior, probably material
causes. But Plato makes the further criticism, that the error of
Anaxagoras consisted, not in denying the universal agency of mind, but in
denying the priority, or, as we should say, the eternity of it. Yet in the
Timaeus he had himself allowed that God made the world out of pre-existing
materials: in the Statesman he says that there were seeds of evil in the
world arising out of the remains of a former chaos which could not be got
rid of; and even in the Tenth Book of the Laws he has admitted that there
are two souls, a good and evil. In the Meno, the Phaedrus, and the Phaedo,
he had spoken of the recovery of ideas from a former state of existence.
But now he has attained to a clearer point of view: he has discarded these
fancies. From meditating on the priority of the human soul to the body, he
has learnt the nature of soul absolutely. The power of the best, of which
he gave an intimation in the Phaedo and in the Republic, now, as in the
Philebus, takes the form of an intelligence or person. He no longer, like
Anaxagoras, supposes mind to be introduced at a certain time into the
world and to give order to a pre-existing chaos, but to be prior to the
chaos, everlasting and evermoving, and the source of order and
intelligence in all things. This appears to be the last form of Plato's
religious philosophy, which might almost be summed up in the words of
Kant, 'the starry heaven above and the moral law within.' Or rather,
perhaps, 'the starry heaven above and mind prior to the world.'

IV. The remarks about retail trade, about adulteration, and about
mendicity, have a very modern character. Greek social life was more like
our own than we are apt to suppose. There was the same division of ranks,
the same aristocratic and democratic feeling, and, even in a democracy,
the same preference for land and for agricultural pursuits. Plato may be
claimed as the first free trader, when he prohibits the imposition of
customs on imports and exports, though he was clearly not aware of the
importance of the principle which he enunciated. The discredit of retail
trade he attributes to the rogueries of traders, and is inclined to
believe that if a nobleman would keep a shop, which heaven forbid! retail
trade might become honourable. He has hardly lighted upon the true reason,
which appears to be the essential distinction between buyers and sellers,
the one class being necessarily in some degree dependent on the other.
When he proposes to fix prices 'which would allow a moderate gain,' and to
regulate trade in several minute particulars, we must remember that this
is by no means so absurd in a city consisting of 5040 citizens, in which
almost every one would know and become known to everybody else, as in our
own vast population. Among ourselves we are very far from allowing every
man to charge what he pleases. Of many things the prices are fixed by law.
Do we not often hear of wages being adjusted in proportion to the profits
of employers? The objection to regulating them by law and thus avoiding
the conflicts which continually arise between the buyers and sellers of
labour, is not so much the undesirableness as the impossibility of doing
so. Wherever free competition is not reconcileable either with the order
of society, or, as in the case of adulteration, with common honesty, the
government may lawfully interfere. The only question is,--Whether the
interference will be effectual, and whether the evil of interference may
not be greater than the evil which is prevented by it.

He would prohibit beggars, because in a well-ordered state no good man
would be left to starve. This again is a prohibition which might have been
easily enforced, for there is no difficulty in maintaining the poor when
the population is small. In our own times the difficulty of pauperism is
rendered far greater, (1) by the enormous numbers, (2) by the facility of
locomotion, (3) by the increasing tenderness for human life and suffering.
And the only way of meeting the difficulty seems to be by modern nations
subdividing themselves into small bodies having local knowledge and acting
together in the spirit of ancient communities (compare Arist. Pol.)

V. Regarded as the framework of a polity the Laws are deemed by Plato to
be a decline from the Republic, which is the dream of his earlier years.
He nowhere imagines that he has reached a higher point of speculation. He
is only descending to the level of human things, and he often returns to
his original idea. For the guardians of the Republic, who were the elder
citizens, and were all supposed to be philosophers, is now substituted a
special body, who are to review and amend the laws, preserving the spirit
of the legislator. These are the Nocturnal Council, who, although they are
not specially trained in dialectic, are not wholly destitute of it; for
they must know the relation of particular virtues to the general principle
of virtue. Plato has been arguing throughout the Laws that temperance is
higher than courage, peace than war, that the love of both must enter into
the character of the good citizen. And at the end the same thought is
summed up by him in an abstract form. The true artist or guardian must be
able to reduce the many to the one, than which, as he says with an
enthusiasm worthy of the Phaedrus or Philebus, 'no more philosophical
method was ever devised by the wit of man.' But the sense of unity in
difference can only be acquired by study; and Plato does not explain to us
the nature of this study, which we may reasonably infer, though there is a
remarkable omission of the word, to be akin to the dialectic of the
Republic.

The Nocturnal Council is to consist of the priests who have obtained the
rewards of virtue, of the ten eldest guardians of the law, and of the
director and ex-directors of education; each of whom is to select for
approval a younger coadjutor. To this council the 'Spectator,' who is sent
to visit foreign countries, has to make his report. It is not an
administrative body, but an assembly of sages who are to make legislation
their study. Plato is not altogether disinclined to changes in the law
where experience shows them to be necessary; but he is also anxious that
the original spirit of the constitution should never be lost sight of.

The Laws of Plato contain the latest phase of his philosophy, showing in
many respects an advance, and in others a decline, in his views of life
and the world. His Theory of Ideas in the next generation passed into one
of Numbers, the nature of which we gather chiefly from the Metaphysics of
Aristotle. Of the speculative side of this theory there are no traces in
the Laws, but doubtless Plato found the practical value which he
attributed to arithmetic greatly confirmed by the possibility of applying
number and measure to the revolution of the heavens, and to the regulation
of human life. In the return to a doctrine of numbers there is a
retrogression rather than an advance; for the most barren logical
abstraction is of a higher nature than number and figure. Philosophy fades
away into the distance; in the Laws it is confined to the members of the
Nocturnal Council. The speculative truth which was the food of the
guardians in the Republic, is for the majority of the citizens to be
superseded by practical virtues. The law, which is the expression of mind
written down, takes the place of the living word of the philosopher.
(Compare the contrast of Phaedrus, and Laws; also the plays on the words
nous, nomos, nou dianome; and the discussion in the Statesman of the
difference between the personal rule of a king and the impersonal reign of
law.) The State is based on virtue and religion rather than on knowledge;
and virtue is no longer identified with knowledge, being of the commoner
sort, and spoken of in the sense generally understood. Yet there are many
traces of advance as well as retrogression in the Laws of Plato. The
attempt to reconcile the ideal with actual life is an advance; to 'have
brought philosophy down from heaven to earth,' is a praise which may be
claimed for him as well as for his master Socrates. And the members of the
Nocturnal Council are to continue students of the 'one in many' and of the
nature of God. Education is the last word with which Plato supposes the
theory of the Laws to end and the reality to begin.

Plato's increasing appreciation of the difficulties of human affairs, and
of the element of chance which so largely influences them, is an
indication not of a narrower, but of a maturer mind, which had become more
conversant with realities. Nor can we fairly attribute any want of
originality to him, because he has borrowed many of his provisions from
Sparta and Athens. Laws and institutions grow out of habits and customs;
and they have 'better opinion, better confirmation,' if they have come
down from antiquity and are not mere literary inventions. Plato would have
been the first to acknowledge that the Book of Laws was not the creation
of his fancy, but a collection of enactments which had been devised by
inspired legislators, like Minos, Lycurgus, and Solon, to meet the actual
needs of men, and had been approved by time and experience.

In order to do justice therefore to the design of the work, it is
necessary to examine how far it rests on an historical foundation and
coincides with the actual laws of Sparta and Athens. The consideration of
the historical aspect of the Laws has been reserved for this place. In
working out the comparison the writer has been greatly assisted by the
excellent essays of C.F. Hermann ('De vestigiis institutorum veterum,
imprimis Atticorum, per Platonis de Legibus libros indagandis,' and 'Juris
domestici et familiaris apud Platonem in Legibus cum veteris Graeciae
inque primis Athenarum institutis comparatio': Marburg, 1836), and by J.B.
Telfy's 'Corpus Juris Attici' (Leipzig, 1868).

EXCURSUS ON THE RELATION OF THE LAWS OF PLATO TO THE INSTITUTIONS OF CRETE
AND LACEDAEMON AND TO THE LAWS AND CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS.

The Laws of Plato are essentially Greek: unlike Xenophon's Cyropaedia,
they contain nothing foreign or oriental. Their aim is to reconstruct the
work of the great lawgivers of Hellas in a literary form. They partake
both of an Athenian and a Spartan character. Some of them too are derived
from Crete, and are appropriately transferred to a Cretan colony. But of
Crete so little is known to us, that although, as Montesquieu (Esprit des
Lois) remarks, 'the Laws of Crete are the original of those of Sparta and
the Laws of Plato the correction of these latter,' there is only one
point, viz. the common meals, in which they can be compared. Most of
Plato's provisions resemble the laws and customs which prevailed in these
three states (especially in the two former), and which the personifying
instinct of the Greeks attributed to Minos, Lycurgus, and Solon. A very
few particulars may have been borrowed from Zaleucus (Cic. de Legibus),
and Charondas, who is said to have first made laws against perjury (Arist.
Pol.) and to have forbidden credit (Stob. Florileg., Gaisford). Some
enactments are Plato's own, and were suggested by his experience of
defects in the Athenian and other Greek states. The Laws also contain many
lesser provisions, which are not found in the ordinary codes of nations,
because they cannot be properly defined, and are therefore better left to
custom and common sense. 'The greater part of the work,' as Aristotle
remarks (Pol.), 'is taken up with laws': yet this is not wholly true, and
applies to the latter rather than to the first half of it. The book rests
on an ethical and religious foundation: the actual laws begin with a hymn
of praise in honour of the soul. And the same lofty aspiration after the
good is perpetually recurring, especially in Books X, XI, XII, and
whenever Plato's mind is filled with his highest themes. In prefixing to
most of his laws a prooemium he has two ends in view, to persuade and also
to threaten. They are to have the sanction of laws and the effect of
sermons. And Plato's 'Book of Laws,' if described in the language of
modern philosophy, may be said to be as much an ethical and educational,
as a political or legal treatise.

But although the Laws partake both of an Athenian and a Spartan character,
the elements which are borrowed from either state are necessarily very
different, because the character and origin of the two governments
themselves differed so widely. Sparta was the more ancient and primitive:
Athens was suited to the wants of a later stage of society. The relation
of the two states to the Laws may be conceived in this manner:--The
foundation and ground-plan of the work are more Spartan, while the
superstructure and details are more Athenian. At Athens the laws were
written down and were voluminous; more than a thousand fragments of them
have been collected by Telfy. Like the Roman or English law, they
contained innumerable particulars. Those of them which regulated daily
life were familiarly known to the Athenians; for every citizen was his own
lawyer, and also a judge, who decided the rights of his fellow-citizens
according to the laws, often after hearing speeches from the parties
interested or from their advocates. It is to Rome and not to Athens that
the invention of law, in the modern sense of the term, is commonly
ascribed. But it must be remembered that long before the times of the
Twelve Tables (B.C. 451), regular courts and forms of law had existed at
Athens and probably in the Greek colonies. And we may reasonably suppose,
though without any express proof of the fact, that many Roman institutions
and customs, like Latin literature and mythology, were partly derived from
Hellas and had imperceptibly drifted from one shore of the Ionian Sea to
the other (compare especially the constitutions of Servius Tullius and of
Solon).

It is not proved that the laws of Sparta were in ancient times either
written down in books or engraved on tablets of marble or brass. Nor is it
certain that, if they had been, the Spartans could have read them. They
were ancient customs, some of them older probably than the settlement in
Laconia, of which the origin is unknown; they occasionally received the
sanction of the Delphic oracle, but there was a still stronger obligation
by which they were enforced,--the necessity of self-defence: the Spartans
were always living in the presence of their enemies. They belonged to an
age when written law had not yet taken the place of custom and tradition.
The old constitution was very rarely affected by new enactments, and these
only related to the duties of the Kings or Ephors, or the new relations of
classes which arose as time went on. Hence there was as great a difference
as could well be conceived between the Laws of Athens and Sparta: the one
was the creation of a civilized state, and did not differ in principle
from our modern legislation, the other of an age in which the people were
held together and also kept down by force of arms, and which afterwards
retained many traces of its barbaric origin 'surviving in culture.'

Nevertheless the Lacedaemonian was the ideal of a primitive Greek state.
According to Thucydides it was the first which emerged out of confusion
and became a regular government. It was also an army devoted to military
exercises, but organized with a view to self-defence and not to conquest.
It was not quick to move or easily excited; but stolid, cautious,
unambitious, procrastinating. For many centuries it retained the same
character which was impressed upon it by the hand of the legislator. This
singular fabric was partly the result of circumstances, partly the
invention of some unknown individual in prehistoric times, whose ideal of
education was military discipline, and who, by the ascendency of his
genius, made a small tribe into a nation which became famous in the
world's history. The other Hellenes wondered at the strength and stability
of his work. The rest of Hellas, says Thucydides, undertook the
colonisation of Heraclea the more readily, having a feeling of security
now that they saw the Lacedaemonians taking part in it. The Spartan state
appears to us in the dawn of history as a vision of armed men,
irresistible by any other power then existing in the world. It can hardly
be said to have understood at all the rights or duties of nations to one
another, or indeed to have had any moral principle except patriotism and
obedience to commanders. Men were so trained to act together that they
lost the freedom and spontaneity of human life in cultivating the
qualities of the soldier and ruler. The Spartan state was a composite body
in which kings, nobles, citizens, perioeci, artisans, slaves, had to find
a 'modus vivendi' with one another. All of them were taught some use of
arms. The strength of the family tie was diminished among them by an
enforced absence from home and by common meals. Sparta had no life or
growth; no poetry or tradition of the past; no art, no thought. The
Athenians started on their great career some centuries later, but the
Spartans would have been easily conquered by them, if Athens had not been
deficient in the qualities which constituted the strength (and also the
weakness) of her rival.

The ideal of Athens has been pictured for all time in the speech which
Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles, called the Funeral Oration. He
contrasts the activity and freedom and pleasantness of Athenian life with
the immobility and severe looks and incessant drill of the Spartans. The
citizens of no city were more versatile, or more readily changed from land
to sea or more quickly moved about from place to place. They 'took their
pleasures' merrily, and yet, when the time for fighting arrived, were not
a whit behind the Spartans, who were like men living in a camp, and,
though always keeping guard, were often too late for the fray. Any
foreigner might visit Athens; her ships found a way to the most distant
shores; the riches of the whole earth poured in upon her. Her citizens had
their theatres and festivals; they 'provided their souls with many
relaxations'; yet they were not less manly than the Spartans or less
willing to sacrifice this enjoyable existence for their country's good.
The Athenian was a nobler form of life than that of their rivals, a life
of music as well as of gymnastic, the life of a citizen as well as of a
soldier. Such is the picture which Thucydides has drawn of the Athenians
in their glory. It is the spirit of this life which Plato would infuse
into the Magnesian state and which he seeks to combine with the common
meals and gymnastic discipline of Sparta.

The two great types of Athens and Sparta had deeply entered into his mind.
He had heard of Sparta at a distance and from common Hellenic fame: he was
a citizen of Athens and an Athenian of noble birth. He must often have sat
in the law-courts, and may have had personal experience of the duties of
offices such as he is establishing. There is no need to ask the question,
whence he derived his knowledge of the Laws of Athens: they were a part of
his daily life. Many of his enactments are recognized to be Athenian laws
from the fragments preserved in the Orators and elsewhere: many more would
be found to be so if we had better information. Probably also still more
of them would have been incorporated in the Magnesian code, if the work
had ever been finally completed. But it seems to have come down to us in a
form which is partly finished and partly unfinished, having a beginning
and end, but wanting arrangement in the middle. The Laws answer to Plato's
own description of them, in the comparison which he makes of himself and
his two friends to gatherers of stones or the beginners of some composite
work, 'who are providing materials and partly putting them together:--
having some of their laws, like stones, already fixed in their places,
while others lie about.'

Plato's own life coincided with the period at which Athens rose to her
greatest heights and sank to her lowest depths. It was impossible that he
should regard the blessings of democracy in the same light as the men of a
former generation, whose view was not intercepted by the evil shadow of
the taking of Athens, and who had only the glories of Marathon and Salamis
and the administration of Pericles to look back upon. On the other hand
the fame and prestige of Sparta, which had outlived so many crimes and
blunders, was not altogether lost at the end of the life of Plato. Hers
was the only great Hellenic government which preserved something of its
ancient form; and although the Spartan citizens were reduced to almost
one-tenth of their original number (Arist. Pol.), she still retained,
until the rise of Thebes and Macedon, a certain authority and predominance
due to her final success in the struggle with Athens and to the victories
which Agesilaus won in Asia Minor.

Plato, like Aristotle, had in his mind some form of a mean state which
should escape the evils and secure the advantages of both aristocracy and
democracy. It may however be doubted whether the creation of such a state
is not beyond the legislator's art, although there have been examples in
history of forms of government, which through some community of interest
or of origin, through a balance of parties in the state itself, or through
the fear of a common enemy, have for a while preserved such a character of
moderation. But in general there arises a time in the history of a state
when the struggle between the few and the many has to be fought out. No
system of checks and balances, such as Plato has devised in the Laws,
could have given equipoise and stability to an ancient state, any more
than the skill of the legislator could have withstood the tide of
democracy in England or France during the last hundred years, or have
given life to China or India.

The basis of the Magnesian constitution is the equal division of land. In
the new state, as in the Republic, there was to be neither poverty nor
riches. Every citizen under all circumstances retained his lot, and as
much money as was necessary for the cultivation of it, and no one was
allowed to accumulate property to the amount of more than five times the
value of the lot, inclusive of it. The equal division of land was a
Spartan institution, not known to have existed elsewhere in Hellas. The
mention of it in the Laws of Plato affords considerable presumption that
it was of ancient origin, and not first introduced, as Mr. Grote and
others have imagined, in the reformation of Cleomenes III. But at Sparta,
if we may judge from the frequent complaints of the accumulation of
property in the hands of a few persons (Arist. Pol.), no provision could
have been made for the maintenance of the lot. Plutarch indeed speaks of a
law introduced by the Ephor Epitadeus soon after the Peloponnesian War,
which first allowed the Spartans to sell their land (Agis): but from the
manner in which Aristotle refers to the subject, we should imagine this
evil in the state to be of a much older standing. Like some other
countries in which small proprietors have been numerous, the original
equality passed into inequality, and, instead of a large middle class,
there was probably at Sparta greater disproportion in the property of the
citizens than in any other state of Hellas. Plato was aware of the danger,
and has improved on the Spartan custom. The land, as at Sparta, must have
been tilled by slaves, since other occupations were found for the
citizens. Bodies of young men between the ages of twenty-five and thirty
were engaged in making biennial peregrinations of the country. They and
their officers are to be the magistrates, police, engineers, aediles, of
the twelve districts into which the colony was divided. Their way of life
may be compared with that of the Spartan secret police or Crypteia, a name
which Plato freely applies to them without apparently any consciousness of
the odium which has attached to the word in history.

Another great institution which Plato borrowed from Sparta (or Crete) is
the Syssitia or common meals. These were established in both states, and
in some respects were considered by Aristotle to be better managed in
Crete than at Lacedaemon (Pol.). In the Laws the Cretan custom appears to
be adopted (This is not proved, as Hermann supposes ('De Vestigiis,'
etc.)): that is to say, if we may interpret Plato by Aristotle, the cost
of them was defrayed by the state and not by the individuals (Arist. Pol);
so that the members of the mess, who could not pay their quota, still
retained their rights of citizenship. But this explanation is hardly
consistent with the Laws, where contributions to the Syssitia from private
estates are expressly mentioned. Plato goes further than the legislators
of Sparta and Crete, and would extend the common meals to women as well as
men: he desires to curb the disorders, which existed among the female sex
in both states, by the application to women of the same military
discipline to which the men were already subject. It was an extension of
the custom of Syssitia from which the ancient legislators shrank, and
which Plato himself believed to be very difficult of enforcement.

Like Sparta, the new colony was not to be surrounded by walls,--a state
should learn to depend upon the bravery of its citizens only--a fallacy or
paradox, if it is not to be regarded as a poetical fancy, which is fairly
enough ridiculed by Aristotle (Pol.). Women, too, must be ready to assist
in the defence of their country: they are not to rush to the temples and
altars, but to arm themselves with shield and spear. In the regulation of
the Syssitia, in at least one of his enactments respecting property, and
in the attempt to correct the licence of women, Plato shows, that while he
borrowed from the institutions of Sparta and favoured the Spartan mode of
life, he also sought to improve upon them.

The enmity to the sea is another Spartan feature which is transferred by
Plato to the Magnesian state. He did not reflect that a non-maritime power
would always be at the mercy of one which had a command of the great
highway. Their many island homes, the vast extent of coast which had to be
protected by them, their struggles first of all with the Phoenicians and
Carthaginians, and secondly with the Persian fleets, forced the Greeks,
mostly against their will, to devote themselves to the sea. The islanders
before the inhabitants of the continent, the maritime cities before the
inland, the Corinthians and Athenians before the Spartans, were compelled
to fit out ships: last of all the Spartans, by the pressure of the
Peloponnesian War, were driven to establish a naval force, which, after
the battle of Aegospotami, for more than a generation commanded the
Aegean. Plato, like the Spartans, had a prejudice against a navy, because
he regarded it as the nursery of democracy. But he either never
considered, or did not care to explain, how a city, set upon an island and
'distant not more than ten miles from the sea, having a seaboard provided
with excellent harbours,' could have safely subsisted without one.

Neither the Spartans nor the Magnesian colonists were permitted to engage
in trade or commerce. In order to limit their dealings as far as possible
to their own country, they had a separate coinage; the Magnesians were
only allowed to use the common currency of Hellas when they travelled
abroad, which they were forbidden to do unless they received permission
from the government. Like the Spartans, Plato was afraid of the evils
which might be introduced into his state by intercourse with foreigners;
but he also shrinks from the utter exclusiveness of Sparta, and is not
unwilling to allow visitors of a suitable age and rank to come from other
states to his own, as he also allows citizens of his own state to go to
foreign countries and bring back a report of them. Such international
communication seemed to him both honourable and useful.

We may now notice some points in which the commonwealth of the Laws
approximates to the Athenian model. These are much more numerous than the
previous class of resemblances; we are better able to compare the laws of
Plato with those of Athens, because a good deal more is known to us of
Athens than of Sparta.

The information which we possess about Athenian law, though comparatively
fuller, is still fragmentary. The sources from which our knowledge is
derived are chiefly the following:--

(1) The Orators,--Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates, Demosthenes,
Aeschines, Lycurgus, and others.

(2) Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, as well as later
writers, such as Cicero de Legibus, Plutarch, Aelian, Pausanias.

(3) Lexicographers, such as Harpocration, Pollux, Hesychius, Suidas, and
the compiler of the Etymologicum Magnum, many of whom are of uncertain
date, and to a great extent based upon one another. Their writings extend
altogether over more than eight hundred years, from the second to the
tenth century.

(4) The Scholia on Aristophanes, Plato, Demosthenes.

(5) A few inscriptions.

Our knowledge of a subject derived from such various sources and for the
most part of uncertain date and origin, is necessarily precarious. No
critic can separate the actual laws of Solon from those which passed under
his name in later ages. Nor do the Scholiasts and Lexicographers attempt
to distinguish how many of these laws were still in force at the time when
they wrote, or when they fell into disuse and were to be found in books
only. Nor can we hastily assume that enactments which occur in the Laws of
Plato were also a part of Athenian law, however probable this may appear.

There are two classes of similarities between Plato's Laws and those of
Athens: (i) of institutions (ii) of minor enactments.

(i) The constitution of the Laws in its general character resembles much
more nearly the Athenian constitution of Solon's time than that which
succeeded it, or the extreme democracy which prevailed in Plato's own day.
It was a mean state which he hoped to create, equally unlike a Syracusan
tyranny or the mob-government of the Athenian assembly. There are various
expedients by which he sought to impart to it the quality of moderation.
(1) The whole people were to be educated: they could not be all trained in
philosophy, but they were to acquire the simple elements of music,
arithmetic, geometry, astronomy; they were also to be subject to military
discipline, archontes kai archomenoi. (2) The majority of them were, or
had been at some time in their lives, magistrates, and had the experience
which is given by office. (3) The persons who held the highest offices
were to have a further education, not much inferior to that provided for
the guardians in the Republic, though the range of their studies is
narrowed to the nature and divisions of virtue: here their philosophy
comes to an end. (4) The entire number of the citizens (5040) rarely, if
ever, assembled, except for purposes of elections. The whole people were
divided into four classes, each having the right to be represented by the
same number of members in the Council. The result of such an arrangement
would be, as in the constitution of Servius Tullius, to give a
disproportionate share of power to the wealthier classes, who may be
supposed to be always much fewer in number than the poorer. This tendency
was qualified by the complicated system of selection by vote, previous to
the final election by lot, of which the object seems to be to hand over to
the wealthy few the power of selecting from the many poor, and vice versa.
(5) The most important body in the state was the Nocturnal Council, which
is borrowed from the Areopagus at Athens, as it existed, or was supposed
to have existed, in the days before Ephialtes and the Eumenides of
Aeschylus, when its power was undiminished. In some particulars Plato
appears to have copied exactly the customs and procedure of the Areopagus:
both assemblies sat at night (Telfy). There was a resemblance also in more
important matters. Like the Areopagus, the Nocturnal Council was partly
composed of magistrates and other state officials, whose term of office
had expired. (7) The constitution included several diverse and even
opposing elements, such as the Assembly and the Nocturnal Council. (8)
There was much less exclusiveness than at Sparta; the citizens were to
have an interest in the government of neighbouring states, and to know
what was going on in the rest of the world.--All these were moderating
influences.

A striking similarity between Athens and the constitution of the Magnesian
colony is the use of the lot in the election of judges and other
magistrates. That such a mode of election should have been resorted to in
any civilized state, or that it should have been transferred by Plato to
an ideal or imaginary one, is very singular to us. The most extreme
democracy of modern times has never thought of leaving government wholly
to chance. It was natural that Socrates should scoff at it, and ask, 'Who
would choose a pilot or carpenter or flute-player by lot' (Xen. Mem.)? Yet
there were many considerations which made this mode of choice attractive
both to the oligarch and to the democrat:--(1) It seemed to recognize that
one man was as good as another, and that all the members of the governing
body, whether few or many, were on a perfect equality in every sense of
the word. (2) To the pious mind it appeared to be a choice made, not by
man, but by heaven (compare Laws). (3) It afforded a protection against
corruption and intrigue...It must also be remembered that, although
elected by lot, the persons so elected were subject to a scrutiny before
they entered on their office, and were therefore liable, after election,
if disqualified, to be rejected (Laws). They were, moreover, liable to be
called to account after the expiration of their office. In the election of
councillors Plato introduces a further check: they are not to be chosen
directly by lot from all the citizens, but from a select body previously
elected by vote. In Plato's state at least, as we may infer from his
silence on this point, judges and magistrates performed their duties
without pay, which was a guarantee both of their disinterestedness and of
their belonging probably to the higher class of citizens (compare Arist.
Pol.). Hence we are not surprised that the use of the lot prevailed, not
only in the election of the Athenian Council, but also in many
oligarchies, and even in Plato's colony. The evil consequences of the lot
are to a great extent avoided, if the magistrates so elected do not, like
the dicasts at Athens, receive pay from the state.

Another parallel is that of the Popular Assembly, which at Athens was
omnipotent, but in the Laws has only a faded and secondary existence. In
Plato it was chiefly an elective body, having apparently no judicial and
little political power entrusted to it. At Athens it was the mainspring of
the democracy; it had the decision of war or peace, of life and death; the
acts of generals or statesmen were authorized or condemned by it; no
office or person was above its control. Plato was far from allowing such a
despotic power to exist in his model community, and therefore he minimizes
the importance of the Assembly and narrows its functions. He probably
never asked himself a question, which naturally occurs to the modern
reader, where was to be the central authority in this new community, and
by what supreme power would the differences of inferior powers be decided.
At the same time he magnifies and brings into prominence the Nocturnal
Council (which is in many respects a reflection of the Areopagus), but
does not make it the governing body of the state.

Between the judicial system of the Laws and that of Athens there was very
great similarity, and a difference almost equally great. Plato not
unfrequently adopts the details when he rejects the principle. At Athens
any citizen might be a judge and member of the great court of the Heliaea.
This was ordinarily subdivided into a number of inferior courts, but an
occasion is recorded on which the whole body, in number six thousand, met
in a single court (Andoc. de Myst.). Plato significantly remarks that a
few judges, if they are good, are better than a great number. He also, at
least in capital cases, confines the plaintiff and defendant to a single
speech each, instead of allowing two apiece, as was the common practice at
Athens. On the other hand, in all private suits he gives two appeals, from
the arbiters to the courts of the tribes, and from the courts of the
tribes to the final or supreme court. There was nothing answering to this
at Athens. The three courts were appointed in the following manner:--the
arbiters were to be agreed upon by the parties to the cause; the judges of
the tribes to be elected by lot; the highest tribunal to be chosen at the
end of each year by the great officers of state out of their own number--
they were to serve for a year, to undergo a scrutiny, and, unlike the
Athenian judges, to vote openly. Plato does not dwell upon methods of
procedure: these are the lesser matters which he leaves to the younger
legislators. In cases of murder and some other capital offences, the cause
was to be tried by a special tribunal, as was the custom at Athens:
military offences, too, as at Athens, were decided by the soldiers. Public
causes in the Laws, as sometimes at Athens, were voted upon by the whole
people: because, as Plato remarks, they are all equally concerned in them.
They were to be previously investigated by three of the principal
magistrates. He believes also that in private suits all should take part;
'for he who has no share in the administration of justice is apt to
imagine that he has no share in the state at all.' The wardens of the
country, like the Forty at Athens, also exercised judicial power in small
matters, as well as the wardens of the agora and city. The department of
justice is better organized in Plato than in an ordinary Greek state,
proceeding more by regular methods, and being more restricted to distinct
duties.

The executive of Plato's Laws, like the Athenian, was different from that
of a modern civilized state. The difference chiefly consists in this, that
whereas among ourselves there are certain persons or classes of persons
set apart for the execution of the duties of government, in ancient
Greece, as in all other communities in the earlier stages of their
development, they were not equally distinguished from the rest of the
citizens. The machinery of government was never so well organized as in
the best modern states. The judicial department was not so completely
separated from the legislative, nor the executive from the judicial, nor
the people at large from the professional soldier, lawyer, or priest. To
Aristotle (Pol.) it was a question requiring serious consideration--Who
should execute a sentence? There was probably no body of police to whom
were entrusted the lives and properties of the citizens in any Hellenic
state. Hence it might be reasonably expected that every man should be the
watchman of every other, and in turn be watched by him. The ancients do
not seem to have remembered the homely adage that, 'What is every man's
business is no man's business,' or always to have thought of applying the
principle of a division of labour to the administration of law and to
government. Every Athenian was at some time or on some occasion in his
life a magistrate, judge, advocate, soldier, sailor, policeman. He had not
necessarily any private business; a good deal of his time was taken up
with the duties of office and other public occupations. So, too, in
Plato's Laws. A citizen was to interfere in a quarrel, if older than the
combatants, or to defend the outraged party, if his junior. He was
especially bound to come to the rescue of a parent who was ill-treated by
his children. He was also required to prosecute the murderer of a kinsman.
In certain cases he was allowed to arrest an offender. He might even use
violence to an abusive person. Any citizen who was not less than thirty
years of age at times exercised a magisterial authority, to be enforced
even by blows. Both in the Magnesian state and at Athens many thousand
persons must have shared in the highest duties of government, if a section
only of the Council, consisting of thirty or of fifty persons, as in the
Laws, or at Athens after the days of Cleisthenes, held office for a month,
or for thirty-five days only. It was almost as if, in our own country, the
Ministry or the Houses of Parliament were to change every month. The
average ability of the Athenian and Magnesian councillors could not have
been very high, considering there were so many of them. And yet they were
entrusted with the performance of the most important executive duties. In
these respects the constitution of the Laws resembles Athens far more than
Sparta. All the citizens were to be, not merely soldiers, but politicians
and administrators.

(ii) There are numerous minor particulars in which the Laws of Plato
resemble those of Athens. These are less interesting than the preceding,
but they show even more strikingly how closely in the composition of his
work Plato has followed the laws and customs of his own country.

(1) Evidence. (a) At Athens a child was not allowed to give evidence
(Telfy). Plato has a similar law: 'A child shall be allowed to give
evidence only in cases of murder.' (b) At Athens an unwilling witness
might be summoned; but he was not required to appear if he was ready to
declare on oath that he knew nothing about the matter in question (Telfy).
So in the Laws. (c) Athenian law enacted that when more than half the
witnesses in a case had been convicted of perjury, there was to be a new
trial (anadikos krisis--Telfy). There is a similar provision in the Laws.
(d) False-witness was punished at Athens by atimia and a fine (Telfy).
Plato is at once more lenient and more severe: 'If a man be twice
convicted of false-witness, he shall not be required, and if thrice, he
shall not be allowed to bear witness; and if he dare to witness after he
has been convicted three times,...he shall be punished with death.'

(2) Murder. (a) Wilful murder was punished in Athenian law by death,
perpetual exile, and confiscation of property (Telfy). Plato, too, has the
alternative of death or exile, but he does not confiscate the murderer's
property. (b) The Parricide was not allowed to escape by going into exile
at Athens (Telfy), nor, apparently, in the Laws. (c) A homicide, if
forgiven by his victim before death, received no punishment, either at
Athens (Telfy), or in the Magnesian state. In both (Telfy) the contriver
of a murder is punished as severely as the doer; and persons accused of
the crime are forbidden to enter temples or the agora until they have been
tried (Telfy). (d) At Athens slaves who killed their masters and were
caught red-handed, were not to be put to death by the relations of the
murdered man, but to be handed over to the magistrates (Telfy). So in the
Laws, the slave who is guilty of wilful murder has a public execution: but
if the murder is committed in anger, it is punished by the kinsmen of the
victim.

(3) Involuntary homicide. (a) The guilty person, according to the Athenian
law, had to go into exile, and might not return, until the family of the
man slain were conciliated. Then he must be purified (Telfy). If he is
caught before he has obtained forgiveness, he may be put to death. These
enactments reappear in the Laws. (b) The curious provision of Plato, that
a stranger who has been banished for involuntary homicide and is
subsequently wrecked upon the coast, must 'take up his abode on the sea-
shore, wetting his feet in the sea, and watching for an opportunity of
sailing,' recalls the procedure of the Judicium Phreatteum at Athens,
according to which an involuntary homicide, who, having gone into exile,
is accused of a wilful murder, was tried at Phreatto for this offence in a
boat by magistrates on the shore. (c) A still more singular law, occurring
both in the Athenian and Magnesian code, enacts that a stone or other
inanimate object which kills a man is to be tried, and cast over the
border (Telfy).

(4) Justifiable or excusable homicide. Plato and Athenian law agree in
making homicide justifiable or excusable in the following cases:--(1) at
the games (Telfy); (2) in war (Telfy); (3) if the person slain was found
doing violence to a free woman (Telfy); (4) if a doctor's patient dies;
(5) in the case of a robber (Telfy); (6) in self-defence (Telfy).

(5) Impiety. Death or expulsion was the Athenian penalty for impiety
(Telfy). In the Laws it is punished in various cases by imprisonment for
five years, for life, and by death.

(6) Sacrilege. Robbery of temples at Athens was punished by death, refusal
of burial in the land, and confiscation of property (Telfy). In the Laws
the citizen who is guilty of such a crime is to 'perish ingloriously and
be cast beyond the borders of the land,' but his property is not
confiscated.

(7) Sorcery. The sorcerer at Athens was to be executed (Telfy): compare
Laws, where it is enacted that the physician who poisons and the
professional sorcerer shall be punished with death.

(8) Treason. Both at Athens and in the Laws the penalty for treason was
death (Telfy), and refusal of burial in the country (Telfy).

(9) Sheltering exiles. 'If a man receives an exile, he shall be punished
with death.' So, too, in Athenian law (Telfy.).

(10) Wounding. Athenian law compelled a man who had wounded another to go
into exile; if he returned, he was to be put to death (Telfy). Plato only
punishes the offence with death when children wound their parents or one
another, or a slave wounds his master.

(11) Bribery. Death was the punishment for taking a bribe, both at Athens
(Telfy) and in the Laws; but Athenian law offered an alternative--the
payment of a fine of ten times the amount of the bribe.

(12) Theft. Plato, like Athenian law (Telfy), punishes the theft of public
property by death; the theft of private property in both involves a fine
of double the value of the stolen goods (Telfy).

(13) Suicide. He 'who slays him who of all men, as they say, is his own
best friend,' is regarded in the same spirit by Plato and by Athenian law.
Plato would have him 'buried ingloriously on the borders of the twelve
portions of the land, in such places as are uncultivated and nameless,'
and 'no column or inscription is to mark the place of his interment.'
Athenian law enacted that the hand which did the deed should be separated
from the body and be buried apart (Telfy).

(14) Injury. In cases of wilful injury, Athenian law compelled the guilty
person to pay double the damage; in cases of involuntary injury, simple
damages (Telfy). Plato enacts that if a man wounds another in passion, and
the wound is curable, he shall pay double the damage, if incurable or
disfiguring, fourfold damages. If, however, the wounding is accidental, he
shall simply pay for the harm done.

(15) Treatment of parents. Athenian law allowed any one to indict another
for neglect or illtreatment of parents (Telfy). So Plato bids bystanders
assist a father who is assaulted by his son, and allows any one to give
information against children who neglect their parents.

(16) Execution of sentences. Both Plato and Athenian law give to the
winner of a suit power to seize the goods of the loser, if he does not pay
within the appointed time (Telfy). At Athens the penalty was also doubled
(Telfy); not so in Plato. Plato however punishes contempt of court by
death, which at Athens seems only to have been visited with a further fine
(Telfy).

(17) Property. (a) Both at Athens and in the Laws a man who has disputed
property in his possession must give the name of the person from whom he
received it (Telfy); and any one searching for lost property must enter a
house naked (Telfy), or, as Plato says, 'naked, or wearing only a short
tunic and without a girdle. (b) Athenian law, as well as Plato, did not
allow a father to disinherit his son without good reason and the consent
of impartial persons (Telfy). Neither grants to the eldest son any special
claim on the paternal estate (Telfy). In the law of inheritance both
prefer males to females (Telfy). (c) Plato and Athenian law enacted that a
tree should be planted at a fair distance from a neighbour's property
(Telfy), and that when a man could not get water, his neighbour must
supply him (Telfy). Both at Athens and in Plato there is a law about bees,
the former providing that a beehive must be set up at not less a distance
than 300 feet from a neighbour's (Telfy), and the latter forbidding the
decoying of bees.

(18) Orphans. A ward must proceed against a guardian whom he suspects of
fraud within five years of the expiration of the guardianship. This
provision is common to Plato and to Athenian law (Telfy). Further, the
latter enacted that the nearest male relation should marry or provide a
husband for an heiress (Telfy),--a point in which Plato follows it
closely.

(19) Contracts. Plato's law that 'when a man makes an agreement which he
does not fulfil, unless the agreement be of a nature which the law or a
vote of the assembly does not allow, or which he has made under the
influence of some unjust compulsion, or which he is prevented from
fulfilling against his will by some unexpected chance,--the other party
may go to law with him,' according to Pollux (quoted in Telfy's note)
prevailed also at Athens.

(20) Trade regulations. (a) Lying was forbidden in the agora both by Plato
and at Athens (Telfy). (b) Athenian law allowed an action of recovery
against a man who sold an unsound slave as sound (Telfy). Plato's
enactment is more explicit: he allows only an unskilled person (i.e. one
who is not a trainer or physician) to take proceedings in such a case. (c)
Plato diverges from Athenian practice in the disapproval of credit, and
does not even allow the supply of goods on the deposit of a percentage of
their value (Telfy). He enacts that 'when goods are exchanged by buying
and selling, a man shall deliver them and receive the price of them at a
fixed place in the agora, and have done with the matter,' and that 'he who
gives credit must be satisfied whether he obtain his money or not, for in
such exchanges he will not be protected by law. (d) Athenian law forbad an
extortionate rate of interest (Telfy); Plato allows interest in one case
only--if a contractor does not receive the price of his work within a year
of the time agreed--and at the rate of 200 per cent. per annum for every
drachma a monthly interest of an obol. (e) Both at Athens and in the Laws
sales were to be registered (Telfy), as well as births (Telfy).

(21) Sumptuary laws. Extravagance at weddings (Telfy), and at funerals
(Telfy) was forbidden at Athens and also in the Magnesian state.

There remains the subject of family life, which in Plato's Laws partakes
both of an Athenian and Spartan character. Under this head may
conveniently be included the condition of women and of slaves. To family
life may be added citizenship.

As at Sparta, marriages are to be contracted for the good of the state;
and they may be dissolved on the same ground, where there is a failure of
issue,--the interest of the state requiring that every one of the 5040
lots should have an heir. Divorces are likewise permitted by Plato where
there is an incompatibility of temper, as at Athens by mutual consent. The
duty of having children is also enforced by a still higher motive,
expressed by Plato in the noble words:--'A man should cling to
immortality, and leave behind him children's children to be the servants
of God in his place.' Again, as at Athens, the father is allowed to put
away his undutiful son, but only with the consent of impartial persons
(Telfy), and the only suit which may be brought by a son against a father
is for imbecility. The class of elder and younger men and women are still
to regard one another, as in the Republic, as standing in the relation of
parents and children. This is a trait of Spartan character rather than of
Athenian. A peculiar sanctity and tenderness was to be shown towards the
aged; the parent or grandparent stricken with years was to be loved and
worshipped like the image of a God, and was to be deemed far more able
than any lifeless statue to bring good or ill to his descendants. Great
care is to be taken of orphans: they are entrusted to the fifteen eldest
Guardians of the Law, who are to be 'lawgivers and fathers to them not
inferior to their natural fathers,' as at Athens they were entrusted to
the Archons. Plato wishes to make the misfortune of orphanhood as little
sad to them as possible.

Plato, seeing the disorder into which half the human race had fallen at
Athens and Sparta, is minded to frame for them a new rule of life. He
renounces his fanciful theory of communism, but still desires to place
women as far as possible on an equality with men. They were to be trained
in the use of arms, they are to live in public. Their time was partly
taken up with gymnastic exercises; there could have been little family or
private life among them. Their lot was to be neither like that of Spartan
women, who were made hard and common by excessive practice of gymnastic
and the want of all other education,--nor yet like that of Athenian women,
who, at least among the upper classes, retired into a sort of oriental
seclusion,--but something better than either. They were to be the perfect
mothers of perfect children, yet not wholly taken up with the duties of
motherhood, which were to be made easy to them as far as possible (compare
Republic), but able to share in the perils of war and to be the companions
of their husbands. Here, more than anywhere else, the spirit of the Laws
reverts to the Republic. In speaking of them as the companions of their
husbands we must remember that it is an Athenian and not a Spartan way of
life which they are invited to share, a life of gaiety and brightness, not
of austerity and abstinence, which often by a reaction degenerated into
licence and grossness.

In Plato's age the subject of slavery greatly interested the minds of
thoughtful men; and how best to manage this 'troublesome piece of goods'
exercised his own mind a good deal. He admits that they have often been
found better than brethren or sons in the hour of danger, and are capable
of rendering important public services by informing against offenders--for
this they are to be rewarded; and the master who puts a slave to death for
the sake of concealing some crime which he has committed, is held guilty
of murder. But they are not always treated with equal consideration. The
punishments inflicted on them bear no proportion to their crimes. They are
to be addressed only in the language of command. Their masters are not to
jest with them, lest they should increase the hardship of their lot. Some
privileges were granted to them by Athenian law of which there is no
mention in Plato; they were allowed to purchase their freedom from their
master, and if they despaired of being liberated by him they could demand
to be sold, on the chance of falling into better hands. But there is no
suggestion in the Laws that a slave who tried to escape should be branded
with the words--kateche me, pheugo, or that evidence should be extracted
from him by torture, that the whole household was to be executed if the
master was murdered and the perpetrator remained undetected: all these
were provisions of Athenian law. Plato is more consistent than either the
Athenians or the Spartans; for at Sparta too the Helots were treated in a
manner almost unintelligible to us. On the one hand, they had arms put
into their hands, and served in the army, not only, as at Plataea, in
attendance on their masters, but, after they had been manumitted, as a
separate body of troops called Neodamodes: on the other hand, they were
the victims of one of the greatest crimes recorded in Greek history
(Thucyd.). The two great philosophers of Hellas sought to extricate
themselves from this cruel condition of human life, but acquiesced in the
necessity of it. A noble and pathetic sentiment of Plato, suggested by the
thought of their misery, may be quoted in this place:--'The right
treatment of slaves is to behave properly to them, and to do to them, if
possible, even more justice than to those who are our equals; for he who
naturally and genuinely reverences justice, and hates injustice, is
discovered in his dealings with any class of men to whom he can easily be
unjust. And he who in regard to the natures and actions of his slaves is
undefiled by impiety and injustice, will best sow the seeds of virtue in
them; and this may be truly said of every master, and tyrant, and of every
other having authority in relation to his inferiors.'

All the citizens of the Magnesian state were free and equal; there was no
distinction of rank among them, such as is believed to have prevailed at
Sparta. Their number was a fixed one, corresponding to the 5040 lots. One
of the results of this is the requirement that younger sons or those who
have been disinherited shall go out to a colony. At Athens, where there
was not the same religious feeling against increasing the size of the
city, the number of citizens must have been liable to considerable
fluctuations. Several classes of persons, who were not citizens by birth,
were admitted to the privilege. Perpetual exiles from other countries,
people who settled there to practise a trade (Telfy), any one who had
shown distinguished valour in the cause of Athens, the Plataeans who
escaped from the siege, metics and strangers who offered to serve in the
army, the slaves who fought at Arginusae,--all these could or did become
citizens. Even those who were only on one side of Athenian parentage were
at more than one period accounted citizens. But at times there seems to
have arisen a feeling against this promiscuous extension of the citizen
body, an expression of which is to be found in the law of Pericles--monous
Athenaious einai tous ek duoin Athenaion gegonotas (Plutarch, Pericles);
and at no time did the adopted citizen enjoy the full rights of
citizenship--e.g. he might not be elected archon or to the office of
priest (Telfy), although this prohibition did not extend to his children,
if born of a citizen wife. Plato never thinks of making the metic, much
less the slave, a citizen. His treatment of the former class is at once
more gentle and more severe than that which prevailed at Athens. He
imposes upon them no tax but good behaviour, whereas at Athens they were
required to pay twelve drachmae per annum, and to have a patron: on the
other hand, he only allows them to reside in the Magnesian state on
condition of following a trade; they were required to depart when their
property exceeded that of the third class, and in any case after a
residence of twenty years, unless they could show that they had conferred
some great benefit on the state. This privileged position reflects that of
the isoteleis at Athens, who were excused from the metoikion. It is
Plato's greatest concession to the metic, as the bestowal of freedom is
his greatest concession to the slave.

Lastly, there is a more general point of view under which the Laws of
Plato may be considered,--the principles of Jurisprudence which are
contained in them. These are not formally announced, but are scattered up
and down, to be observed by the reflective reader for himself. Some of
them are only the common principles which all courts of justice have
gathered from experience; others are peculiar and characteristic. That
judges should sit at fixed times and hear causes in a regular order, that
evidence should be laid before them, that false witnesses should be
disallowed, and corruption punished, that defendants should be heard
before they are convicted,--these are the rules, not only of the Hellenic
courts, but of courts of law in all ages and countries. But there are also
points which are peculiar, and in which ancient jurisprudence differs
considerably from modern; some of them are of great importance...It could
not be said at Athens, nor was it ever contemplated by Plato, that all
men, including metics and slaves, should be equal 'in the eye of the law.'
There was some law for the slave, but not much; no adequate protection was
given him against the cruelty of his master...It was a singular privilege
granted, both by the Athenian and Magnesian law, to a murdered man, that
he might, before he died, pardon his murderer, in which case no legal
steps were afterwards to be taken against him. This law is the remnant of
an age in which the punishment of offences against the person was the
concern rather of the individual and his kinsmen than of the
state...Plato's division of crimes into voluntary and involuntary and
those done from passion, only partially agrees with the distinction which
modern law has drawn between murder and manslaughter; his attempt to
analyze them is confused by the Socratic paradox, that 'All vice is
involuntary'...It is singular that both in the Laws and at Athens theft is
commonly punished by a twofold restitution of the article stolen. The
distinction between civil and criminal courts or suits was not yet
recognized...Possession gives a right of property after a certain
time...The religious aspect under which certain offences were regarded
greatly interfered with a just and natural estimate of their guilt...As
among ourselves, the intent to murder was distinguished by Plato from
actual murder...We note that both in Plato and the laws of Athens, libel
in the market-place and personality in the theatre were forbidden...Both
in Plato and Athenian law, as in modern times, the accomplice of a crime
is to be punished as well as the principal...Plato does not allow a
witness in a cause to act as a judge of it...Oaths are not to be taken by
the parties to a suit...Both at Athens and in Plato's Laws capital
punishment for murder was not to be inflicted, if the offender was willing
to go into exile...Respect for the dead, duty towards parents, are to be
enforced by the law as well as by public opinion...Plato proclaims the
noble sentiment that the object of all punishment is the improvement of
the offender... Finally, he repeats twice over, as with the voice of a
prophet, that the crimes of the fathers are not to be visited upon the
children. In this respect he is nobly distinguished from the Oriental, and
indeed from the spirit of Athenian law (compare Telfy,--dei kai autous kai
tous ek touton atimous einai), as the Hebrew in the age of Ezekial is from
the Jewish people of former ages.

Of all Plato's provisions the object is to bring the practice of the law
more into harmony with reason and philosophy; to secure impartiality, and
while acknowledging that every citizen has a right to share in the
administration of justice, to counteract the tendency of the courts to
become mere popular assemblies.

...

Thus we have arrived at the end of the writings of Plato, and at the last
stage of philosophy which was really his. For in what followed, which we
chiefly gather from the uncertain intimations of Aristotle, the spirit of
the master no longer survived. The doctrine of Ideas passed into one of
numbers; instead of advancing from the abstract to the concrete, the
theories of Plato were taken out of their context, and either asserted or
refuted with a provoking literalism; the Socratic or Platonic element in
his teaching was absorbed into the Pythagorean or Megarian. His poetry was
converted into mysticism; his unsubstantial visions were assailed secundum
artem by the rules of logic. His political speculations lost their
interest when the freedom of Hellas had passed away. Of all his writings
the Laws were the furthest removed from the traditions of the Platonic
school in the next generation. Both his political and his metaphysical
philosophy are for the most part misinterpreted by Aristotle. The best of
him--his love of truth, and his 'contemplation of all time and all
existence,' was soonest lost; and some of his greatest thoughts have slept
in the ear of mankind almost ever since they were first uttered.

We have followed him during his forty or fifty years of authorship, from
the beginning when he first attempted to depict the teaching of Socrates
in a dramatic form, down to the time at which the character of Socrates
had disappeared, and we have the latest reflections of Plato's own mind
upon Hellas and upon philosophy. He, who was 'the last of the poets,' in
his book of Laws writes prose only; he has himself partly fallen under the
rhetorical influences which in his earlier dialogues he was combating. The
progress of his writings is also the history of his life; we have no other
authentic life of him. They are the true self of the philosopher, stripped
of the accidents of time and place. The great effort which he makes is,
first, to realize abstractions, secondly, to connect them. In the attempt
to realize them, he was carried into a transcendental region in which he
isolated them from experience, and we pass out of the range of science
into poetry or fiction. The fancies of mythology for a time cast a veil
over the gulf which divides phenomena from onta (Meno, Phaedrus,
Symposium, Phaedo). In his return to earth Plato meets with a difficulty
which has long ceased to be a difficulty to us. He cannot understand how
these obstinate, unmanageable ideas, residing alone in their heaven of
abstraction, can be either combined with one another, or adapted to
phenomena (Parmenides, Philebus, Sophist). That which is the most familiar
process of our own minds, to him appeared to be the crowning achievement
of the dialectical art. The difficulty which in his own generation
threatened to be the destruction of philosophy, he has rendered unmeaning
and ridiculous. For by his conquests in the world of mind our thoughts are
widened, and he has furnished us with new dialectical instruments which
are of greater compass and power. We have endeavoured to see him as he
truly was, a great original genius struggling with unequal conditions of
knowledge, not prepared with a system nor evolving in a series of
dialogues ideas which he had long conceived, but contradictory, enquiring
as he goes along, following the argument, first from one point of view and
then from another, and therefore arriving at opposite conclusions,
hovering around the light, and sometimes dazzled with excess of light, but
always moving in the same element of ideal truth. We have seen him also in
his decline, when the wings of his imagination have begun to droop, but
his experience of life remains, and he turns away from the contemplation
of the eternal to take a last sad look at human affairs.

...

And so having brought into the world 'noble children' (Phaedr.), he rests
from the labours of authorship. More than two thousand two hundred years
have passed away since he returned to the place of Apollo and the Muses.
Yet the echo of his words continues to be heard among men, because of all
philosophers he has the most melodious voice. He is the inspired prophet
or teacher who can never die, the only one in whom the outward form
adequately represents the fair soul within; in whom the thoughts of all
who went before him are reflected and of all who come after him are partly
anticipated. Other teachers of philosophy are dried up and withered,--
after a few centuries they have become dust; but he is fresh and blooming,
and is always begetting new ideas in the minds of men. They are one-sided
and abstract; but he has many sides of wisdom. Nor is he always consistent
with himself, because he is always moving onward, and knows that there are
many more things in philosophy than can be expressed in words, and that
truth is greater than consistency. He who approaches him in the most
reverent spirit shall reap most of the fruit of his wisdom; he who reads
him by the light of ancient commentators will have the least understanding
of him.

We may see him with the eye of the mind in the groves of the Academy, or
on the banks of the Ilissus, or in the streets of Athens, alone or walking
with Socrates, full of those thoughts which have since become the common
possession of mankind. Or we may compare him to a statue hid away in some
temple of Zeus or Apollo, no longer existing on earth, a statue which has
a look as of the God himself. Or we may once more imagine him following in
another state of being the great company of heaven which he beheld of old
in a vision (Phaedr.). So, 'partly trifling, but with a certain degree of
seriousness' (Symp.), we linger around the memory of a world which has
passed away (Phaedr.).

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